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My first trip to Amsterdam was for a couple of days in the autumn of 2003. 
A second-year student at the University of Georgia, I was studying abroad at 
Oxford, just a few hours by air from Amsterdam. Years before, I had learned 
how to smoke marijuana and enjoy its effects, probably too much so.1 For 
stoners like my former self, visiting Amsterdam’s coffeeshops is a recreational 
pilgrimage.2 There a smoker can purchase cannabis and get high without 
fear of legal trouble, despite it being an illegal activity.3 This was a welcome 
change from the accustomed stress of acquiring weed in the United States.4
I arrived at Amsterdam’s Schiphol Airport in the early afternoon 
and boarded a train to Central Station. I exited its main doors, walked 
across Prins Hendrikkade and set off down Damrak. This wide avenue is 
lined with stone buildings about six storeys in height. These are occupied 
by establishments normal to a city centre: hotels, souvenir shops, restau-
rants, sex museum. Nearing the end of this avenue, a young woman of 
about my age asked for spare change to buy food. I offered to get her 
a McDonald’s, which I saw a few doors down, but she turned her back 
and walked away. I guessed that what she really wanted was money to 
buy drugs, but who was I to judge?
Damrak ends at Dam Square, about a couple football pitches in size. 
Straight ahead is Madame Tussauds and another avenue, Rokin, which 
leads toward the Flower Market. Further down is the Rijksmuseum, Van 
Gogh Museum and Heineken Factory. To the right are two impressive 
buildings, New Church and Royal Palace. Going in that direction eventu-
ally takes you to Anne Frank’s House. Heading in the other direction, as 
I did, brings you past a massive shopping mall on the left, De Bijenkorf. 
In the square’s centre is the National Monument, a 72-foot high pillar. 
People gather on its steps to people-watch, sometimes while smoking a 
joint.5 The spot has changed quite a bit since the city executed criminals 
here, a few centuries ago.6
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Following the map to my hostel, The Bulldog, I ventured past the 
National Monument to Damstraat. This short street is a gateway into the 
city’s red light district, the birthplace of coffeeshops.7 These little estab-
lishments are a big deal, having sown the seeds for drug policy reform in 
Portugal, Australia, the United States, Uruguay, Canada and beyond.8 
About half way down Damstraat, I noticed Coffeeshop Paradise on my right. 
Above the door was a green and red neon sign, its name surrounded by 
palm trees.9 I went inside and took in the atmosphere: a Rasta motif of Pan-
African colours and Bob Marley posters on the wall, with his music playing 
over the speakers.
I noticed a sales counter in the back left corner. Unsure how ‘this’ 
worked, I walked up, admitted my ignorance to the dealer and humbly 
requested assistance. He showed me two menus, one for cannabis, the 
other for drinks and food. The cannabis menu had several types of mari-
juana and hashish, ranging in price from about €10 to €20 per gram. He 
offered to let me inspect the options by taking a close look and a whiff. 
I made a selection, purchased provisions (rolling papers, lighter, green 
tea) and took a seat at a small round table by the window.
The subsequent details of my trip are hazy, but it was an informative 
experience. From afar, I saw Amsterdam’s coffeeshops as an exotic feature 
of the drug market landscape. Yet once the novelty wore off, coffeeshops 
appeared mundane, even boring. Emma, the manager of a coffeeshop 
whom I interviewed years later, joked that ‘passing out is usually the most 
excitement you get’. Coffeeshops are under control. At the time, I gave this 
little consideration. If anything, I assumed it is a byproduct of people being 
high.10 Years later I discovered that the civilised atmosphere is more than 
a secondhand effect.11 Rather, order in the midst of smoke is key to Dutch 
drug policy. Coffeeshops do not have a carte blanche to sell cannabis. The 
government allows them to break the law, but not the rules.
*****
Coffeeshops are known internationally as the most famous example 
of Dutch tolerance.12 Yet the Netherlands does not in fact tolerate cof-
feeshops.13 Inaction is not the policy lever. Actually, coffeeshops are highly 
regulated.14 Surveillance and punishment make the policy work. Those 
tools are used to enforce the rules. The rules specify what coffeeshops 
can do, and cannot do, to be ‘tolerated’. This book examines the rules in 
Amsterdam’s coffeeshops: what they are; why they exist; how they are 
enforced; how they are broken – and to what effect. What are the ben-
efits? What are the problems? Does this strategy of control have utility?
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I describe and explore the perspective of coffeeshop personnel, includ-
ing owners, managers, dealers of cannabis and servers of drink and food.15 I 
interviewed and observed them while living in Amsterdam from September 
2008 to May 2010,16 returning for the summers of 2011 and 2016 to keep 
in touch with the scene.17 Geographically, I focus on coffeeshops in the 
1012 postal code of Amsterdam. It is the city’s centre and its oldest part.18 
‘The 1012’, for short, is about a square kilometre in size (Figure 0.1). It is 
bordered on the north by the Prins Hendrikkade, which recall runs along 
Central Station; on the east by the Geldersekade and Kloveniersburgwal 
Canals; and, on the south and west by the Singel Canal. Damrak and Rokin 
constitute the area’s spine, with an oversized heart made up of the infamous 
red light district. I also looked at Haarlemmerstraat, which technically lies 
outside the 1012 postal code, but is geographically and socially contiguous.
Figure 0.1 Map of the 1012. Google, Aerodata International Surveys. 
Street segment lines added by Wim Bernasco
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By walking every street in the 1012, I learned that it contained 84 
coffeeshops, about one-third of the city’s total.19 I spent countless hours 
observing coffeeshops while hanging out.20 I visited each one on multiple 
occasions, becoming a regular at some. My field notes documented routine 
practices and unusual events. This mostly involved recording how person-
nel managed their stock, patrons and the rules, all of which are interre-
lated. The nice thing about taking field notes in coffeeshops is that I could 
do so in plain sight without impeding the social scene, as it is entirely nor-
mal for someone to be on their laptop computer there. However, that is not 
always appropriate, such as at weekends, evenings, or other busy times. In 
those circumstances I took short notes on my phone and then expanded 
them later. In bits of this book, I give precise, observation-based percent-
ages and counts. These data were collected near the end of my time in 
Amsterdam with the help of a colleague, Danielle Reynald, and a team of 
students who collected numbers on every coffeeshop in the sample.
In addition I convinced personnel of 50 coffeeshops to do an inter-
view in exchange for €50.21 The data thus gathered lies behind most of 
the findings presented throughout this book. Interviews lasted between 
one and two hours and covered a variety of topics, including the rules. I 
asked each participant for permission to record the interview so that our 
conversation could be transcribed word for word.22 Seven respondents 
refused and one conversation was conducted in a place too loud to be 
recorded; for these interviews, I made written notes. Table 0.1 provides 
an overview of the interviewees’ characteristics; Table 0.2 provides one 
of all personnel at their respective coffeeshops.23
Table 0.1 Interviewee characteristics
Participant 
name (#)




Adam (41) Howling Man Dealer <1 30 White Yes
Amani (30) Stop Owner 24 48 Black No
Amir (21) Mirror Image Dealer 1 30 Arab Yes
Anna (22) Maple Street Manager 2 40 White Yes
Charlotte (43) Nick of Time Server <1 23 White No
Claire (14) Sun Dealer <1 28 Multi No
Dean (39) Dollar Room Manager <1 32 White Yes
Elias (32) Passage Dealer 2 34 White Yes
Emir (4) Walking 
Distance









Emma (19) Purple 
Testament
Manager 7 38 White Yes
Fabian (46) Most Unusual Dealer 5 30 White No
Finn (26) Execution Owner 23 53 White No
Gijs (6) Escape 
Clause
Manager 2 46 White Yes
Guus (36) World of His 
Own
Dealer 20 48 Multi No
Gwen (29) Like a Child Manager 1.5 32 White Yes
Hanna (47) Meek Dealer <1 31 White No
Hassan (5) Shrine Manager 4 25 Arab Yes
Helen (18) Last Flight Manager <1 38 White No
Imran (42) Eye of the 
Beholder
Owner 15 45 Multi No
Jack (25) Alike All Over Manager 3.5 35 White No
James (37) No Return Dealer 4 31 White No
Jana (23) World of 
Difference
Dealer 6 26 White Yes
Jasper (44) The Hour Manager 5 28 White Yes
Jens (28) Nice Place to 
Visit
Dealer 1.5 28 White Yes
Joseph (11) Open Sky Manager 6 55 Black No
Kamila (15) Arrow in the 
Air
Server 2 32 White No
Keven (13) Four of Us Dealer 10 39 White Yes
Lizzie (50) Whole Truth Manager 3.5 35 White Yes
Lola (17) Fever Server 9 30 White Yes
Luca (7) The Lonely Dealer 5 38 White Yes
Lucia (3) Doomsday Server <1 20 White No
Luuk (2) Angels Owner 16 50 White Yes
Maikel (40) Thing Owner 4 38 Black Yes
Mara (27) Wish Owner 6 35 White Yes
Maud (8) At Last Dealer 1 27 Asian Yes
Max (1) Everybody Manager 37 White Yes
Mike (10) Judgement 
Night










Noah (12) What You 
Need
Dealer 5 35 White Yes
Noortje (48) Dust Dealer 10 34 White Yes
Olivia (20) Elegy Dealer 3 24 White Yes
Omar (49) Back There Manager 8 25 Arab Yes
Ruben (35) The Mighty Dealer 10 45 White Yes
Selma (38) Man in the 
Bottle
Dealer <1 27 Multi Yes
Sophie (16) Hitch-Hiker Server 2.5 25 Multi Yes
Stefan (34) After Hours Dealer 5 40 White No
Stijn (33) Mr. Bevis Dealer 8 35 White No
Thomas (45) Buzz Manager 3.5 32 White No
Victor (31) Chaser Dealer <1 30 Multi Yes
Willem (9) Perchance Owner 1.5 27 Asian Yes




- Dealer 5 34 White Yes
Note: An empty cell denotes ‘Don’t know’. ‘#’ refers to a participant’s order in study, 
from first interviewed (1) to last (50). ‘Tenure’ reflects a participant’s time, measured 
in years, serving in a specific position at the coffeeshop, not their total time working 
there or other coffeeshops. ‘NL born’ shows whether an individual participant was 
born in the Netherlands. Overall averages may be slightly different from those reported 
in Jacques et al. 2016, due to rounding. To calculate average tenure, employees with 
less than one year in the position are counted as 0.5 year or 6 months.
Table 0.1 (Continued)












(per cent NL 
born)
After Hours 11 5 (45) 21–40 10 (90) 1 (91)
Alike All Over 11 4 (36) 24–50 11 (100) 4 (64)
Angels D/k 11 (D/k) 20–44 14 (D/k) 14 (D/k)
Arrow in the Air 7 4 (57) 24–40 7 (100) 7 (0)
At Last 4 2 (50) 21–34 2 (50) 1 (75)














(per cent NL 
born)
Buzz 7 7 (100) 23–43 6 (86) 3 (57)
Chaser 9 9 (100) D/k 5 (56) D/k (D/k)
Dollar Room 12 11 (92) 22–36 12 (100) 2 (83)
Doomsday D/k 4 (D/k) 18–36 18 (D/k) 14 (D/k)
Dust 9 6 (67) 32–45 8 (89) 0 (100)
Elegy 13 7 (54) 24–49 12 (92) 12 (8)
Escape Clause 9 8 (88) 25–46 9 (100) 8 (11)
Everybody 19 11 (58) 20–45 19 (100) 1 (95)
Execution 12 7 (58) 25–53 12 (100) 6 (50)
Eye of the 
Beholder
8 7 (88) 22–46 4 (50) 6 (25)
Fever 5 4 (80) 25–33 3 (60) 4 (20)
Four of Us 7 6 (86) 27–50 7 (100) 0 (100)
Hitch-Hiker 17 12 (71) 21–52 14 (82) 1 (94)
Howling Man 15 12 (80) 20–51 12 (80) 2 (87)
Judgement 
Night
23 15 (65) 19–50 D/k 
(D/k)
6 (74)
Last Flight 19 10 (53) 20–38 10 (53) 10 (47)
Like a Child 20 9 (45) 18–44 18 (90) 10 (50)
Live Long 7 7 (100) 22–50 7 (100) 0 (100)
Man in the 
Bottle
4 3 (75) 27–41 4 (100) 3 (25)
Maple Street 9 4 (44) 23–42 9 (100) 2 (78)
Meek 4 1 (25) 21–46 3 (75) 3 (25)
Mirror Image D/k 2 (D/k) 30–33 3 (D/k) 3 (D/k)
Most Unusual 5 0 (0) 30–60 5 (100) 5 (0)
Mr. Bevis 18 2 (11) 19–50 8 (44) 14 (22)
Nice Place to 
Visit
18 9 (50) 21–43 14 (78) 4 (78)
Nick of Time 13 9 (69) 23–44 13 (100) 12 (8)
No Return 9 9 (100) 28–47 8 (89) 4 (56)
Open Sky 3 3 (100) 33–55 1 (33) 3 (0)
















(per cent NL 
born)
Perchance 4 3 (75) 27–32 2 (50) 3 (25)
Purple 
Testament
5 2 (40) 20–38 2 (40) 3 (40)
Shrine 6 5 (83) 22–36 4 (67) 2 (67)
Stop 2 2 (100) 48 0 (0) 2 (0)
Sun 9 2 (22) 25–50 8 (89) 8 (11)
The Hour 21 13 (62) 20–40 20 (95) 1 (95)
The Lonely D/k 6 (D/k) 32–40 7 (D/k) 0 (D/k)
The Mighty 9 8 (89) 20–46 8 (89) 9 (0)
Thing 4 3 (75) 21–38 1 (25) 1 (75)
Walking 
Distance
4 4 (100) 31–48 0 (0) 4 (0)
What You Need 11 6 (55) 21–50 11 (100) 0 (100)
Whole Truth 27 7 (26) 21–43 25 (93) 10 (63)
Wish 8 5 (63) 24–41 8 (100) 3 (63)
World of 
Difference
15 10 (67) 23–50 12 (80) 15 (0)
World of His 
Own
10 6 (60) 21–60 1 (10) 8 (20)
Average 10 6 (60) 24–44 8 (80) 5 (50)
Note: ‘D/k’ denotes do not know. ‘Per cent NL born’ shows the percentage of personnel 
born in the Netherlands. Overall averages may be slightly different from those 
reported in Jacques et al. 2016, due to rounding and number of cases in denominator. 
In this work overall average percentages are calculated by dividing the variable’s 
mean by the average number of total personnel across coffeeshops, which is 10. 
Especially for coffeeshops with more personnel, these numbers may not perfectly 
reflect the actual characteristics because they are based on interviewees’ knowledge 
and recall.
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1Introduction
The law and rules
In Amsterdam’s coffeeshops, the worldwide prohibition on cannabis sales 
is void.1 Kamila, a server at Arrow in the Air, described these retail estab-
lishments as ‘where you can come and socialise, and don’t be scared that 
the police will get you. You go to the bar [counter], you take your coffee, 
you roll your joint, and see how it is – and you don’t get punishment for 
it’. The manager of Purple Testament, Emma, nonchalantly stated, ‘We 
just sell weed here. It is normal’.2
Many municipalities in the Netherlands, not only Amsterdam, allow 
licensed coffeeshops to sell cannabis.3 But on the books, and confusingly, 
this business is outlawed. ‘I keep on telling people’, said Selma, who deals 
at Man in the Bottle, ‘it is still illegal because the law never allowed it. It 
has been tolerated because, at the moment, it is still illegal: if the govern-
ment decide they want to put a stop behind it, they can do it.’
It is a crime to sell cannabis in the Netherlands. There are severe 
sanctions for breaking the law. At the time of my study, the maximum 
penalties for possession, cultivation, sale, transport and production of 
cannabis for commercial purposes are six years’ imprisonment or a fine 
of €67,000.4 The penalties apply to cannabis sales outside a licensed cof-
feeshop. Once a supply enters a coffeeshop, it transforms from a serious 
risk to a taxed good.5 In the words of Jack, who manages Alike All Over: 
‘Everything coming in the back door is black. It is all off the books, and 
then everything out the front door goes through the books, so is taxed.’
As a national policy, the Dutch government’s allowance of cof-
feeshops stems from its distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ drugs.6 The 
former refers to illicit substances deemed to have an unacceptable health 
risk (for example, cocaine or heroin), whereas the latter includes drugs 
considered to be less harmful, such as cannabis.7 These categories inform 
harm reduction: doing less about one problem to avoid causing worse 
problems.8 The rationale of allowing coffeeshops is to ‘protect cannabis 
users … from exposure to hard drugs and the criminal elements who 
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traffic in them’.9 If people are allowed to buy cannabis from coffeeshops, 
the thinking goes, they are less likely to use hard drugs sold by dealers 
with a diversified product line.
Dutch drug policy is set at the national level, but municipal govern-
ments, such as that of Amsterdam, decide whether to permit coffeeshops 
in their jurisdiction.10 Where allowed, the local government issues a sort 
of business licence to coffeeshops, albeit not a traditional licence because 
cannabis distribution is a crime. Finn, the owner of Execution, described 
the licence in this way:
It is a warning letter from the mayor in which he allows me to break 
the law unless I break the [rules]. It is a really strange document 
because it is signed by the mayor, it is printed on paper from the 
local government, but it doesn’t have any status. In other words, 
I can never take it to court. That is the tension in the Dutch cof-
feeshop system. Owners of coffeeshops always feel harassed and 
blackmailed, and in fact they are, because they know that the gov-
ernment can suspend that drug supply [licence] at any time.
As alluded to by Finn, the privilege to break the law comes with a 
catch – a set of strictly enforced rules or regulations.11 Everyone inside 
a coffeeshop must be at least 18 years of age. No customer can be sold 
more than 5 grams of cannabis per day, nor can there be more than 500 
grams on the premises. Hard drugs are strictly prohibited. Nuisance is 
not allowed and cannabis advertisements are forbidden. In short, Dutch 
policy is meant not only to separate the markets for cannabis and hard 
drugs from one another, but also to restrict sales by coffeeshops and pre-
vent them from becoming an intolerable problem.
Police checks
To ensure that coffeeshops adhere to the rules, the police conduct sur-
prise checks.12 The prospect of these visits is a constant concern for cof-
feeshop personnel. ‘“When [are] the police coming?” That’s the only 
worry’, complained Luuk, the owner of Angels. The fear is that police sur-
veillance will lead to punishment. As Jack explained: ‘You get a licence 
and you agree to let the police in the door whenever they come. So you 
make sure you are doing nothing wrong, ever. We get checked up [on] 
very regularly. We have far more checks on our business than any other 
sort of business in the country. We have police checking for all sort of 
stipulations they can shut us down for.’
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According to Dutch policy, police checks are supposed to occur at 
each coffeeshop at least twice a year. ‘They always come around, for sure, 
twice a year’, stated Stijn, a dealer at Mr. Bevis. He added: ‘I know two 
or three months [ago] they came in [here] after the summer, and then 
again at the end of the year or the beginning of the year. There are loads 
of coffeeshops, though.’ Some coffeeshops are subject to fewer police 
searches than dictated. Mara, the owner of Wish, recounted: ‘In the last 
year we didn’t have one [check]. They did it every year in August, always 
in August. The last week of August, they always come in, but the last 
four years there was nothing wrong, so I think they [stopped coming].’ 
I remarked, ‘Well, it hasn’t hit the last week of August yet’, to which she 
responded: ‘Maybe today, tomorrow [they will come], but last year in 
August they didn’t come in, also. It’s quiet.’ I asked when the last check 
was, to which she replied: ‘It seems about 18 months ago, or something 
like that. We normally know [they come] two times a year, but maybe 
because it’s quiet [they don’t come], maybe because they wait.’
It is atypical for coffeeshops to have had only one or no police checks 
in the previous 12 months. For those in my sample, the average number 
is about two and a half. This means some establishments are subject to 
more than the requisite couple checks. Jack talked about this happening 
at Alike All Over:
I would say for checks, we have probably averaged one a month, so 
12 in the past 12 months. It is ridiculous, and we kind of feel unfairly 
done, but my mate down the road is starting to get the same [at his 
coffeeshop]. They didn’t have any [checks] for ages and ages and 
ages, and then they are suddenly getting them every two weeks. 
And it is almost like these [police] units aren’t communicating with 
each other, they are like two different units. ‘You were only here 10 
days ago and we were perfect then!’ It’s like [from them], ‘Ah, we 
are going to catch you out now! You weren’t expecting us!’ When 
they come really regularly, it sometimes seems like they are expect-
ing you to relax and let your standards slip. But you don’t do that, 
and [therefore] you can welcome the police when they come in to 
do their checks. It is annoying because you shut the shop for three 
hours, sometimes.
I am uncertain why coffeeshops are inspected more or less. Possibly 
a researcher could interview officers in charge of these searches to learn 
the answers, but I did not try this.13 However, the answer is more com-
plicated than establishments that are perceived to be ‘bad’ coming under 
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greater surveillance. Indeed, the police regularly visit some coffeeshops 
due to perceiving them as good. Olivia, who deals at Elegy, told me: ‘They 
actually take the trainee cops here because we always have our licences 
and everything in order, and we are supposed to be very nice for the police 
to come in and do their checking things. They do come in, but we never 
get in trouble. They take their trainees and say, “Now this is how it works”.’ 
Local police also bring foreign colleagues to good coffeeshops to demon-
strate Dutch drug policy in action. Stijn described these visits as follows:
We always work with the police. Here everything is cool. When the 
police come, we work always together. And even sometimes, police 
come here from Germany, America, China, and they [local Dutch 
police] show you their badge and say, ‘Listen, we have colleagues 
across the road, and they don’t know how it works in Holland. Can 
you show them stuff?’ Then I show them the weed. I show them the 
hash. I show them what we sell. Tell them the rules.
Coffeeshops’ proximity to police stations may also increase the 
number of inspections. This situation was mentioned by Jack, who talked 
about the stress involved in being a training dummy:
It is very funny, and I think this may be because we are right across 
the road from the station, but we seem to get all the juniors being 
trained how to do the coffeeshop checks. So there are a bunch of 
kids with guns, younger than me, telling me what to do. It freaks 
me out because I come from a place where police don’t carry guns, 
and certainly not fucking children. A bunch of 20-year-olds, armed, 
coming in my shop, [screaming] ‘Don’t touch that!’ They freak out, 
they are really sketchy, because they have this idea that we are try-
ing to pull one over on them.
When police checks occur, there is a standard procedure. First, they 
are unnanounced. ‘They just come in and “poof”’ is how Luke put it. He 
went on to describe what happens next: ‘They come down and search. 
You have to do everything in the law, but it’s always a fuss. They come in 
with 15 [officers], and search everything. They check everything, look 
everywhere, opening everything, and asking everything.’ Imran, who 
owns Eye of the Beholder, further detailed the investigative steps:
They never come [by] to say they are coming [later]. They just 
come. They put everything on the scale, they see if the scale is right, 
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and then they see how much [cannabis] you have [in total]. Then 
they check the ID of the [person] who is working, then they check 
the money – what you have sold already that day, and what you 
started with. Then they start checking every area, sometimes with 
a dog.
Police and coffeeshop personnel are not the only parties involved 
in checks. Customers get entangled in the surveillance web too. Are 
they minors? Do they have hard drugs? Does the cannabis in their pos-
session add up to more than 500 grams in the coffeeshop? Evidence of 
such amounts to a rule violation and trouble for the business. It is easy 
to imagine that patrons, especially tourists, are taken aback by the sight 
of several officers barging inside. I asked Anna, manager of Maple Street, 
if customers seem worried when that occurs. ‘No, I don’t think so’, she 
replied. ‘Well, maybe in the first place. But it is no problem if they see that 
I think it is normal that they are coming in.’ Still, a problem for customers 
is they cannot simply walk out of the door when the police arrive. Maud 
mentioned this happened at the most recent check of At Last: ‘At the 
time, there were two customers, and they couldn’t leave. They [officers] 
said they had to stay there while they were investigating. They were here 
for their break and they were like, “Hey we have to go back to work”, and 
they were like, “Our boss is not going to be happy”.’
Some personnel, such as Emma, claim to ‘like the fact that they 
come in and check us’. But most owners and employees have a negative 
view of inspections. This is not only because of the inconvenience and 
risk. Even if everything is in order, these are tenuous encounters because 
the duty of officers is to search for wrongdoing.14 It is unsurprising, then, 
that personnel express displeasure with how checks unfold – although 
they complain less about the process than officers’ demeanour.15 For 
example, Anna, the manager of Maple Street, told me: ‘We have had 
them in here probably three times, and they were so impolite to us, and 
they are really stupid.’
No matter how officers behave, there is little personnel can do at the 
time to improve their position, other than be respectful.16 Jack explained 
why it is good to exhibit a positive demeanour to officers, even when fac-
ing a negative one:
When they come, they are just doing their job. They can be rude 
and aggressive, sometimes. One of the young girls here opened the 
shop one morning, and literally two customers had walked in the 
door, and then there were 10 policemen in the door, all armed and 
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in her face demanding to see things. She had to ring me up and talk 
to me for half an hour so I could explain. ‘Show them this, show 
them that’. I told her not to take shit off them, just to be nice and tell 
them to relax. They shout at the little girl expecting her to crack and 
say, ‘Yes, we’ve got 6 kilos of cocaine under here! Sorry!’
Sometimes they come in with this attitude, like you are really 
up to no good. I know we are doing nothing wrong, so my reac-
tion is just like, ‘Come in, chill out, relax’. They want to take all our 
names and check all our passports. One of my friends in another 
coffeeshop now has a form that he prints out to try and get the 
name of the chief of the search, and all of your [officer] names and 
which station you work, and [will say to them], ‘If you can write 
that down for me, then we can all sit down, have a cup of coffee and 
get started, and speak like civilised people’. Then they are like, ‘Oh, 
all right, you are just another business’.
As touched on by Jack, personnel use humour to relieve the strain of 
interaction with officers.17 Another example was mentioned by Gijs, who 
manages Escape Clause: ‘They just showed up. I say laughing, “Hi, guys. 
Want a coffee?” It sort of breaks the ice and then we do our thing, they 
do their thing. Everyone is doing their job. And, yeah, it’s basically vice 
versa. “OK, you do your job, we do our job”.’
Punishment
The attitude of coffeeshop personnel towards police also matters 
because detected violations do not invariably result in punishment. By 
treating officers with respect, personnel may reduce the sanction risk, if 
a violation is detected. The same effect results from earning a reputation 
as a coffeeshop that generally abides by the rules.18 Gijs talked about 
this when I asked if there had ever been more than 500 grams on his 
premises:
That has happened in the past. It is sometimes hard to check. Now, 
there is not more than 500 grams in the shop because a little while 
ago in the [shop], there was a bust from the police and they found 
like 540 grams. Because we have a good relationship with the 
police – they like the way we work, they like the way we stick to the 
rules and all that – they were milder [with the punishment].
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‘So what did they do?’ I asked. His answer was surprising:
Well, they didn’t do anything, really. They didn’t give us any closing 
or whatever, but it might have to do with we have good contact with 
the police. We have better contact with the police than other shops, 
so we are standing in a better daylight because when they come in 
with a bust it is always fairly normal, fairly mild, and almost a good 
atmosphere.
For violating the rules coffeeshops may be shut down, temporarily 
or permanently, and fined. In addition personnel may be arrested, prose-
cuted and accordingly punished, though this seems rare. Typically punish-
ments are administered on an escalating basis, such that more infractions 
lead to more severe penalties, although this does not apply invariably. 
Jasper, who manages The Hour, described how the escalation process 
works: ‘Yellow cards are like you get a bust, they fine it [the business] and 
get one yellow card [on your record]. Two yellow cards: you go for a week, 
you close. Three yellow [cards]: a month. And then four: you’re done.’
Punishment is not a frequent occurrence, but personnel know the 
risk is real. This is because the coffeeshop community is close-knit. When 
a member is punished for a violation, personnel learn about it.19 Anna 
had heard of coffeeshops where the police ‘came and found hard drugs 
on the customers, then they closed’. The owner of Perchance, Willem, 
told me about a ‘coffeeshop [that] is closed down now – I heard rumours 
that they were selling other things inside’. And a popular website devoted 
to the coffeeshop scene, www.smokersguide.com, posted a story with the 
headline: ‘ABRAXAS COFFEESHOP AMSTERDAM FORCED TO CLOSE 
ITS DOORS!’ The story reported:
Due to the strict policies regarding possession of any hard drugs 
on coffeeshop premises, Abraxas Coffeeshop was forced to close 
its doors. The employee who caused this situation was a recently 
employed women [sic] from Italy, who had less than a gram of 
cocaine and a bit over a gram of MDMA in her bag, left over from 
the previous night. Her carelessness has cost this fine establishment 
it’s [sic] life.20
Being closed, even temporarily, is bad for business. Speaking purely 
in financial terms, coffeeshop owners have the most to lose from closure. 
In the short term, the punishment equals the sum of missed sales profit. 
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The loss is greater if the business is closed for good because the owner is 
prohibited from selling it as well. In both the short and long term, how 
much is lost depends on the coffeeshop, as some obviously make more 
sales and so are worth money more than others.
To gain a rudimentary sense of coffeeshop economics,21 I asked 
personnel to estimate their coffeeshop’s annual profit, a fair sale price 
for the whole business and the normal weekly number of customers and 
sales (Table 0.3). On average, the annual profit is about €535,000, with 
Table 0.3  Economic estimates for interviewed coffeeshops




After Hours €100,000 200 200
Alike All Over €730,000 1,400 1,400
Angels €200,000
Arrow in the Air €353,600 €300,000 560 1,400
At Last €365,000 €750,000 100
Back There €150,000 350 140
Buzz €1,277,500 €2,250,000 1,500 2,500
Chaser €1,095,000 €500,000 200 200
Dollar Room €730,000 1,050 1,575
Doomsday €100,000 €1,000,000
Dust €1,000,000 490 280
Elegy €1,000,000 1,400 840
Escape Clause 2,100
Everybody €500,000 €5,000,000
Execution €250,000 €1,800,000 700 700
Eye of the Beholder €300,000 €2,000,000 875 1,575
Fever €65,700 €400,000 420 329
Four of Us 300 300
Hitch-Hiker €547,500 €1,500,000 1,400 4,200
Howling Man €1,095,000 €1,000,000 1,400 2,100
Judgement Night 2,800
Last Flight €1,000,000 600 1,000
Like a Child €500,000 1,225 2,450
Live Long €547,500 €500,000 1,050 1,575
Man in the Bottle €547,500 €200,000 700 1,260
Maple Street €547,500 1,225 1,225
(Continued)
 InTROdUCTIOn 9




Meek €255,500 €500,000 560 350
Mirror Image €711,750 €1,000,000 420 1,330
Most Unusual €300,000 1,400 1,400
Mr. Bevis €1,000,000 1,000 850
Nice Place to Visit €1,277,500 €1,000,000 1,400 1,400
Nick of Time €912,500 €50,000
No Return €1,095,000 €750,000 200 150
Open Sky €350,000 1,240
Passage 55
Perchance 0 350
Purple Testament €310,250 €200,000 1,190 1,190
Shrine €100,000
Stop €310,250 €300,000 43 130
Sun €328,500 €5,000,000 350 350
The Hour €2,000,000 7,000 7700
The Lonely
The Mighty €104,000 0 250 250
Thing €219,000 €400,000 175 420
Walking Distance
What You Need €547,500 1,050 1,400
Whole Truth
Wish €730,000 €4,000,000 1,050 1,050
World of Difference €5,000,000 2,100 273











Note: An empty cell denotes ‘Don’t know’. ‘For sale price’ presents answers to the 
question ‘If the business was for sale, what would be the approximate asking price?’ 
Especially for interviewees who are not in ownership or management positions, the 
profit and sale price estimates may not accurately reflect the actual economics. At the 
time of the study US$1 = ~€1.30–1.40; AU$1 = ~€1.40–1.80; £1 = ~€0.85–0.90.
a range from zero to more than €1.25 million.22 For reasons I get into 
shortly, the ‘for sale’ price estimates are all over the place: they range 
from zero to €5 million, with an average of about €1.2 million. As might 
be expected, those amounts positively correlate with the number of 
Table 0.3 (Continued)
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weekly customers and sales. The average of the former is €950, with a 
range from €43 to €7,000. The sales average is €1,300 and ranges from 
€100 to more than €7,700.
Not all personnel are able to answer questions about the business; 
owners have the most valid information. Mara gave a ballpark ‘€400,000’ 
as the price for her coffeeshop, while Imran estimated, ‘More or less 
€2 million because if you calculate the 20 years’ profit [that’s what it is 
worth].” Managers know the numbers, too. Joseph, who manages Open 
Sky, recounted:
Two or three years ago, I know this place was roughly half a million 
because there was a girl who offered 250,000 [euros] [for the cof-
feeshop next door] and she [the owner] refused. That was about 
four or five years ago, and here is a lot upgraded, so I think a lot 
more than that [now].
A factor in calculating coffeeshop worth is whether the licence can 
be sold. If not, these establishments are far less valuable, especially since 
the Amsterdam government is no longer issuing new licences. When I 
asked respondents about the sale price, some thought it was effectively 
zero because, to their knowledge, a coffeeshop licence cannot be sold. 
Jack’s view was that:
A coffeeshop licence is not worth fuck all. You can have one, but you 
can’t sell it. You can’t change the name and it can’t change address. 
It is only there for as long as they give it, and there is no guarantee 
that they will renew the licence. So to sell it, it is very hard to say 
what it is worth.
A couple days later I interviewed Finn and admitted my confusion 
to him. Could places sell their licences? He explained the legal situation 
as follows:
They can. There are two addresses in Amsterdam that cannot be sold. 
In 1996 when the Amsterdam coffeeshop policy was put to papers, 
there were six addresses of coffeeshops that were catering to high 
school kids. They were allowed to stay, but when the shops closed 
there were to be no new coffeeshops on those locations. Of those 
six, there are two left. So in reality, unless the school goes away or is 
upgraded to a university, they cannot sell their licence. So out of [all] 
the coffeeshops [in Amsterdam], only two cannot sell.
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Next, I asked about the worth of Finn’s business. He was not entirely sure. 
‘You can get the licence and the inventory, I would say a million [euros]; 
it all depends. If it is some filthy rich former freedom fighter who comes 
with a suitcase with 2 million [euros in it], then fine!’
Closure of a coffeeshop has a serious effect on the lives of employ-
ees, not just owners. As seen in Table 0.4, the average coffeeshop has 


















1 (9) 1 (9) 6 (55) 0 (0) 2 (18) 1 (9)
Alike All Over 
(11)
2 (18) 1 (9) 8 (73) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Angels (D/k) 1 (D/k) D/k (D/k) D/k (D/k) D/k (D/k) D/k (D/k) D/k (D/k)
Arrow in the 
Air (7)
1 (14) 2 (29) 3 (43) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (14)
At Last (4) 1 (25) 0 (0) 3 (75) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Back There 
(6)
1 (16) 2 (33) 3 (50) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Buzz (7) 1 (14) 1 (14) 5 (71) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Chaser (9) 1 (11) 2 (22) 2 (22) 2 (22) 1 (11) 1 (11)
Dollar Room 
(12)
1 (8) 2 (17) 6 (50) 0 (0) 3 (25) 0 (0)
Doomsday 
(D/k)
2 (D/k) 1 (D/k) 4 (D/k) 10 (D/k) D/k (D/k) 1 (D/k)
Dust (9) 4 (44) 1 (11) 4 (44) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Elegy (13) 1 (8) 2 (15) 8 (62) 0 (0) 2 (15) 0 (0)
Escape 
Clause (9)
1 (11) 2 (22) 6 (67) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Everybody 
(19)
1 (5) 1 (5) 7 (37) 7 (37) 2 (11) 1 (5)
Execution 
(12)
1 (8) 1 (8) 10 (83) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Eye of the 
Beholder (8)
1 (13) 1 (13) 6 (75) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Fever (5) 1 (20) 0 (0) 4 (80) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)




















1 (6) 3 (18) 5 (29) 5 (29) 3 (18) 0 (0)
Howling Man 
(15)
2 (13) 1 (7) 4 (27) 3 (20) 3 (20) 2 (13)
Judgement 
Night (23)
2 (9) 3 (13) 15 (65) 0 (0) 3 (13) 0 (0)
Last Flight 
(19)
1 (5) 2 (11) 8 (42) 8 (42) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Like a Child 
(20)
1 (5) 4 (20) 4 (20) 8 (40) 0 (0) 3 (15)
Live Long (7) 2 (29) 0 (0) 4 (57) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (14)
Man in the 
Bottle (4)
2 (50) 0 (0) 2 (50) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Maple Street 
(9)
1 (11) 1 (11) 6 (67) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (11)
Meek (4) 1 (25) 0 (0) 3 (75) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Mirror Image 
(D/k)
D/k (D/k) 1 (D/k) 1 (D/k) 1 (D/k) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Most Unusual 
(5)
1 (20) 1 (20) 3 (60) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Mr. Bevis (18) 1 (6) 2 (11) 14 (78) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (6)
Nice Place to 
Visit (18)
1 (6) 4 (22) 6 (33) 6 (33) 0 (0) 1 (6)
Nick of Time 
(13)
1 (8) 0 (0) 4 (29) 3 (23) 3 (23) 2 (15)
No Return (9) 1 (11) 4 (44) 3 (33) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (11)
Open Sky (3) 1 (33) 1 (33) 1 (33) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Passage (3) 1 (33) 0 (0) 2 (67) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Perchance (4) 2 (50) 0 (0) 2 (50) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Purple 
Testament (5)
1 (20) 0 (0) 3 (60) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (20)
Shrine (6) 1 (17) 1 (17) 4 (67) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Stop (2) 2 (100) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)





















3 (14) 1 (5) 6 (29) 8 (38) 2 (10) 1 (5)
The Lonely 
(D/k)
1 (D/k) 0 (0) 6 (D/k) 0 (0) D/k (D/k) 0 (0)
The Mighty 
(9)
1 (11) 1 (11) 6 (67) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (11)
Thing (4) 1 (25) 1 (25) 1 (25) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (25)
Walking 
Distance (4)
2 (50) 0 (0) 2 (50) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
What You 
Need (11)
3 (27) 0 (0) 4 (36) 3 (27) 1 (9) 0 (0)
Whole Truth 
(27)
2 (7) 6 (22) 8 (30) 8 (30) 2 (7) 1 (4)




1 (7) 2 (13) 9 (6) 0 (0) 3 (2) 0 (0)
World of His 
Own (10)
1 (10) 1 (10) 4 (40) 4 (40) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Average (10) 1 (10) 1 (10) 5 (50) 2 (20) 1 (10) 0 (0)
Note: ‘D/k’ denotes ‘do not know’. Dealers may serve drink and food in addition to selling cannabis, 
but servers do not sell cannabis except, perhaps, in a rare circumstance. ‘Other’ largely includes 
cleaners, who perform their role outside open hours. Totals may not add up to 100 per cent due 
to rounding. Average percentages are calculated by dividing the variable’s mean by the average 
number of total personnel across coffeeshops, which is 10. In particular, for coffeeshops with more 
personnel, these numbers may not perfectly reflect the actual characteristics because they are 
based on interviewees’ knowledge and recall.
Table 0.4 (Continued)
about 10 personnel, so at least 500 individuals depend financially on 
the 1012’s coffeeshops.23 Some coffeeshops are small operations with 
just a few personnel; others have around a couple of dozen. These 
individuals fill different roles, or positions, which are not always mutu-
ally exclusive. The average coffeeshop has one owner, one manager, 
five dealers who focus on selling cannabis but may also serve drink 
and food, two servers who only serve the latter, a runner who brings 
the cannabis stock and maybe another dedicated employee, such as a 
cleaner or a doorman.24
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Violations put the entire existence of a coffeeshop at risk – and, by 
extension, jeopardise the livelihoods of its personnel. Interviewees con-
sistently put the average salary of workers at €1,000 to €2,000 a month.25 
For instance, when I asked Ruben, a dealer at The Mighty, what they 
earn, he answered, ‘Approximately 1,600 euros a month, with bonuses’. 
And Gwen, who manages Like a Child, told me, ‘The average working 
income, everybody here makes between 1,000 and 1,300 euros a month 
net. That depends [on] how much you work [in hours].’
Understanding how coffeeshop workers approach their work 
relates to employment contracts.26 Many employees have a contract with 
the business that guarantees a certain number of hours on the job and 
specifies a salary. Such a contract also protects them from being arbitrar-
ily laid off or fired. For those reasons, owners and managers hand out 
contracts selectively. As Gijs explains:
People who start working their first contract of three months, in 
those three months we can say, or after the three months [ends], 
we can say, ‘No, it’s not going to work, we are not going to extend 
your contract’. But in the first two months you [also] have the pos-
sibility of saying, ‘I don’t even want to have to think about it. Sorry, 
you have to go. This is not your job’.
Because owners and managers are careful about giving contracts, it 
may be more difficult to land a job in the first place. But once an employee 
has a contract, it can work to the benefit of the entire business. This is 
because the contract secures the employee’s stake in conformity and the 
business.27 To protect their reliable source of income, contracted employ-
ees do more to protect the coffeeshop from violations. To quote Kamila: ‘I 
have a long-term contract for my future and I have my rent to pay, so you 
have to be smart. Don’t cut your wings!’
Not all employees have contracts, however. Some also work off the 
books, at least partially.28 One reason that owners and managers make 
this arrangement with workers is to avoid the legal restraints commen-
surate with contracts. Another reason is it can reduce the taxes paid by 
all parties. This issue came up when Sophie, a server, told me about the 
extent to which Hitch-Hiker follows the rules: ‘We don’t get hired, how 
do you call it, “under the table”? We don’t do that here.’ I asked, ‘Is that 
a big thing?’ She answered, ‘In coffeeshops? Yeah. Most girls and guys, 
they have jobs in this area and you get paid without taxes. That is the 
main reason to work in this kind of job.’
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Selma was partially paid ‘under the table’. I learned of her situation 
when asking how many hours she works each week. Looking for clarifi-
cation, she asked me, ‘Officially?’ I told her, ‘No, in reality’, to which she 
replied:
45 hours a week. Like €1,500 a month. I signed a contract for 10 
hours a week, so I work officially 10 hours, so he has to pay tax for 
10 hours a week for his employee, me. Through my salary slip I 
earn €346 a month [officially]. I work 6 or 7 days a week, so when 
you put all the numbers together you divide them into a couple of 
weeks, that’s what we did here. I get paid under the table. My sal-
ary, I take €8 an hour. I just work a normal day, it is €65 from 9 till 5.
She went on to describe how this arrangement benefited the owner but 
cost her, which she tolerated to keep her job:
If I would be working 36 hours a week officially then I would be 
building up holiday money [that the business has to give its 
employees for time off]. Everything you build up. With 10 hours 
a week, you build up shit. Then for sure he pays the government 
less because he does not have to pay tax for an employee working 
that amount of hours. I would rather have a contract of 36 hours, of 
course, because at the end of the year that is the days I have been 
building up to be free [for holiday].
Obeying and breaking rules
The prospect of punishment coupled with regular police checks motivate 
coffeeshop personnel to obey the rules.29 ‘There are things they [police] 
could find that would shut you straight away’, said Jack, ‘so you just make 
sure those things are always fucking dealt with. You make sure you are 
on top of those things. We stay within the rules because we know how 
easy it is for them to shut us down.’ Similarly, Sophie described her work-
place as: ‘a very good coffeeshop. My boss is very strict. The owner, she 
is very strict. She does not want to break any rules: don’t do anything 
illegal.’ Meanwhile Emir, a dealer at Walking Distance, told me, ‘It is my 
business. I try to keep it clean [of violations].’
Personnel stay on top of rule enforcement because everyone has 
something to lose from the closure of their coffeeshop. When I asked 
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Thomas, who manages Buzz, about why they follow the rules, he 
asserted, ‘We love our shop, we love our job and we would be at risk of 
the coffeeshop being closed down’. Likewise Luca, a dealer at The Lonely, 
stated the rules are enforced because otherwise ‘these seven people are 
out of a job, and I don’t want that responsibility. It is not worth it. This is 
our job. This is our way of paying our living. You have to work. You have 
to pay your rent. You have to live.’
Though a coffeeshop may not be punished for a violation, an 
employee risks termination if a misdeed happens on his or her watch. 
Jens, who deals at Nice Place to Visit, talked about this pressure:
Under-aged people, young kids with [fake] ID, drunk and disorderly 
people and street dealers, we don’t want them in our coffeeshops. 
Street dealers can cost you your licence; so can underage children 
and young kids. They are not allowed. If they are in there and the 
police come in on my fucking watch, I would be fired – if the cof-
feeshop is not closed down.
Clearly, personnel have reason to play within the rules. Indeed, and as 
intended by Dutch policy, the rules create order in coffeeshops. Jens 
continued:
Cannabis is still illegal in most of the world, so it is still a little bit of 
a taboo thing. And they [the government] do feel that they have to 
regulate it more. So you get all these extra little rules because you 
have got this whole grey area thing. It leads to more control in the 
coffeeshops themselves, and you should have staff who take care 
because you are playing with your licence.
At a glance, the rules appear uncomplicated and easy to handle. For 
that reason some personnel, such as Emir, worry about checks, but reckon 
no harm will come from them. ‘If police come in, they are always happy with 
us. Always, everything is perfect, always perfect.’30 ‘They give you rules’, said 
Stijn, a dealer at Mr. Bevis, ‘and they are simple to follow. You would be very 
idiotic if you didn’t follow the rules because the rules are simple.’31
The mechanisms for enforcing the rules – again, police checks and 
punishments – are part deterrence, part ‘proterrence’.32 Deterrence entails 
scaring people out of doing something ‘bad’, however this is defined.33 
Proterrence involves scaring people into doing something to stop others 
from doing something bad. In coffeeshops, the rules scare personnel 
out of making violations (deterrence) and into preventing other persons 
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from making them (proterrence). This whole book focuses on the rules 
and enforcement mechanisms as deterrents, but the second half, starting 
with the chapter on minors, also examines how those shape proterrence.
Deterrence and proterrence effects are not absolute, but rather 
restrictive.34 In other words, fear of police checks and punishment does 
not prevent all violations, but it does suppress their frequency and serious-
ness. This outcome is evident from what personnel disclosed about vio-
lations at their respective coffeeshops in the prior 12 months (Table 0.5). 
Table 0.5 Rule violation among interviewed coffeeshops
Coffeeshop >500 
grams









Alike All Over X X
Angels
Arrow in the Air D/k
At Last X X
Back There
Buzz X X
Chaser X X X
Dollar Room X
Doomsday D/k D/k X
Dust
Elegy X X X X
Escape Clause X
Everybody X X X
Execution X
Eye of the Beholder X
Fever
Four of Us
Hitch-Hiker D/k X X
Howling Man X X
Judgement Night X X X
Last Flight X
Like a Child
Live Long X X


















Nice Place to Visit D/k X X X









The Hour X X
The Lonely
The Mighty X X
Thing
Walking Distance
What You Need D/k X X
Whole Truth X X
Wish X
World of Difference
World of His Own
Per cent violated 11 15 6 43 32 12
Note: ‘X’ denotes violation of rule. ‘D/k’ denotes ‘do not know’, meaning the 
interviewee neither confirmed nor denied violation. For each coffeeshop the 
following labels refer to whether the following occurred in the 12 months before 
the interview: ‘>500 grams’ – more than 500 grams of cannabis on the premises; 
‘Advertise’ – advertisement of coffeeshop; ‘Sold to minor’ – a person under 18 years 
of age was sold cannabis; ‘Sold >5 grams’ – a person was sold more than 5 grams of 
cannabis in a single day; ‘Hard drugs’ – hard drugs were on the premises; ‘Nuisance’ – 
a physical altercation between customers.
Table 0.5 (Continued)
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Almost two-fifths reported no violations. Another one-fifth reported that 
only one rule had been broken. Nearly 90 per cent of those interviewed 
reported breaking two rules or fewer. The other 10 per cent reported vio-
lating three of the six rules, with the exception of Elegy, which violated 
four. Across the 50 coffeeshops, 6 per cent disclosed selling to a minor; 
11 per cent had more than 500 grams inside; 12 per cent admitted to a 
fight taking place between customers (prohibited under the ‘nuisance’ 
rule); 15 per cent had advertised; hard drugs were inside 32 per cent; 
and 43 per cent sold more than 5 grams to a person in a single day.35
Those statistics should be taken with a pinch of salt as it is unlikely 
that they perfectly reflect reality. I see no good reason for personnel to 
make up violations, but it makes sense to lie by denying they occurred. 
My guess is the statistics thus undercount infractions, much in the same 
way there is a dark figure of crime.36 It is impossible to know for sure, 
however, as there is no foolproof source of information on the issue. 
Police reports are even more problematic because officers detect only 
a very small portion of all violations. For instance, only three of the 50 
participants said their coffeeshop had been punished in the 12 months 
leading up to the interview.
From a quantitative perspective, the dark figure of violation is a 
serious problem. But it is less bad, even good, when examined through 
an ethnographic lens. It is possible to learn from lies, withholdings and 
other sorts of invalid information, so long as they are recognised as 
potentially being such.37 To that point, there are a few reasons why my 
data probably undercounts coffeeshop violation. The most obvious is 
some participants are not fully forthcoming. If true, this reflects the con-
cern of personnel that admitting to violations could lead to punishment. 
Why else would they lie? And in addition to lying, how else do they pre-
vent being discredited as a violator?
It is also possible that denials are not lies, but invalid due to a lack of 
information. An owner or employee may not know what other personnel 
are doing. Superiors may warn subordinates to obey the rules, but this 
may not fully deter them from bringing hard drugs to work, selling to 
minors or dealing more than 5 grams to a person in a day. Conversely, 
workers may follow the rules while their superiors secretly store more 
than 500 grams on the premises or make large sales. Such secrets, like 
lies, suggest all coffeeshop personnel are concerned about the risk of 
violations. Otherwise a greater flow of information would be expected 
between the interviewees and myself.
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Furthermore, personnel do not know about everything and every-
one in their establishment. My educated guess is that hard drugs go inside 
every coffeeshop, stowed inside patrons’ pockets and bags. And though 
personnel do not sell to known minors, few coffeeshops have a doorman 
stopping them from walking inside, though even entry is forbidden by 
the government. In addition, detecting fake IDs is not that easy, espe-
cially when IDs are not consistently checked. These possibilities are only 
a few of the daily difficulties faced by coffeeshop personnel.
Mistakes are another cause of violations. For example, the 
500  grams limit is breached when a runner accidentally brings too 
much cannabis to the coffeeshop; this may happen if a dealer acciden-
tally orders too much due to miscounting the stock on hand. When such 
events occur, personnel break the rules by accident, despite being fearful 
of punishment. These violations are logically impossible to report to a 
researcher, unless subsequently discovered, perhaps by police. This also 
illustrates the regular problems that personnel worry about, lest they risk 
their business and livelihood.
*****
There is no business like a coffeeshop that has to stick to so many 
rules. The coffeeshop owner has the most worries of every business-
man basically because you have so many rules. It’s too much to com-
prehend sometimes.
–Gijs
Having outlined the rules and risks, the book turns to more specific ques-
tions: How do personnel go about obeying the rules? How are they vio-
lated? What are the causes and consequences? Each chapter examines a 
different rule, with the goal being to comprehend better how each rule 
shapes the social life of coffeeshops. First is how personnel stock the cof-
feeshop, a process complicated by the 500 grams limit and the illegal-
ity of the back door. Next is attracting customers by advertising, which 
can land a coffeeshop in hot water. Nor are all customers welcome: cof-
feeshops are obliged to keep out persons who are under the legal age 
limit, in possession of hard drugs or a source of nuisance. While handling 
those troubles, personnel try to maximise profit by selling customers as 
much as possible, though the government limit is 5 grams per person per 
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‘Never, never. That is the biggest rule we have’, answered Gwen when 
asked if her coffeeshop exceeded the 500 grams limit. To the same 
query, Luca also responded: ‘No, not allowed. If it is too much, we are 
fucked.’ As explained in the Introduction, coffeeshops obey the rule in 
case police come to check. Selma put it this way: ‘Never more than 500 
grams because I never want to take the risk of having a control [check] 
inside. If you have more than 500 then they can close your shop.’ Mai-
kel, the owner of Thing, addressed my question by saying: ‘No, because 
I would have to explain myself if the police came to check. I would lose 
my registration and that would be it, over.’ And Stijn stated: ‘When they 
come in and you have more than 500 grams, you are fucked. You have a 
fine [the first time] and it [if] is two times you are closed.’ Personnel must 
stay vigilant because the police checks occur without warning. To quote 
Joseph: ‘Usually about 450 [is the most it gets up to in here]. We have 
to be very serious because anything can happen. We don’t know when 
the police are coming. They could come today or come tomorrow, so you 
have to be alert.’
Early one Tuesday morning, I caught a glimpse of what checks 
entail. I walked up to At Last to meet its dealer, Maud, with whom I had 
a scheduled interview. I opened the front door. Standing there was a uni-
formed officer. His colleague was 10 metres away at the sales counter. 
The officer at the door said something to me in Dutch. With no idea what 
he was saying, I requested we speak in English. ‘Sorry’, he said, ‘you have 
to leave. The shop is closed.’ I asked if it would be that way for long. He 
guessed another 10 minutes.
I walked along a nearby street to pass the time and returned a quar-
ter of an hour later. I went inside, saw both officers at the counter and 
did a 180-degree turn. However, the policeman who had been at the 
door shouted that it was OK to stay, so I completed the 360-degree turn, 
24 GREY AREA
went up to the counter and greeted Maud. She asked ‘Isn’t this interest-
ing?’ ‘Yeah, very interesting’, I responded. The officer looked confused, 
so I told him ‘I’m a criminologist’, thinking that would clarify things. He 
must have heard me incorrectly, as he replied ‘Yeah, I’m a criminal, too.’ 
I emphasised ‘No, I’m a criminologist’. A funny guy, he stayed with his 
original response of ‘Oh, well, I’m a criminal’, and joked about why police 
make good crooks. I did not argue.
The officers left a few minutes later. Maud made me a cup of coffee 
as I reviewed the informed consent form with her, which I did with every 
participant.1 Then the interview commenced. I started the conversation 
by asking about the officers’ visit.
Maud: They came a few minutes before you. I was working and 
then boom, suddenly they were here. They came [in] like I did 
something [wrong]. They give you that feeling. They come with so 
many police officers, I don’t know why. This is crazy [I thought]. 
That was why it felt so like ‘boom’. There was one woman, I think, 
and six or seven guys checking everything: the toilet, the craziest 
places; weighing the weed.
Me: And do you know what [gram] total they came up with?
Maud: Less than I counted. They said, ‘Oh, you have less than you 
were counting’. I said, ‘Oh, so how did you get more? Maybe I did 
something wrong’. So then I got nervous from it because I did not 
know.
Me: What was your number?
Maud: 464 grams, I think, and he said we had about 423 grams. 
He said he did not know how come we had more [listed] than we 
have [in actuality]. Now we know [what explains] the difference. 
My boss says [to me after], ‘You count the list from yesterday and 
you make a new list from today [and added them together, but you 
shouldn’t have].’ I said, ‘Oh, that’s why.’ I was so nervous. He [the 
officer who was still here] was waiting for my boss because my boss 
also has a closet. My boss has the only key of it and they want to 
know what is inside.
The numbers were off, which may have raised officers’ suspicion; ditto 
the locked closet. Maud was understandably stressed by the encounter with 
police, given what was at stake.2 In the end, however, the police found the 
coffeeshop to be in compliance with the rules. Unlike Maud’s arithme-
tic, that outcome was not a mistake. ‘My boss does not take the risk’, she 
asserted. ‘You don’t take the risk for that, in case they come checking.’
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Weighing risk
To give a mental picture, 500 grams of cannabis fills more than a few 
gallon-size plastic re-sealable bags. It is a lot of cannabis by conventional 
standards, enough to provide 100 customers with 5 grams each, though 
few buy that much at once. Most coffeeshops have no pressing need to 
keep more than 500 grams on the premises. Indeed, about 90 per cent of 
my participants reported that they did not exceed that amount. To under-
stand further how the supply is managed, I asked personnel to specify the 
largest amount of cannabis that had been inside their coffeeshops in the 
past 12 months (Table 1.1).
Table 1.1 Aspects of coffeeshop supply
Coffeeshop Max. gram count # Suppliers # Monthly buys
After Hours 400
Alike All Over 470 35 4
Angels <500
Arrow in the Air 1 8
At Last 500.1 1
Back There 390 5 1
Buzz 497 6
Chaser 500







Eye of the Beholder 450 60 5
Fever 450 4 1
Four of Us 500 1 30
Hitch-Hiker
Howling Man 500 15
Judgement Night >500
Last Flight 450
Like a Child 495
Live Long 500 15 3
(Continued)
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Some establishments come nowhere near exceeding the limit. The lowest 
total is 200 grams, a number given to me for Thing and Maple Street. 
Anna said of the latter: ‘Never, ever more than 500 grams. We keep it 
Coffeeshop Max. gram count # Suppliers # Monthly buys
Man in the Bottle 500 16 8
Maple Street 200 1 30




Nice Place to Visit 500 4 5
Nick of Time 500
No Return 500 20 1
Open Sky 450
Passage 420
Perchance 450 1 15
Purple Testament 350 2
Shrine <500
Stop 350 4 30
Sun 460
The Hour 470 6 1
The Lonely <500
The Mighty 480 25 3
Thing 200 1 0
Walking Distance <500
What You Need 2
Whole Truth 500
Wish 480 1 4
World of Difference 500
World of His Own 400 50 10
Mean (median) 454 13 (5) 8 (4)
Note: An empty cell denotes ‘Don’t know’. ‘Max gram count’ refers to largest amount 
in coffeeshop in the previous 12 months. During first seven interviews I asked only 
if the 500 grams limit had been exceeded. For these coffeeshops ‘<500’ denotes ‘No’ 
and ‘>500’ denotes ‘Yes’. Also, Mike knew the limit had exceeded 500 grams, but not 
by how much; thus his answer for Judgement Night is recorded as ‘>500’.
Table 1.1 (Continued)
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lower, 200 or something. We don’t want to be over it because [of the 
risk].’ The next lowest amount is 350 grams at Meek, Purple Testament 
and Stop. Other coffeeshops set the absolute maximum closer to 500 
grams, but leave breathing room. The safe space ranges from a couple of 
scores to a few grams below the government-set limit. ‘About 460 grams’ 
is the figure gave by Claire, who deals at Sun. Mara put the figure at 
‘Almost 5[00], 480 I believe it is’. And a manager of Whole Truth, Lizzie, 
told me: ‘490 [is the maximum we go to], but it never goes over. It always 
stays under [500]. We are not allowed [to have more].’
Coffeeshops do violate this rule, however. The finding that about 90 
per cent fully complied means, of course, that about 10 per cent did not. 
Also, 11 of the coffeeshops reportedly bring their supply up to the very 
maximum allowable limit of 500 grams. They, too, probably break the 
rule, without being aware of it. This is because drug tourists3 purchase 
cannabis at one coffeeshop, smoke some of it and venture to another cof-
feeshop with the residual in their pockets or bags – a process that repeats 
several times in a day or across several days. Thus coffeeshops that stock 
te maximum 500 grams of cannabis are susceptible to being pushed over 
the limit by customers who bring their own stock inside.
Personnel also choose to violate the 500 grams rule – something 
not always approved of by owners or managers. I talked with Charlotte, a 
server at Nick of Time, about how a coffeeshop can be in violation because 
of business ‘under the table’. Though her coffeeshop never intention-
ally overstocked per se, she appreciated that the limit could be broken: 
‘Some [dealers] do other [side] deals. The dealers do their own things, 
not really from the coffeeshop. If someone comes and checks, sometimes 
there is 100 [grams not accounted for, potentially].’ Charlotte is saying 
that dealers selfishly sell their own cannabis instead of the coffeeshop’s 
stock, thereby increasing, in effect, their hourly wage and the risk to the 
establishment.
In other cases, exceeding the 500 grams rule is a management 
decision. Finn reported the largest amount during the preceding year, 
specifically 800 grams in Execution. He also told me of a time the police 
found even more there. It happened a few years ago,4 and resulted in 
‘an extremely pleasant altercation with a judge’. He was being sarcas-
tic. ‘I had more than 500 grams on the premises and they found it, 900 
[grams].’ The violation was punished with ‘a fine, about €1,200’. He took 
the loss in his stride, comparing it to the life of a sports professional: ‘If 
you are a professional football player, you can get injured. You might not 
like it, but that is what you chose to do.’
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Clearly that experience failed to deter Finn from keeping more 
stock on hand than allowed, as he continues to do so.5 Other coffeeshops 
change trajectory after being caught and punished.6 Jana, a dealer 
at World of Difference, described an incident that led to its reformed 
operation:
They [police] come to check that all things are right, and to check 
[that] you have no more than 500 grams in the shop. They found 
30 grams too much. They kept me responsible for that 30 grams too 
much. It was a lot of things coming together. First, they get irritated 
because I didn’t have my ID on me. Then they get irritated because 
there was too much. And then I didn’t have a key for the safe, so 
there were a lot of things. I didn’t really agree with the way it went 
because I am not responsible for the things that go on around here. 
If my boss had too much they [police] should not try to make me 
responsible because I am the only one in the shop.
The series of calamities resulted in Jana being jailed ‘until somebody – 
my former boyfriend – brought my passport to the station’. I asked Jana, 
‘Do you guys ever have more than 500 grams here any more?’ Her answer 
demonstrates that coffeeshops become obedient because of sanction 
experiences:
No, never again. Before we start, we always count how much we 
have, and that is about 450. It was really, really bad [being in jail], 
because in the beginning I was always thinking, ‘Yeah, If I go to the 
station it is not nice, but it is not that bad’. Then I was there for eight 
hours and then I was thinking, ‘Yeah, I appreciate my freedom of 
smoking a cigarette or drinking a coffee when I want’. Also, the sta-
tion where they put me was with a lot of junkies and it was really, 
really bad that you cannot go where you want to go.
Checking
Personnel keep within the 500 grams through constant accounting, or 
what they refer to as ‘checking’.7 Ruben, for example, said the shop’s sup-
ply is kept ‘a little bit under [500], like 480. We check a lot’. When I asked 
Wouter, a dealer at Live Long, if the total ever breaches 500 grams, he 
answered: ‘No, because we check that, we check that. Between 4 and 5 
hundred [is what it gets to], but we check it.’
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Checking occurs where cannabis is sold: the dealer counter. In 
some coffeeshops this counter stands apart from that for food and drink. 
In others, the counters for cannabis, food and drink are adjacent or one 
and the same.8 Either way, coffeeshops store stock on, under or behind 
the dealer counter, where the cannabis menu tends to be found too. 
Menus are discussed further in the next chapter.
Checking in the old days was a pen-and-paper process, but this 
method still persists at less prosperous or old-fashioned coffeeshops. It 
works by personnel starting the day or shift with a known number of 
grams in the shop, for example 450. They subtract each gram as it is 
sold and add each gram delivered by a runner, owner or manager, or 
a supplier. I often watched Selma do this at Man in the Bottle, where I 
was a regular. When a customer ordered marijuana or hashish, or ‘hash’ 
for short, she grabbed her pen and a single sheet of paper divided into 
many rows and three columns labelled with type, quantity and price. For 
each sale, that information is recorded in a different row. As needed, the 
entries are subtracted from the starting amount to determine how much 
cannabis is inside the coffeeshop. This shows the types and quantities 
required to restock up to the self-imposed or government limit.
By the time of my study, many coffeeshops had transitioned from 
the pen-and-paper method to electronic accounting. This is done with 
a special computer, or computers, connected to the coffeeshop’s digital 
scale(s). To use these, a dealer tells the computer which type of canna-
bis is being sold; this looks the same as servers tapping screens in res-
taurants. Before or after communicating information to the computer, 
the dealer puts the selection on the scale, aiming to parcel out precisely 
the amount ordered by the customer. The scale relays that amount to the 
computer, which then multiples that number by the pre-programmed 
price and displays it on the monitor.
Though more expensive than the old-school accounting method, 
the electronic method is easier for personnel to deal with; it is also more 
accurate. In James’s words, the benefit of computer-based checking is 
knowing ‘exactly to .00 [grams] how much you have in stock at all times’. 
Jack described the system in more detail:
The legal limit is 500 grams, everything included, and that includes 
our cakes, our joints, our weed and our hash. We keep it at about 
470, just to be on the safe side, just in case one of the staff mem-
bers has a 10 gram bag in their pocket. We are very strict. When we 
got this whole computerised system, we [now] have a system and 
spreadsheets and all sorts. I can push a button now and see exactly 
how many grams are in the building.
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As Jack mentions, the cannabis products of coffeeshops include 
loose marijuana and hash, pre-rolled joints and cakes – or, more gener-
ally, ‘space’ food. Marijuana is a green plant substance while hash is a 
hard, clay-like substance made from the resin of marijuana (Figures 1.1 
and 1.2). Across coffeeshops in the 1012, more than a 100 marijuana 
strains and 50 kinds of hash were available during my time in Amsterdam. 
Twenty-two is the largest number of marijuana strains that I saw sold at 
an establishment: four is the fewest, and about 10 is typical. For hash, 
the most I noticed being sold at a single coffeeshop is 13 types, with four 
being the least and about six the norm.
There are two ways in which coffeeshops sell ‘loose’ cannabis, 
meaning cannabis not already rolled into joints or baked into food. One 
is the ‘free-weigh system’, in which marijuana and hash are weighed and 
bagged in front of the customer. Until sold, each variety of loose mar-
ijuana is stored in its own plastic or metal container that can comfort-
ably hold between 10 and 20 grams. When a customer orders a strain, 
the dealer reaches into the appropriate container and weighs out the 
requested amount. With a computerised system, this is automatically 
subtracted from the gram total; if pen and paper are used, it is written 
down.
The ‘pre-weigh system’ is different. The weighing and bagging of 
loose cannabis is done off-site. There are two ways of storing and selling 
Figure 1.1  A piece of marijuana weighing about 0.5 to 1 gram. 
Coffeeshops using the pre-weigh system would have this ‘nug’ ready for 
sale in a plastic bag, labelled with weight and price. Coffeeshops using the 
free-weigh system would select one or more ‘nugs’ from a plastic or metal 
container to build up the correct weight on the scale. Source: author
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pre-weighed bags. The more common of the two resembles the free-
weigh process in that the bags are stored in containers, each of a single 
variety. The other way resembles a jewellers where items are displayed 
in a glass case, except that here the items are cannabis in plastic bags. 
Customers look it over until they spot what they want and then inform 
the dealer. I asked Luca why they do it that way at The Lonely. ‘Because 
you want to see what you are buying’, he explained. ‘You want to see 
what you buy. That is the whole idea.’
In addition to loose marijuana and hash, coffeeshops sell pre-rolled 
joints. Three types are found on menus: marijuana mixed with tobacco; 
hash mixed with tobacco; and marijuana alone, referred to as ‘pure’.9 
Edibles are another option. When ingested, these produce a psychoactive 
effect, albeit a slightly different high to that experienced by smoking. In 
addition, the effect of edibles takes longer to feel and lasts for longer. 
In Amsterdam, the word ‘space’ is added to their name to denote psy-
chopharmacological properties. Customers can find space cookies, space 
cakes, space muffins and space brownies in a few flavours, but mostly 
chocolate.
Pre-rolled joints and edibles count toward the 500 grams limit. 
Emma mentioned how pre-rolled joints weigh into their accounting: ‘We 
will have a maximum of maybe 350 [grams], but we usually try to keep 
Figure 1.2 Two large blocks of hash, each weighing several grams. 
Coffeeshops using the pre-weigh system cut this hash into small 
portions and place them in labelled plastic bags. Coffeeshops using the 
free-weigh system cut these blocks with a large kitchen knife when a 
customer places an order. The dealer seeks to cut off the exact amount 
ordered to give the customer a solid piece. Source: author
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well under it, because they count 0.3 grams for a joint, so you have to be 
well under the 500 grams, so we always make sure.’10 Stijn commented 
on how edibles add up: ‘We do 400 [grams maximum] because we have 
space cakes, and we have about 100 [of them] and that is 40 grams. Max 
in the shop is 450. Yeah man, no more than 500 grams.’
From a business standpoint, offering a greater variety is good, to 
the extent it generates sales. Yet it increases the difficulty of checking 
and restocking. For instance, Dean initially said of Dollar Room’s supply, 
‘There are no problems getting it’, but then corrected himself: ‘Well, that 
is not really true. Sometimes you have problems, [such as] that we don’t 
have that kind of [variety of] weed or something. Special strains, some-
times you have it, sometimes you don’t have it.’
Because of such difficulties, coffeeshops wind up listing more 
products on their respective menus than can be reliably restocked. This 
is evident by looking at how menus evolve over time. As of November 
2009, for example, that of one coffeeshop listed nine marijuana strains, 
eight types of hash, five pre-rolled joint varieties and 13 flavours of space 
cake – by far the most I ever saw. A year later, that menu showed one 
less marijuana strain, one less hash option and no space cake; all were 
crossed out with a pen.
Restocking
As with any retail business, running out of items may result in missed 
sales.11 To prevent this problem, businesses stock more than needed to fill 
the immediate demand. Yet coffeeshops, especially the most successful 
ones, have their hands tied by the 500 grams rule. They cannot simply 
overstock cannabis on the premises, so instead they regularly restock. 
This occurs daily during closing time. At the end of each night, staff check 
how much cannabis remains to determine what needs to be replenished 
before reopening. Selma, who opened Man in the Bottle most days, told 
me how the restocking process worked there:
I wait for a text [message] from my colleague at 11 o’clock at night, 
or 12 before we close. He would put for me on the text the amount 
we have in total, the total after closing time. So like [if] he had left 
220 grams that means I can fill it up with 280 grams [in the morn-
ing when I open]. And then he makes a list of the stuff we need, and 
then I make the whole calculation of what I take, yeah because it is 
always 500 or less.
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Man in the Bottle is not one of the busiest coffeeshops, so they usually 
wait to restock after their door has shut for the evening. Other estab-
lishments make many more sales and are in constant jeopardy of selling 
out – a problem exacerbated by offering more variety. Though good for 
the bottom line, it causes a restocking problem. As Gijs explained:
You can only have 500 grams in the shop. You can imagine that we 
have 27 kinds of weed and 20 kinds of hash – so basically you can 
have 10 grams from every kind roughly in the shop to stay under the 
500. So you can imagine if somebody comes in, buys 5 grams from 
that kind [of variety], and the next person says they want 5 [of the 
same], then that’s finished.
When a coffeeshop sells out of a variety, one option is to ‘86’ it (i.e. 
remove it from the menu) for the day and restock once the door shuts. 
The cost of that choice is lost sales, so instead coffeeshops restock the 
supply while still open. A role strictly dedicated to restocking, day or 
night, is that of the runner.12 ‘One goes, one comes, one goes, one comes’, 
Imran said of them. If you keep your eyes open in a busy coffeeshop, it is 
easy enough to see them at work. Based on appearance alone, they look 
like many of the customers: casually dressed, often wearing a backpack. 
But runners take their bag behind the dealer counter and unload tens to 
hundreds of grams. Before leaving they put the new goods in their proper 
place and add them to the books, or hand over those tasks to an on-duty 
dealer or manager.
Though usually Man in the Bottle restocked while closed, I did see 
a delivery there due to an emergency outage of space cakes. The boss 
was on holiday with his wife, who usually baked them. Selma’s sister was 
asked to make some instead; she agreed to whip up 10 pans of space cake 
in exchange for €150. While I was drinking my coffee at the counter, a 
guy rode up on a bicycle. He came inside the shop and handed a back-
pack full of space cakes to Selma. She counted them, wrote down the 
number and stuffed the brownies into the coffeeshop’s mini-fridge.
Though cannabis deliveries are made in plain sight, personnel dis-
cussed them with an air of secrecy, if they mentioned them at all. When 
interviewees were asked about how cannabis gets to their coffeeshop, 
they commonly feigned ignorance. This secretiveness is a source of 
insight; it shows personnel are concerned about the de facto risks of 
transporting large amounts of cannabis around Amsterdam.
But almost anyone who works in a coffeeshop must know some-
thing about the cannabis delivery process. For example, when Claire 
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was questioned about it, her immediate reply was: ‘I don’t know, I don’t 
check this.’ ‘But you are smart, you watch’, I remarked. Then she admit-
ted the truth: ‘Yes, well, lots of times in a day.’ Similarly, I asked a server, 
Charlotte, if it is anyone’s job to bring cannabis to Nick of Time. She 
initially replied, ‘I don’t know. They don’t talk about it with me’, then 
added: ‘Well, [there are] three [runners] that I know of for sure, and 
then maybe there are other people.’ Posed with the same question, Stijn 
at first declared he could not answer, but continued: ‘Yes, of course, there 
is someone bringing the stuff in, but I really don’t want to say. There is 
always somebody coming to bring the stuff, at some parts of the day.’ And 
Sophie, in reference to the runners who deliver to Hitch-Hiker, said sim-
ply, ‘They work for my owner. It’s three guys we know, but we don’t really 
know what they do here. They just bring the weed every day.’
Runners do not simply show up randomly. That would be too risky, 
as it could put the coffeeshop in possession of more than 500 grams. 
Rather, personnel make orders that the runners fulfil. Mike, a dealer at 
Judgement Night, described how he and his colleagues called on runners:
There is another form of employee who basically goes into the place 
where the weed is stored, and comes to the coffeeshop every now 
and then with a certain amount. It is about 100 grams. Basically 
the coffeeshop cannot have more than 500 grams of weed inside, 
so that’s the problem when you have a lot of things to sell. For 
example, you have one top seller [strain] that sells like 40 grams, 
so you always need to have a lot of this one. You have weed that 
you sell almost every 15 to 30 minutes. You need to have it there 
because many people come just for that weed. So [imagine] a cus-
tomer comes and you say it is over [out of stock], so you don’t make 
money. So you call this guy who comes with what you want. It’s on 
a mobile phone that stays always in the coffeeshop and is nobody’s 
phone. This is the phone for the runners, and that is it. Just the run-
ners have the number [for the phone], nobody else. When you order 
things with the runner, you cannot say to him, ‘Give me 25 grams 
of this’, so you just say the name of the product that you want. That 
happens twice a day on a quiet day, but on a busy day it can happen 
about six times. It depends how much you sell.
Runners are not the only people who deliver cannabis to cof-
feeshops. Owners do too. When I questioned Maikel, who recall owns 
Thing, about getting cannabis there, he simply told me ‘I bring the stuff’. 
Owners rely on family to participate in the supply chain, too. ‘My parents 
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do that for me’, said Mara. ‘They retired and my father hates to do noth-
ing, so he says, “OK, I bring it every morning”. Sometimes, I will do it 
myself.’ Emma’s boss is normally responsible for deliveries, but she also 
discussed how he benefits from free family labour: ‘If need be and my 
boss is on holiday, two of my boss’s nephews and his little brother have to 
bring it. But they don’t get paid for it because it’s family. There are people 
bringing it, but it is not their job.’
The job description of some managers includes delivery. Speaking 
about the deliverers for Like a Child, Gwen told me: ‘They are assistant 
managers. Yeah, the weed store managers, and then [there is] one large 
manager who takes control of everything. Those three are also for the 
other coffeeshop [that is under the same name].’
Instead of making delivery part of an employee’s primary job 
description, another option is to pay them for the duty on top of their 
regular salary. This is how it worked at Alike All Over, according to Jack:
Generally the boss [owner] will do it during the week when he is 
here. But during the weekend there is somebody, well maybe two of 
them, whose responsibility it is to refill. That’s part of like an extra 
thing on top of their regular job with us [as dealers].
Independent contractors are yet another type of person involved in 
delivering cannabis to coffeeshops. Kamila referred to these individuals 
as ‘private persons, like about two or three persons’. When I asked if they 
are considered to be personnel, she replied, ‘Well, they are different’. 
Similarly, Adam, a dealer at Howling Man, said of the deliverers: ‘The 
manager is one of them, and there are two or three other people who 
bring stuff. They don’t work here. They are guys who work for the big 
boss and they have their own specialities.’
Storing excess grams
When a deliverer arrives with product in tow, proper accounting calls for 
the addition to be logged and added to the total. Like many technologies, 
accounting is both a way to maintain and to escape control.13 By keep-
ing track of what comes in and goes, personnel know with certainty how 
close they are to exceeding the 500 grams limit. And when they see there 
is too much, they can take remedial measures to reduce the risk of being 
caught in violation by police.
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One way to prevent too much cannabis from being inside the cof-
feeshop is to tell the deliverer to stay outside until enough of the existing 
supply is sold to replenish. Adam provided an example:
They [runners] come twice a day. Basically, every shift orders its 
new stock that they need, and we have to make sure that we stay 
under 500 grams. Well obviously they don’t just ‘try to’: they do. 
You can see everything on the scales, on the computer, to tell you 
how much. Sometimes they bring a bit too much and then they wait 
for another half an hour, until you have sold enough.
It makes sense that personnel have deliverers bide their time off 
the premises, but that puts them at risk of prison time. This is because, 
remember, possession of large quantities of cannabis outside a cof-
feeshop is a de facto offence. From what I heard, though, deliverers 
are rarely apprehended. Two circumstances heighten the risk. One is 
when the police set up a road block. ‘They close off the street’, Selma 
told me, ‘and everybody who goes in and out has to show their ID or 
passport. Then if they think you have something on you, they have 
the right to search you.’ Luckily for deliverers, road blocks are rare. 
In Luca’s words: ‘Those are things you have to watch out for. This past 
weekend, they put it on the news that they were going to stop all peo-
ple on bikes and check their bags. That is not very often. It is the first 
time I heard of it.’
The more likely problem for deliverers is a surprise police inspec-
tion at the coffeeshop. If caught at the wrong moment, such as outside 
the door, the person with the delivery is in hot water. If inside, the cof-
feeshop is at risk of exceeding the 500 grams limit. To prevent such an 
occurrence, personnel call to warn deliverers when the police show up. 
As Mike explained: ‘If the police come, the first thing you have to do is call 
him [the deliverer]. I know for sure it happened in the past. The runner 
was about to come, the police came inside and the first thing you do is 
call him.’
Whereas those troubles are situational, the 500 grams rule pre-
sents a constant problem. Breaking it jeopardises the coffeeshop’s 
survival, but keeping the supply elsewhere puts individuals at risk of 
serious punishment. To quote Sophie: ‘The big problem is that we have 
to get supplies in a half legal and half illegal way.’ As a solution, per-
sonnel store excess stock in secret places. Finn gave an example of such 
practice:
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Especially [on] busy days like the Cannabis Cup14 in November or 
New Year’s Eve, we might stash an additional 200, 300 grams [on 
site]. The additional inventory that I need for logistical reasons on 
those days is harder to find for the police.
Another coffeeshop I frequented is Everything. On a couple of occa-
sions I observed personnel secretly store cannabis inside the back of a 
small vending machine.15 These machines hang on the walls of many 
coffeeshops. They are about 0.5 to 1 m in height and width, and 0.25 m 
in depth. A glass pane reveals different items for sale, such as lighters, 
rolling papers, grinders and other provisions. Below each item is a price 
listed in euros. If a customer wants to buy one of these items, he or she 
presses a button to select the product and slots in the appropriate amount 
of coins. The product can then be collected from the hole in the bottom.
Within the machine is an area visible only when opened from the side 
with a key. This is the space from which items drop into the take-out port, 
but also where Everything stores excess cannabis. As I watched covertly, I 
saw an employee enter the coffeeshop and unlock the machine. He reached 
inside and pulled out a stack of cash. He quickly shuffled it into his large, 
bright blue Albert Heijn shopping bag – common in the 1012 because ‘AH’ 
is the largest Dutch supermarket chain; several of its locations are scattered 
in the vicinity.16 Then the runner unloaded 10 to 20 containers into the back 
of the vending machine, locked it and left. These containers looked exactly 
like those stored behind the dealer counter: about a fist or two in size, made 
of hard plastic, with a re-sealable cover to keep the cannabis fresh, with a 
different container for each one. I think it is safe to assume that the contain-
ers in the vending machine find their way behind the dealer counter, but are 
stowed in the meantime so the visible gram total stays under 500.
Coffeeshops also store extra stock in adjacent space outside the 
legally defined confines of the coffeeshop. Technically this is off the 
premises and so not checkable by police. Mike told me about such a spot:
In the boxes [out of which the cannabis is sold], there is always 
less than 500 grams. But, for example, it happened in the past they 
had it in the basement because the runner comes. What happens is 
you have to guess [what] they are going to sell in half an hour, so 
that he brings you [all] the weed [you will need]. If he comes with 
more [than you end up needing] and you have 510 grams in the 
coffeeshop at that moment [for example,] the first thing you do is 
take the 5 or 10 grams more into the basement or somewhere else, 
never into the boxes. It is like everything [is] hidden.
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Off-premises stash spots reduce a coffeeshop’s risk of being found in 
violation of the 500 grams rule, but do increase the risk of serious legal 
trouble if discovered by police. The danger is to whoever occupies or 
owns the space. Unless restocking is totally outsourced, coffeeshop own-
ers and managers have to decide on the safest place to keep their stock 
until delivery time. Unlike deliveries, off-site storage places are not a visi-
ble part of working at a coffeeshop. Thus some personnel genuinely know 
nothing about it, or little more than that. Lola, for instance, told me: ‘The 
boss, he buys [the stock], puts in a place that nobody knows, and then 
every day he gets [some of] it back and you have a supply for the whole 
day.’ When I asked Mike if he knows the off-premises storage location, 
he answered: ‘I don’t really know, but I can guess it is at the house of this 
guy. That sounds to me logical. But I am not sure. I never ask. I have no 
sure information, but that is what I think.’
Again this withholding of information – from personnel and from 
me – is evidence that the proverbial back door of coffeeshops is risky 
business. A degree of common sense dictates, after all, not to tell a 
stranger where a large quantity of a valuable, illegal goods are stored. 
A few personnel gave details, however. In line with Mike’s guess, the 
only off-premises stash spots I learned of are private residences. ‘I am 
not supposed to have more than 500 grams in the shop, so I have to keep 
it at home so it is not here’, Maikel admitted. Max thought that was a bad 
idea, noting, ‘As a coffeeshop owner, it’s best you don’t put stuff like that 
in your house’. Yet he acknowledged that Everything’s supply is ‘always 
in a safe house’.
For ‘eight to nine weeks’, Selma kept Man in the Bottle’s supply in 
her home. To contextualise the experience, she starts with a description 
of how it came to be there:
I started working here in April, and then in May I heard they [own-
ers] were going on holiday, so they were planning to close the shop 
for six weeks. That meant they would fire me and then hire me 
again after six weeks, when they came back again. And I couldn’t 
handle that – six weeks, no job, no contract, nothing. Then I wanted 
to go and talk with my boss to say that ‘OK, for me it was no problem 
if he wants to close for six weeks, but then I just need some money 
for this period, and then I can start working again and I would pay it 
back’. While I was saying this, I asked him is there no option to stay 
open and he was like ‘Yeah, if you want to keep all the stuff in your 
house. I trust you. Then we can just stay open’.
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For me to make the decision to do that was pretty easy because 
I would just be able to work every day and earn my money and get 
extra money. I had a total going through my house [of] 18.5 kilos 
because we had some stuff coming out of Finland. It became a big 
mess in that corner [of my apartment] because I made upstairs a 
nice table with a scale and everything. I had one box like this [c.16 
x 12.5 x 10 in, about the size of a banker’s box] and I had hash in 
there and then, you know, those big blue garbage bags, I had three 
really big blue garbage bags and my colleague was already telling 
me ‘It’s a lot, a kilo of marijuana is huge’. I didn’t know how it would 
look like and it was just very big. For the moment I had my sister 
coming over one day and I was like ‘Yeah, I want to show you some-
thing, look at this, look at this’. Yeah, it was really nice. Still, it was 
strange because I really felt I was doing something not right.
Regular suppliers
Coffeeshops sell cannabis above board, but their supply comes from 
the underground market. Jana described the problems caused by this 
paradox:
It is very hard to work with this situation. There are so many ele-
ments of the black markets, so it is very hard. You are still some-
times being treated like criminals [by the government], but you 
have a business and you pay taxes, you pay rent and [do] everything 
that the police tell you [that] you need to do.
In general personnel were reluctant to talk about the supply side 
of business. For instance, when I inquired as to how Passage obtains its 
product, Elias, a dealer there, was apprehensive. ‘I don’t think my boss 
will like [me talking about] it, and I have to respect that’ was his reply. 
When posed the same question about Open Sky, Joseph stated: ‘That 
question I will not answer. It is personal and I do not want to disclose that 
here. I am sorry. I am not going to say anything at all.’ Despite expressing 
trust in me, Jana was also unwilling to discuss the matter with respect to 
World of Difference: ‘I am not going to answer that one. It is the part of 
the business that is in a grey area. I am not the owner of this business. I 
know you won’t do anything with it, but I don’t even want to take that 
risk.’
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Other personnel could not talk about the supply because they 
knew nothing about it. ‘I have no idea. I can’t tell you that. I really have 
no clue’, admitted Stefan, a dealer at After Hours. Likewise, Stijn, Victor 
and Noah told me, respectively, ‘No idea’; ‘I don’t know shit about suppli-
ers’; ‘It is all done without my knowledge’. Lower-level employees looked 
at the back door as beyond their purview. ‘I really don’t know [about 
it]’, said Luca. ‘I only work here, and the rest is none of my business.’ 
Personnel such as Olivia, a dealer at Elegy, thought ignorance is bliss: 
‘I don’t know. I really would rather not know. They really don’t tell us. 
I am very happy that I don’t know.’ And though Gwen managed Like 
a Child, her responsibility was more for food and drink than cannabis. 
So when questioned about the coffeeshop’s supply, she responded cau-
tiously: ‘That I don’t know. That is information I don’t have.’ She then 
detailed why not:
It’s something I don’t want to know, to be honest. I think that’s a bit 
too deep down for [me to have] information. I think that is some-
thing that has to do with the managers and people that actually 
make that decision, not something that the girls who stand behind 
the bar have to know. Like, for instance, the dealer does not know 
how much I pay at the grocery store to buy whatever I have to buy, 
you know what I mean? So, I think it is information that maybe 
you could know, but it is not really necessary to know, I think. Of 
course, I would like to know in a way, but I don’t think it is our level 
to know.
Other employees knew a little more about their coffeeshop’s supply. 
When asked about that of Purple Testament, Emma initially answered, 
‘No clue at all’. After I politely pressed her, she added, ‘It is more than 
one [supplier], but I have no idea how many’. Then I probed for further 
information on how the money and cannabis are transferred at the back 
door. She speculated by generalising from her experience working there:
I think it is usually a direct transfer [meaning that the business is 
not done on credit]. And I think maybe there are a couple of people 
that you work with that you can first give them the money and then 
get the weed, but that would be only people that you have known 
for a long time and that you trust. Other than that, I am pretty sure 
it is always direct. That is logical. It is the same here: when I sell the 
weed, I want the money from the people before they start smoking 
it. Otherwise, they forget it altogether.
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Fortunately, some personnel were able and willing to talk at length 
about the two major issues involved in obtaining a supply for resale: who 
does it come from? How are transactions made with them? One of the 
findings is surprising and is examined in the next section. I also learned 
that coffeeshops have ‘regular’ suppliers, as many people could guess.17 By 
definition, they are persons who supply a coffeeshop ‘over and over’, to use 
the words of Hassan, a manager at Shrine. Maikel told me: ‘I have a regular 
[supplier] I order from; four years now.’ Other coffeeshops, such as Dollar 
Room, have more than one regular supplier. To quote Dean: ‘We definitely 
do not have just one guy. Maybe at least five or something, at least.’
Purchasers rely on regular wholesalers because it saves time and 
energy compared to searching for new suppliers. Victor put it this way: 
‘Basically, we work with the same people. If something goes good once, 
why wouldn’t you use them again?’ When in need of product, then, pur-
chasers simply contact people with whom they successfully did business 
in the past. ‘I call him up’, said Hassan. ‘I say what I need. I say I want 
that amount. It goes like that. He says, “OK, no problem, I’ll get you that 
amount”.’ ‘When I am running out of it’, Maikel explained, ‘then I call for 
it. I don’t wait until it gets finished. So say 20 grams [left] for me to get 
more White Widow.’
I asked how long it takes to be delivered. ‘There is no delay’, he 
answered. ‘Sometimes we [get a] delay because of transport – one or two 
hours.’ Moreover, having a regular supplier ensures a steady stream of 
product. This was a factor mentioned by Jasper: ‘If you have a couple of 
guys who sell you weed, that is very important that you have that, ’cause 
then you have the choice of taking the weed and stuff [before it is sold to 
others] because we sell a lot.’
Another benefit of buying from regular suppliers is that it confers 
better bargains. When the supply-chain question came up with Finn, he 
responded:
I never buy anything. I have never engaged in any transaction larger 
than five grand and I have never been found with grass outside the 
coffeeshop. I don’t want to lose my licence because of some fuck-up 
by the police. Our police force is getting dumber by the year. And, 
of course, the smart policemen do not walk in uniform. I have a spe-
cialist who knows more about these things than I do.
Then he called over the specialist, Florist, to join the conversation. Among 
other things, he explained how having regular suppliers stabilises fluctu-
ations in market price:
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The grower sets the price. If the price is too high, he will not get rid 
of his stock, and then he has to lower his price. [However,] right 
now it is summer and it gets hot, so the yield is not so high and peo-
ple are on holiday [so there is less supply to be had]. The price stays 
the same [though] because when it is easy enough they also want 
their price. They are not short-term thinkers. You have to think in 
the long term because people have so much choice and you can 
buy it from somebody else. So, if you sell it to me more expensive 
because there is not much around then I will not buy from you when 
there is enough around because you asked [of] me a high price.
A further advantage of dealing with regular suppliers is they are 
more trustworthy, having shown themselves not to be defrauders. This 
is especially important for businesspeople who cannot use the court sys-
tem to resolve disputes.18 When I asked Lola if her boss ever buys from 
strangers, she replied: ‘He has his own people whom he trusts, and I think 
he sticks with those people. I think about three or four people. He is going 
to buy from one of those guys what he needs for the moment. It depends 
on what you are searching for because you have so many types of weed.’ 
Meanwhile Jack told me: ‘We will deal with anyone we know and trust. 
With strangers it takes a little while. It is less likely to happen that we will 
take weed off someone we don’t have any knowledge of, if someone just 
turns up with some weed. Generally, it is the people we know and trust 
that we do business with.’
Some suppliers sell product that they personally grow.19 Legend has it 
that there are massive fields of marijuana to be found throughout Holland, 
but this never came up as a direct source of supply. Instead, personnel 
referred to suppliers as ‘house guys’. At the time of this study, the Dutch 
policy is to tolerate the growing of four plants at each residence.20 Clearly 
visible from my apartment, for example, was a neighbour’s balcony with 
an impressive garden of marijuana plants. It is de facto illegal to sell the 
product, but people do so anyway, with coffeeshops as prime customers.21
Other suppliers sell product grown by someone else. Wouter said of 
middlemen and women: ‘People who are growers sell it, but we have also 
people who buy it from the growers and sell it to the coffeeshops. They 
are between it.’ At Maple Street, Anna told me: ‘We don’t buy it [directly]. 
There is somebody in between.’ Mara detailed how her coffeeshop works 
with an intermediary:
I have somebody, and she takes care of that [the supply part of 
the business]. She is not on the list [as personnel]. When she sells 
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us something, she takes something. We pay her once a week. It 
depends how much you buy, but every week she gets money. When 
she buys something for 3,000 [euros, for example,] she sells it to us 
for 3,100 [with 100 euros as profit]. The normal ones [strains] we 
buy in kilos, that’s normal. Almost every time it’s a kilo. But when it 
is the more expensive one, like a Cheese [strain] or something, then 
we buy half a kilo [for] between 3,000 and 3,400 [euros].
Intermediaries are part of the trade in marijuana and hash. They 
are especially important to the latter because it is more of an import prod-
uct. Mike believed that the ‘weed is grown here. I know for sure that some 
hash in the place that I worked, where I used to work, that was imported. 
For sure they are. For sure it is imported from India, Afghanistan, India, 
Pakistan and Nepal’. In Ruben’s estimation, ‘The hash is mostly from 
Moroccan people, the Moroccan hash, and the black hash it varies – 99 
per cent is foreign: Moroccan, Nepalese, Afghani.’
A coffeeshop could grow its own cannabis. However, I only heard of 
this being done by one coffeeshop, which I leave unnamed because it is 
widely known to do so. ‘The owner grows most of his stuff himself some-
where secretly’, its representative admitted.
Because hash is manufactured, not simply grown, what it means to 
be a ‘hash supplier’ is slightly different. Other than making it yourself, the 
next closest option is to buy hash at its source, as did Selma’s boss:
With the hash it is different than with the marijuana. My boss is 
Moroccan. He knows what quality hash is. He wants to see it in a 
block, smell it, burn it to know exactly what the quality is, because 
he knows what the best hash is. So he will never let somebody else 
buy it for him. He takes it himself from Morocco. Or he gets it from 
Spain, he drives there, or he buys it from here when he sees it [is 
high quality].
A variant of the self-grow approach is for coffeeshops to cultivate 
relationships with their regular growers, thereby improving the profita-
bility of all parties. Consider what Max said Everybody does:
We work with people that we know very well, and even we give 
them help if they need it. We point them in a certain direction. If 
you have a problem with growing it then we send somebody, he can 
help you out. We have a guy, ‘Dr. Greenthumbs’ we will call him, 
and he will make house calls if they have a disease or anything is 
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wrong. We started to work that way because sometimes there is a 
big crisis because of all the [police] pressure – they want to catch all 
the growers – and we need to protect ourselves against that. So we 
made arrangements with certain people so that we are sure that we 
will get enough products for the shop.
Something similar goes on at Escape Clause, according to Gijs:
We have our small-time growers, who are nice people. So imagine 
I’m a grower. I keep my weed in the cellar, or in a cupboard in the 
house, and maybe I have a kilo of weed. For each type of weed there 
is a certain price if you grow it perfectly, so there is a minimum price 
and a maximum price. If it’s perfect you get a maximum price; if 
you didn’t give a fuck and you just grew your plants, then you get 
a minimum price. A lot of people you have good contacts with – 
you advise them what to do, stuff like that, so they grow good end 
products. That is part of our policy: we work with small-time grow-
ers. [Other shops] have around the [time of the] Cannabis Cup a 
nice list of things specially grown for the Cannabis Cup to impress 
the Americans. Soon as the Cannabis Cup is over, it’s all sold out. 
People can’t get it any more. We think differently, and this is why 
we have these close contacts with our growers. We try to stick with 
people we know.
Sample-based suppliers
Some coffeeshop purchaser–supplier relationships are based in pre-exist-
ing friendships.22 Luuk said of his suppliers: ‘Some I know already for 10, 
15 years. The one I know the longest is 20 years, and the most recent is 
5 years. Most are friends.’ A manager at The Hour, Jasper, described the 
suppliers as the owner’s ‘friends’. ‘They start [off their relationship while] 
little boys’, he explained. Mara was friends with her supplier before own-
ing Wish, so requested her services once it opened.
If purchasers and regular suppliers do not know each other prior to 
doing business together, how do they meet? There may be many ways, 
such as chance encounters and networking. Most commonly, though, 
back door relations result from the sample process.23 You may recall that 
Jack remarked ‘someone just turns up with some weed’. That is not a fig-
ure of speech: it is literally what happens. ‘You got a lot of people doing 
that’, to quote Lola. Wouter reported: ‘sometimes people come once 
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a week [with a sample]’. And Selma told me: ‘My boss has one or two 
steady people he takes his marijuana from, and the rest is just people that 
come in [with samples].’
The sample process begins, Ruben explained, when ‘people just 
walk in and ask if you need something’. Likewise, Mara said that sam-
ple-based suppliers ‘just come in, bring a sample, [say] “I’ve got some-
thing nice”, and they show what they have’. Maud stated: ‘I see people 
coming and if they say, “Hey, I got some stuff, are you the one who is 
buying?” I say “No”. It is my boss who makes the final decision.’
As touched on by Maud above, not all personnel have the author-
ity to make purchases. If the buyer is not present at the coffeeshop, 
on-duty personnel ask for the supplier’s information. Selma ‘tell[s] 
them to leave the sample, write down the phone number, what it is, and 
how much they want to have for it. Then I give it to my boss and then 
he decides what to do with it’. Similarly, Hanna asked them to leave 
their number. ‘I [will] hold it here and I give it to the owner. I will let 
the owner call.’
Another option is to inform the supplier of when the purchaser will 
be present. ‘With the weed’, Ruben commented, ‘you always ask them to 
show you something, and they have to come back when the boss is here. 
I can take a sample, I can look to see if it is good, but he has the final say 
of whether to buy it.’ Whereas he told suppliers to come back, other per-
sonnel, such as Gwen, told them to go elsewhere: ‘[I] tell them to go to 
the main office and then they can ask if anyone is interested. If they want 
it then they will have contact, but there is nothing whatsoever that I can 
do about that.’
Personnel do not entertain every sample-based supplier, however. 
When Stefan and I started talking about this issue, he said of their visits:
It happens, people come in. If it happens, they get the same answer: 
‘I don’t know nothing. I don’t know nothing about that.’ I don’t like 
to [deal with that], so I just say I don’t know anything about it. None 
of us [employees], as far as I’m aware, make those decisions. I never 
see any of that. I just work behind the bar [dealer counter], so I 
don’t see any of that.
There are other reasons for keeping out of the sampling process. ‘I 
don’t take samples from Dutch men’, explained Selma, ‘because I don’t 
trust them. They can be police officers, undercover or something. I 
always tell them to come back at 5 o’clock [to see my boss].’24 I asked for 
a concrete example, so she gave this one:
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These Dutch men, they were like in their forties, they started com-
ing in four months ago. They wanted to sell hash. I really didn’t trust 
it, and then they were like at one point, because we were talking for 
like 10 to 15 minutes, they were like, ‘Oh, let’s have a cup of coffee’. 
So they had a cup of coffee, and then he took the big block of hash 
out and he started rolling [a joint] from that. Then I knew he was 
not undercover because you cannot walk with a block of hash like 
this in your pocket; nobody, even undercover police who try and 
catch somebody in a coffeeshop, that is impossible. I told them, ‘If 
you want to come, you come at 5 o’clock and talk with my boss.’
‘The weed supply’, Jack stated, ‘is very much an open market place. 
If someone has a sample, we will look at a sample.’ Samples are not only 
looked at, but also evaluated with other senses.25 Jack continued: ‘The 
chance of me bothering to show it to the boss is pretty slim, unless it looks 
spectacular and the price is good, in which case I will ask the boss to 
have a look.’ Maud’s boss ‘smells it, breaks it, opens it’. Personnel caught 
between the supplier and purchaser become involved in assessment too. 
‘Sometimes’, Selma told me, ‘if they give a really nice sample, I test it 
myself, then I give the rest to my boss and then I say what I think of it. 
I know [from smoking it] what the quality is now from the marijuana.’ 
Humorously, Max described the good and bad parts of sampling:
I can tell you a funny story. My boss is on holiday, people come to 
show me weed and I have to look at this product. I don’t really know 
it that well, but I look at it and it looks good, smells good, but I still 
have to see how strong it is. But it’s one o’clock in the afternoon and 
I have to smoke a joint. [It was really strong so] I go like, ‘Oh no, 
I’m flipping out!’ I have this [new] dealer [we hired] who is coming 
and I have to tell him how to do his job right. I have to do all these 
conversations and I don’t want to be stoned then.
Not every coffeeshop bought from sample-based suppliers, but personnel 
still take advantage of this process. Jasper and I laughed when he said of 
samples: ‘I show them to my boss, and he says, “Oh yeah, now I’m gonna 
smoke it”. He doesn’t buy them. He knows his own people [who are reg-
ular suppliers].’
Yet if a purchaser likes the sample, they may get back in touch with 
the supplier who brought it. Maud observed of her boss: ‘If it is nice, he 
will want to know more about this guy, how much it costs, and how much 
he can offer.’ According to James: ‘They leave a sample with their phone 
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number, how much they have got, and I tell them it will take two or three 
days to go through the manager to ok it, and he will call them if he likes it.’
Assuming contact is re-established, the next-to-last step is for the 
purchaser and supplier to discuss, sometimes negotiate, trade terms.26 
Ruben said of this stage: ‘They ask you, “We have this amount, do you 
want it?” You say yes or no. Everybody who has something for a decent 
price, you buy it.’ If the purchaser thinks the price is too high, they coun-
teroffer. Hassan described the negotiation in this way:
Sometimes it’s like buying your groceries. Let’s say you are going 
to buy coffee from him and he’s asking €2, but you want only to 
pay €1.50. This kind of thing [negotiation], it’s like normal. It’s like 
buying beans or something, that’s the way it goes here. It’s not like 
a big thing, it’s normal. If you can’t agree about a price or you don’t 
like the quality, you just don’t deal with him.
I asked Ruben what a decent price is. ‘That depends on the market’, 
he replied. ‘It is like gold and silver [in that price fluctuates]. It varies 
between €2,000 a kilo and maybe €5,000 or €5,500 a kilo. With hash it is 
even more variable. It is like alcohol. You have a bottle of champagne for 
maybe €10,000.’ I did not ask everyone about purchase price, but I was 
quoted more or less similar numbers. When I questioned Jack about what 
a good bargain is at present, he answered, ‘Between top of the menu and 
bottom of the menu’ – meaning the best to least good cannabis – ‘you are 
looking at wholesale prices of 3 to 7 euros per gram, within that range.’ 
That multiplies up to €3,000 to €7,000 per kilo, echoing Jens’ assertion 
that a kilo of marijuana usually costs ‘between 3 and 7,000’ euros.
Trust, quality and price are all factors that determine what stock a cof-
feeshops buys. So too do the stock levels that they have in reserve. Whereas 
purchasers call regular suppliers when in need of restocking, sample-based 
suppliers come to the coffeeshop on their own impetus. For that reason, 
they may arrive at an inopportune moment in which the coffeeshop does 
need not a particular product. Conversely, a sample-based supplier can 
make a lucrative deal if he or she comes at the right time with the right 
product at the right price. In Maud’s words: ‘This can happen quickly. If he 
[boss] thinks it is OK then it will happen all in one day. If the quality is good, 
we buy it. It is about the quality also and the stock [we have on hand].’
This concurrence is more common at some coffeeshops than others. 
At Last is among the most dependent on sample-based suppliers. Maud 
added to the earlier thought: ‘It can be anyone. It is not always the same 
person; not just one guy who is doing all the stuff. We don’t have to find 
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it, we don’t have to search for it. They just come. There are people that 
do that stuff and just sell it.’ Perhaps due to their dependence on irregu-
lar suppliers, At Last is a sample hotspot.27 ‘In a week’, estimated Maud, 
‘maybe one or two are coming.’ Other personnel estimate a lower but still 
noticeable number. ‘A lot of people just come in [with samples]’, Hanna 
observed. ‘Maybe somebody once in every two weeks’ was Charlotte’s 
guess, while ‘maybe once per month’ was the estimate for Nick of Time.
At the opposite extreme are coffeeshops such as After Hours. ‘It 
rarely happens’, said Stefan of visits from sample-based suppliers. ‘Once 
every few months maybe. Yeah, it’s very rare.’ He theorised a plausible 
reason for the lack of solicitations: ‘Maybe they’ve learned that [my cof-
feeshop doesn’t do business with them]. I mean, if people come a few 
times [and] they’re told, “No, we don’t want to buy that”, you ain’t going 
to come a fifth time, right? They learned. It rarely happens with us.’
Making more sales and having more variety may also make a cof-
feeshop more dependent on sample-based suppliers. The greater those 
numbers, the harder it is for regular suppliers to meet the demand. To 
this point, Jens described the situation at Nice Place to Visit:
They will buy at least four or five or six kilos a month, if you want to 
have a consistent variety on the menu. In about a month, like four 
or five purchases, maybe 50 or 60 kilos a year, also minimum. We’ve 
got 20 types of weed on the menu, so that starts you off with at least 
20 kilos because you have to have at least a kilo of each in stock, 
and if you want to keep that going all year you have to buy 4 kilos 
a month. We probably get a couple of hundred kilos a year, maybe. 
There are at least four people, that I know, that come and deliver to 
us regularly. They are separate people, separate accounts. But peo-
ple that come off the streets [with samples], we get them [too]. We 
may get four or five of them in a weekend.
Looking ahead to Chapter 2 on advertising, it should be asked why 
coffeeshops put up with the hassle of buying, restocking, storing and 
selling so many strains. Owing to the large number of coffeeshops in the 
1012, it is important for these establishments to win market share by sell-
ing a range of quality products.28 This was mentioned by Willem, when 
I asked what affects his earnings: ‘Quality. Your product must be very 
good. Most people come for your product. If your product is shit then 
you are fucked. The main thing is you go to a bar for a drink, you go to a 
coffeeshop for a smoke. It has to be good product or they say, “What the 
fuck is this place?”’
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Yet the offerings at coffeeshops are about more than making money. 
From what I heard, the wholesale and retail price for cannabis is pretty 
proportionate to its quality. So long as a purchaser pays the going rate, 
the profit margin will be similar irrespective of what is on the menu. In 
addition, coffeeshops in the 1012 are less dependent on turning new cus-
tomers into regulars, given tourists make up much of the demand. Some 
visitors research where to go, but many arbitrarily end up somewhere. 
And countless times, I heard tourists give low- or mid-grade recommen-
dations to fellow travellers.
Despite those mitigating factors, personnel preferred to sell higher- 
over lower-quality product, and more types than fewer. For people such 
as Jack, this is a matter of self-respect: ‘I, for one, certainly want to be 
able to pride myself with the product I am selling. That is the point of 
having a menu, surely. I can say, “Look at my menu. This is the top of 
my menu, this is the bottom of it. This is really good, this is all right”. We 
should all be able to take pride in it.’
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During my senior year of high school I remember when a friend, Trevor, 
returned from Amsterdam. A committed stoner, he made good on his 
word to go there once he was 18. I knew about coffeeshops, but not the 
name of any. That changed when Trevor got back, as he proudly wore 
a Baba Coffeeshop T-shirt. Ever since, I have carried a mental picture 
of that name splayed above the eight-armed elephant logo. Many cof-
feeshops, not only Baba, deal in memorabilia. There is an array of prod-
ucts branded with their logos. ‘We don’t have ads’, commented Linda, a 
server at No Return. ‘What we do is like the merchandise, [like] T-shirts, 
sweaters.’ Coffeeshops also sell sweat pants, scarves, hats, key chains, 
coffee cups, plates, ashtrays, grinders, lighters, rolling papers, small con-
tainers to carry cannabis, and more. They even sell copies of their canna-
bis menu and give away other print materials, such as posters or flyers. 
Customers take these home and put them up on their walls, thereby 
spreading the word about coffeeshops.
The problem with coffeeshop memorabilia is it can be a violation 
of the rule banning advertising, the purpose of which is to minimise the 
proliferation of cannabis use.1 Consider what Jack told me happened at 
Alike All Over:
A picture of a cannabis leaf on that flyer, that can get us shut down. 
That was the last offence we had. A couple of years ago we got in 
trouble for that, and these things do stand against you [affect sanc-
tion for further violations].
The easiest way to avoid such problems, though not the most profita-
ble, is to shun advertising. This is the reported strategy for 85 per cent 
of coffeeshops. When asked if their establishment advertises, common 
responses were ‘No, it is not allowed’ (Adam), and ‘You are not allowed 
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to advertise’ (Lola). In response to being questioned about why Eye of 
the Beholder does not advertise, Imran responded with his own question: 
‘We are not allowed to advertise, so why take the risk in that way?’
However, some personnel understood that the rule against adver-
tisement is nuanced, not unconditional. That is, the ban restricts the use 
of certain information items in certain ways.2 The two key factors are an 
advertisement’s content and location. By content, I mean images and 
words. ‘Weed leaves are not allowed’, explained Lizzie. Nor is ‘cannabis’ 
or its synonyms. The word ‘coffeeshop’ cannot be coupled with the busi-
ness address or phone number. ‘We don’t even use the word “coffeeshop” 
on lighters’, reported Gwen. With respect to location, what could be 
considered an impermissible advertisement is not categorised as such 
if it is only visible from within the coffeeshop. Ruben told me of a time 
the police accused The Mighty of wrongly displaying “T-shirts with our 
phone number and address on them. It said “coffeeshop” and the phone 
number and the address’. The business argued in court this is within the 
rules. ‘We won’, remarked Ruben, because ‘the T-shirts were in a poster 
frame and you couldn’t see it from outside. We were not advertising them 
in front of the window, so you had to come inside to see them.’
Returning to content, Max clarified that advertisements are 
allowed to have ‘coffeeshop’ or the address and phone number. He men-
tioned this when trying to change police officers’ minds about what is 
permissible:
The guy [officer] comes [over to me] and he says, ‘We have a prob-
lem’. I said, ‘What’s the problem?’ He says, ‘This!’ and he showed 
me the match books that we have. I said, ‘I’m allowed to sell gift 
matches to the people. What’s the problem?’ He said, ‘No, look!’ It 
said ‘Coffeeshop’ and featured our logo. I said, ‘Now listen, you have 
to read the letter from your boss again because, actually, there are 
two things that I can do: I put my name on there, or I put my address 
and my telephone number on there, but you cannot do them both. 
So that’s my logo and it says ‘Coffeeshop Everybody Amsterdam’ – 
that’s it.
His coffeeshop also had a conflict with police over a flyer’s content. When 
the officers first discovered the printed material, they thought it merited 
closing the establishment. Luckily for the coffeeshop, Max talked them 
out of pursuing that punishment. He argued the flyer would not leave his 
coffeeshop and was therefore not a violation:
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On the old flyer, it said our address [and ‘Coffeeshop’], but we are 
not allowed to advertise [this way]. We put these flyers in the cel-
lar. The police came in and then this smarty pants – because you 
always have like two detectives, and the rest [are] from the police 
school – this guy from the police school goes into the cellar, and he 
went: ‘Yeah! We got them! We got them!’ So that means for us, they 
can close us for a week, and then he comes with the flyer. ‘Yeah, but 
what’s the problem?’ I asked. [He replied] ‘Your address is on here.’ 
So I said, ‘Oh great, then you’ve got me. Yeah, you’ve found a kilo of 
coke, you know? I’ve got all prostitutes in the cellar, what were you 
making a fuss about?’ Then I also said, ‘The flyer I can keep wherever 
I like. If I want to keep it as memorabilia [but not distribute], just 
to have it, I can put that in my cellar.’ So then the guy, this was the 
funny thing, he said, ‘I’m going to take it all!’ I was like, ‘You’re crazy’.
Other than the ban on nuisance (examined in Chapter 6), the rule 
against advertisement is the most ambiguous. This has both good and 
bad effects. From the perspective of government officials, including 
police, it is good because personnel tend to interpret the rule as a ban 
on all advertisement and so fully refrain. But for personnel who know 
how to play within the rules, the vagueness opens loopholes through 
which to push their advertisements.3 The best example is a series of fly-
ers distributed by jointly owned coffeeshops: the original Dampkring 
on Handboogstraat, the second Dampkring on Haarlemmerstraat and 
the Tweede Kamer.4 These flyers consist of public awareness announce-
ments about improper ‘coffee use’, paired with the coffeeshop’s name, 
and a striking photoshopped image, such as smoke rings hovering above 
a coffee cup, with a solid black background (Figures 2.1–2.5). In order 
that customers notice these flyers and take them home, they are placed 
at conspicuous spots that lend themselves to discovery, such as near the 
dealer counter or front door. They are also stacked in a way to encourage 
the customer to ‘take one’.
While having coffee, I listened to two employees discuss these fly-
ers with a customer who admired them. One of the workers explained 
that coffeeshops cannot advertise, so these flyers are actually ‘inver-
tisements’ – material designed to ‘bring out information’ about canna-
bis use. The other employee referred to these lessons as ‘The Hints’, an 
example being not to smoke every day. Then he pointed out that the 
flyers do not depict or spell out cannabis in any way because ‘we are not 
allowed to talk about the product’. Instead the flyers refer to ‘Amsterdam 
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Coffee’, though everyone knows this really means ‘cannabis’. For exam-
ple, the back of one flyer reads:
You won’t solve your problems by having an Amsterdam coffee. You 
should only use it for enjoyment.
Foreign countries have different law-systems. It is illegal to 
take Amsterdam Coffee or related products abroad.
In the Netherlands the sale of small quantities of Amsterdam 
Coffee is only permitted in ‘tolerated’ coffeeshops. You should 
therefore never buy Amsterdam Coffee on the streets.
There are different strengths of Amsterdam Coffees, so ask the 
coffeeshop staff for information. If you don’t know how strong it is, 
take a ‘sip’ and then wait for a few minutes before continuing.
Combining alcohol and Amsterdam coffee can result in unpre-
dictable effects, so be careful, particularly if you do not have much 
experience of ‘drinking’ Amsterdam Coffee.
Hearing all that, I decided to join the conversation. If they cannot 
advertise, I asked, what do the police think of these flyers? The employee 
Figure 2.1 Two examples of invertisement flyers (i.e. advertisements 
disguised as public service announcements) given away for free at the 
Dampkrings and Tweede Kamer. The reverse sides provide additional 
instructions on how best to enjoy ‘Amsterdam Coffee’. Source: author
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Figure 2.2 Obvious as it is that this painting of a coffee cup with 
smoke rings amounts to a cannabis billboard, the Amsterdam police 
deemed it not to be a violation of the ban on advertising by coffeeshops. 
Source: author
quoted above answered that officers examined them, but saw nothing 
wrong’; one even described them as ‘smart’. He added that their coffeeshops 
always work around the rules to see how far they can go. His colleague 
joined back in, saying more or less (i.e. paraphrased): ‘In the back of our 
heads, the coffeeshop name is on it and all over the world, people know the 
name because of the invertisement. But it’s not advertisement. This [inver-
tisement] is allowed by law, and we stick to following those rules.’ They 
were so confident of this that when the second Dampkring opened in 2008 
a massive invertisement image was painted on its exterior wall.
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Figure 2.3 Large bongs and hookahs are allowed in coffeeshop 
windows, perhaps because of their association with tobacco smoking. 
Words and images visible from outside the coffeeshop must be carefully 
controlled to avoid breaking the advertising rule. Source: author
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Figure 2.4 A window using Rasta colours and symbols to attract 
customers without explicit advertising. The Rasta aesthetic is strongly 
associated with cannabis culture. Source: author
Figure 2.5 The palm tree, the most common image of coffeeshop 
signage, is visible in about one-fifth of those in the area of study. It is 
another feature of the Rasta aesthetic, as well as a more general symbol 
of relaxation. Source: author
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Spreading information
People travel to Amsterdam for its coffeeshops from far and wide. Many 
of their itineraries are barely sketched out. People do not ‘randomly’ 
visit particular coffeeshops in the statistical sense, but rather by happen-
stance. It is common to see tourists walking down a street and pass a cof-
feeshop. They realise what it is, and then discuss – in their own minds or 
with companions – whether to go inside. Often they do.
To get the spontaneous customer in the door, a coffeeshop advertises 
itself as such on the outside.5 The invertisement of the Haarlemmerstraat 
Dampkring is unique. Ubiquitous are the words ‘Coffeeshop’ or ‘Coffee 
Shop’ written on the exterior. The government could disallow this prac-
tice, but Max explained its public benefit:
On every window it says ‘Coffeeshop’. Why? Otherwise you get peo-
ple in [who do not want to be there]. In the beginning, we didn’t put 
‘Coffeeshop’ in the window. We got people from 70 years old who 
came in. They came to drink coffee! No problem, but [they would be 
like] ‘Hey look, they’re smoking marijuana in here!’
To attract passersby, coffeeshops do more to the exterior than 
overtly label themselves. Some advertise their selection of drinks and 
food on the outside, or display the fact that they have amenities such 
as pool tables, air conditioning or Wi-Fi. Though no coffeeshop’s exte-
rior featured a marijuana leaf, presumably because this would violate 
the advertising ban, they incorporate other aspects of cannabis culture 
to attract customers.6 For instance, a few establishments put large bongs 
and hookahs in the front window. Several logos made use of the animal 
kingdom by picturing a dog, mouse, lion, bear or grasshopper smoking 
a joint.7
Bob Marley is seen, too, which segues into another way coffeeshops 
signal their identity: colour choice. Though their outside walls and win-
dows incorporate every major colour, the most common are green, red 
and gold. Nine of their exteriors are dominated by these Pan-African col-
ours, which are associated with Rastafarianism and, by extension, mar-
ijuana smoking.8 Another eight coffeeshops feature green as one of two 
prominent colours, typically paired with red. And green is the sole colour 
(other than black or white) at 25 coffeeshops. Half of exteriors, then, are 
the same colour as a marijuana plant.
Looking at coffeeshop signage, the most common symbol is a palm 
tree. Sixteen of the 84 coffeeshop exteriors incorporate it. I only noticed 
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this long after leaving Amsterdam while looking through pictures, so I 
never asked personnel for an explanation. I like to think that the reason 
why it is so common is that a palm tree’s canopy resembles a marijuana 
leaf in colour and shape, thereby covertly signalling its sale to custom-
ers. Or perhaps the palm tree represents relaxation, which cannabis con-
sumption is known to induce, or is considered another symbol of Rasta 
culture.9
Not all coffeeshop visits are unplanned, of course. Tourists and 
locals share tips on which coffeeshops to visit and which to avoid. Joseph 
mentioned that customers ‘always tell their friends and friends-of-friends 
[to visit Open Sky], so a lot of tourists know this coffeeshop’. Word-of-
mouth is a major way that coffeeshops acquire customers. As explained 
by Willem: ‘Business can’t always go up. You can only do certain things, 
like advertising is not allowed here. So it has to be mouth to mouth.’ 
Linking back to the previous chapter, we see this is part of why the qual-
ity and variety of a coffeeshop’s stock affects their bottom line, despite a 
heavy reliance on tourist customers.
Advice, though, may be based on little more than haphazard visits to 
a few coffeeshops. On countless occasions I heard travellers praising cof-
feeshops I deemed overpriced, lacking quality or variety, with unfriendly 
personnel, poor décor or otherwise below par. Giving advice is human 
nature, but few tourists have the expertise to make sound recommen-
dations.10 My Uncle Irving is an example. Years ago he arbitrarily wan-
dered into a few coffeeshops, and ended up liking one a lot – Coffeeshop 
Smokey in Rembrandtplein, which is barely outside the 1012. He told 
me about having a great time there; his face lit up from the happy mem-
ory and he suggested I check it out. Knowing him, he probably made the 
same suggestion to anyone else who told him of their impending trip to 
Amsterdam. My uncle means well, but in a city with many coffeeshops 
(that promote intoxication and foggy memories), it is easy to make inva-
lid generalisations based on one-off experiences. In other words, some-
one having a good time at one place does not mean someone else will 
be able to replicate this. It certainly does not mean it is better than the 
available alternatives.
Person-to-person advice is not all word-of-mouth. Written infor-
mation is shared in guidebooks, for instance. The guidebook author 
Rick Steves suggests visiting a coffeeshop in Leidseplein, a short walk 
outside the 1012 in the direction of Museumplein.11 It is easy to dismiss 
the notion of taking coffeeshop counsel from Rick Steves, but many 
tourists will like his recommendation. I both love and hate his guide-
books because they contain so many good suggestions. I arrived at this 
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view after my wife and I discovered a nice little bar near our Amsterdam 
Airbnb, where we spent the summer of 2016. While drinking, we noticed 
quite a few Americans there, which, for us, spolit the atmosphere. I joked 
that it must be Rick Steves’s fault, which actually emerged as the truth. 
The reason I made the remark is the same thing had already happened 
to us in London.
The descriptively titled Coffeeshop Guide Amsterdam is a stoner- 
specific travel assistant.12 The first edition came out after my study 
had finished, but it shows how coffeeshops can be ‘advertised’ with-
out advertising. The guide begins with a page on what the guide is 
and is not, then covers, ‘Do’s and Don’ts/The First Time’; ‘Terms and 
Definitions’; ‘The First Coffeeshop’; ‘Why are there coffeeshops in 
the Netherlands?’; ‘The Law Situation Today’; ‘Closed and Renamed 
Coffeeshops’; ‘Prejudices! What Prejudices?’; and ‘Amsterdam’s Best 
Coffeeshops’, organised by areas of the city. Among other disclaimers 
is the following, on page 1 of the book in size 6 font: ‘This book is in no 
way intending to advertise any coffeeshop or the use of soft drugs.’ In 
effect, though, the book does exactly that (and makes a pretty good job 
of it) by providing coffeeshops’ respective names, addresses, cannabis 
products and prices.
A similar observation pertains to another way people learn about 
specific coffeeshops: the internet. The website of the aforementioned 
book is <https://www.coffeeshopguideamsterdam.nl>. There you can 
find information on how to purchase the guidebook and see a map of 
the city’s many coffeeshops. Other websites include customer reviews of 
coffeeshops. Some are dedicated to cannabis, such as <https://www.
coffeeshopdirect.com> and <http://www.smokersguide.com>. During 
my study I used the former a lot, but personnel talked more about the lat-
ter. Others are more general in scope, such as <http://www.yelp.com> 
and <http://www.tripadvisor.com>. By reading reviews on these web-
sites, you see that some coffeeshops are widely lauded and others hated; 
most have reputations between these extremes. In addition to rating 
establishments, for example, on a scale of one to five stars, reviewers pro-
vide their qualitative assessments of a coffeeshop’s menu (variety, price, 
quality), atmosphere (décor, music, clientele) and personnel (rude, help-
ful, attractive). Also reviewers describe specific events, both good and 
bad. Examples of these are examined in this chapter’s final section and 
later in this book.
Coffeeshops are not wholly passive features of the internet. They 
advertise on their own websites. ‘The only advertise[ment] that we have 
is the website’, said Guus of World of His Own, ‘and we only advertise 
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[there].’ James commented: ‘We have a website, but advertising is a grey 
area because you are not legally allowed to advertise coffeeshops.’ The 
effect of these websites may be huge – as evidenced, in part, by Dean 
bragging of Dollar Room: ‘We have around 1 million hits a month on our 
website.’
As of 2010, when my study concluded, at least 28, or about one 
in three, of the coffeeshops in the 1012 had their own website. Some 
of these were barely websites at all, featuring little more than the 
establishment’s name, email address and a message that it was ‘Under 
Construction’. The more developed websites have information about the 
coffeeshop’s identity, such as its history, atmosphere and location, as well 
as its non- cannabis products such as memorabilia, drinks and food.13 A 
few coffeeshop websites display pictures of celebrities visiting the estab-
lishment, which serve as implicit endorsement by these high-status fig-
ures. Snoop Dogg seems to appear in every other image.
Coffeeshops’ websites feature rule and policy statements as well. 
One presents a disclaimer that different countries have different canna-
bis laws, and that the coffeeshop does not condone or take responsibil-
ity for customers breaking them. A few websites list the rules applicable 
to patrons, namely restrictions on minors, hard drugs, nuisance and 
selling more than 5 grams to a customer in a day. Two websites touch 
on whether websites are a violation of the advertising rule. One states 
that Dutch law prohibits listing its address or cannabis products on the 
website; this particular coffeehouse therefore does not. This statement 
is interesting because many other coffeeshop websites do list the physi-
cal address (though none directly mentioned or depicted cannabis). This 
discrepancy further reflects that personnel held multiple interpretations 
of how coffeeshops are allowed to advertise, if at all.14 The discrepancy 
also explains the reasons why coffeeshop websites come and go. On one 
home page is the following message:
Like all Amsterdam coffeeshops, a couple of years ago we were 
advised [by government officials] to remove all mention of canna-
bis from our shop and our website. The whole of our site had to be 
taken down. But we were not alone. Almost all the Amsterdam cof-
feeshop sites disappeared from the web. Nobody, it seems, was sure 
whether they could mention cannabis at all and nobody was taking 
any risks. Confusion reigned as never before. Time and tide wait for 
no man, but they do make one feel a little braver. So here we are 
[with the current website], having another go.
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The cannabis menu
No matter how customers find their way into a particular coffeeshop, 
they probably want to see its cannabis menu. Yet the ‘no advertising’ rule 
restricts how coffeeshops display this information item. It can only be 
placed on the inside of the establishment, for instance; as Selma said of 
the menu, ‘The moment I would hang this on the door or on the window, 
it is illegal’. Even inside, the menu is only supposed to be positioned at 
certain places. Lizzie explained: ‘The menu is not supposed to be very 
visible. So [for example], when people come in, they always ask if you 
have a menu [at the drink counter]. I say that we are not allowed to move 
the menu [over here]. They have to go to the menu [which is located at 
the separate dealer counter].’ Some personnel, such as Ruben, think it 
is a violation to show the menu preemptively to customers: ‘You cannot 
even show the menu to people. They have to ask for the menu. It is ille-
gal to have a menu on the bar. You can only have a menu on the place 
where you sell the weed. They have to ask for the smoking menu.’ For 
this reason, a few coffeeshops hide their menu behind a dark screen. The 
only way a customer can view it is to press a button below the blackout 
screen that reveals the options. But the vast majority of coffeeshops are 
less strict or creative. They simply put the cannabis menu on the dealer 
counter for people to look at as they please.
Cannabis menus are remarkably similar across coffeeshops. Pretty 
much all of them are a single page, or two pages at most. Other than 
maybe the coffeeshop’s logo, these menus have no pictures; they sim-
ply spell out what is available and give prices for a certain quantity.15 
Commonly seen marijuana strains include Amnesia, Bubblegum, Cheese, 
Jack Herer, Northern Lights, Super Silver Haze and White Widow. For a 
gram, these and others sell from about €10 to €12. The lowest price I saw 
is €5 for vague varieties such as Colombia Outdoor, Jamaica or a ‘Salad 
Bowl’ of scraps dumped together. The highest prices tend to be €15 to €20 
for varieties including Amnesia Haze, OG Kush and Head Band, though 
some coffeeshops sell the same product for less. Several coffeeshops offer 
discounts for buying larger quantities at once, such as 5 grams. More will 
be said about this in Chapter 4.
Hash is listed separately on the menu from marijuana, located 
either beside, above or below it. Caramello, Charras, Ice-o-later, Ketama, 
Super Polm, Water Works and Zero Zero are some of the most commonly 
offered types of hash. Compared to marijuana, there are fewer types of 
hash on the market, but they have a greater price range. At the low end, a 
gram of hash costs €4 for Afghan, while the highest price I came across is 
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€70 for 100 per cent Sativa Ice-o-later. The normal price for hash is about 
€10 per gram.
Recall that there are a couple of other cannabis products on cof-
feeshop menus. One is pre-rolled joints, which are sold for €3 to €10 a 
pop, though a few coffeeshops sell packs of three for €10, four for €12 or 
six for €16. Coffeeshops sell edibles in the form of space cookies, space 
cakes, space muffins and space brownies. They cost €4.50 to €7.50 each, 
with €5 as the standard.
To help sell items, some menus include a short description of each 
option. For example, the place of origin is listed as Morocco, Nepal, 
Lebanon or the Netherlands. The means of production is specified as ‘bio/
organic’ or ‘hydro’. The ‘flowering time’ required to produce the plant is 
given as between 9 and 16 weeks. Descriptions of smell and taste are 
‘sweet’, ‘smooth’, ‘spicy’, and of the expected high ‘stoned’, ‘strong stoned’ 
or ‘very strong stoned’.16 A few coffeeshops advertise that the item won an 
award, like those given at the annual Cannabis Cup.17 Almost all menus 
specify whether each marijuana strain is indica or sativa. Jens described 
the difference between these two subspecies:
You have got two basic types: indica and sativa. Indica makes you 
stoned, sativa makes you high. Stoned is the sleepy feeling in your 
head with the heavy eyelids and the sedation where you just want to 
mellow out and feel like a couch potato. Sativas are the ones that lift 
you up, make you a little bit more energetic, a bit more like helium 
type of thing like you are puffing balloons, you have a really tweaky 
feeling. The sativas usually cost more because they are plants from 
closer to the equator, so they are used to longer summer cycles; they 
grow longer, and sativas flower in 12 to 18 weeks. Indicas, because 
they are used to colder climates and shorter summers, flower in six 
to eight weeks. So there is variation in having to keep the plant alive 
for 8 to 10 weeks longer than another, so the fact is that you pay 
more for the weed. They also run twice the risk [per growth cycle], 
of course.
Consumption required
The menu of one coffeeshop reads ‘Drinks, Hash, Weed purchased else-
where may not be consumed in our coffeeshop’. A similar message is on 
coffeeshops’ websites, such as ‘No outside drinks allowed inside’ and ‘food 
we do not sell is NOT allowed’. The same is posted inside and outside 
64 GREY AREA
coffeeshops on rule signs, a means of control examined in the next chap-
ter. It is understandable that staff frown on customers consuming items 
brought from elsewhere. After all, coffeeshops make money from selling 
food and drinks. Indeed, what makes some coffeeshops more popular – 
and more profitable – is the variety and quality of their non-cannabis con-
sumables. ‘We are just a coffeeshop that sells better food than many of 
them’, said Lizzie. She continued: ‘Actually, older people don’t even think 
it is a coffeeshop. They actually come in, order two cups of coffee and go 
home again.’
In addition to forbidding outside products, coffeeshops require vis-
itors to purchase something to stay inside. Fourteen per cent of the cof-
feeshops have a sign indicating consumption is required. This rule is used 
in part to control homeless individuals who use coffeeshops for daytime 
shelter.18 Personnel work to keep homeless people outside because they 
tend to buy as little as possible, as well as for other reasons discussed in 
Chapter 6. Claire and her colleagues, for example, remove ‘people just sit-
ting there all afternoon and not consuming anything, then they ask you 
for a glass of water. We end up having people that have no roofs. They tell 
other people that don’t have a roof to come here [too], then they come 
here for a sleep.’ Dean described how a former customer lost his right to 
be at Dollar Room: ‘We had a guy, he was a good customer. But after he 
tells me a story that now he is sleeping on the streets, now we don’t let him 
in any more.’ Referring to homeless people generally, he explained: ‘They 
don’t spend anything, and that is why they are not allowed.’
On its face, the notion that businesses can require customers to 
make purchases or go elsewhere is uncontroversial. Yet this causes con-
flict between personnel and customers, depending on what must be pur-
chased and how often. Some personnel require frequent purchases, say 
every half hour, by every customer. Linda is an example: ‘I force people 
to drink! I harass people so my efforts [sales] are higher than everybody 
else’s!’ Other personnel accept a single purchase by a single member 
of the group. Victor provided an example of tolerating Italian custom-
ers, stereotyped as ‘want[ing] to sit there in the best places for the least 
amount of money’. He described how: ‘Twenty of them come in, they 
order one drink and they just stay there for hours and hours and hours 
doing nothing.’
Coffeeshop personnel require customers to buy a drink, cannabis 
or both. Some coffeeshops, such as Angels, are fine with customers only 
buying drinks – and even tolerate them smoking cannabis bought else-
where. As Luuk told me: ‘We have the “drinks necessary” [sign] because 
otherwise they come in and sit for hours and don’t drink anything. You 
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can bring your own weed, we don’t care. Our policy is you can bring your 
own weed, but not your own drink. You have to buy something.’ However, 
personnel at other coffeeshops do ask customers to leave unless they pur-
chase cannabis. I was frequently told that I have to buy something off the 
cannabis menu if I wanted to stay. One afternoon, for instance, I walked 
into After Hours and ordered a coffee. The dealer asked, ‘Something to 
smoke?’ ‘No, thank you’, I replied. She told me that is the cost of having a 
seat inside. I questioned this policy. In response, she claimed it is required 
of everyone. I left it at that.
Right or wrong, personnel have reasons for requiring patrons to buy 
cannabis. When interviewing Olivia, I told her of my experiences: ‘I go to 
all the coffeeshops and write down stuff. What is interesting about you, 
actually, is that you kicked me out because I wasn’t buying weed.’ ‘Only 
because this shop is so tiny’, she explained. ‘If people come in for only 
drinks, I usually say “No” in this shop because it is so tiny and I need the 
space for my smokers. But if people buy something to smoke, I am not 
going to make them buy something to drink as well. Smoking is always 
more important than drink because it makes more money.’ When discuss-
ing the issue, Ruben told me: ‘In the big coffeeshops, where you can stack 
500 or 600 people, there is nobody who watches who is doing what [so 
customers can get away without buying anything].’
In addition to a coffeeshop’s size, timing affects who is required to 
buy what and how often. In busier periods of a day, week or year, person-
nel are more likely to require customers to buy cannabis if they want to 
stay. ‘Sometimes people have to buy weed’, Elias said, ‘like on a Saturday 
when it is busy. But on a Monday morning you could come in, roll your 
joint and leave without anything. You have to buy a drink, but if you want 
to skin up real quick because it is raining outside, you can sit down. I 
don’t really care. On a Saturday, yes, you got to smoke.’
I saw this in action one early afternoon in July when I visited Selma 
at Man in the Bottle. Two customers walked inside and asked for drinks, 
but they left once Selma stated they must buy marijuana to stay. Once 
gone, she commented that were it a Tuesday or Wednesday, not Thursday, 
she might have let them stay with only a drink purchase, implying it was 
too busy at present. Days later, I asked her to give me more detail on her 
thinking:
Depends on the situation on the day you are in. Like now it is 
Wednesday, it is very quiet. If five people come inside, and they 
don’t want to buy marijuana, but just a drink, that is not a problem; 
at least they have to buy all five a drink. But then if we have a group 
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of eight people coming in on Saturday, and one person buys a bag of 
weed, I don’t accept it because it doesn’t go like that.
We continued to talk through the variables. First I asked, ‘What if one 
person bought weed but all eight buy drinks?’ She said, ‘That is OK.’ 
‘What if all eight just wanted drinks and it is really busy?’ I questioned. 
She told me:
No, because it is a coffeeshop, and I am here to sell weed and let 
people smoke. If eight people come and take space and it is already 
busy, and they only take drinks, other people will not come in 
because it is full, and they are the people who may buy some mar-
ijuana. In here we are a coffeeshop. You don’t go into a bar in the 
night time and get something to eat, not drink something. If I would 
be working in a coffeeshop three times as big as this one, then I 
won’t care if people buy marijuana or not. At least they have to buy 
a drink because it is not a public open place for everybody, so you 
have to buy something, but this place is very small. There are only 
four tables. So, for me in the end, I would appreciate it if everybody 
sitting at those four tables at least buys a bag of weed, because I am 
a coffeeshop.
An issue that comes up for tourists and locals alike, but especially 
for the former, is how many days of entry a cannabis purchase buys. For 
example, a reviewer on Coffeeshop Directory shared: ‘I was even told they 
wouldn’t serve me unless I purchased some weed. When I told them that 
I had bought a sizeable quantity only the day before, they let me stay, 
but at that point I was too bummed to bother.’19 Some personnel see the 
contract as expiring on a daily basis. Joseph rationalised: ‘In a beer shop, 
[can] you say “I bought this beer last night and this is half of it, so can 
I drink it here?”’ To that I commented: ‘But wouldn’t you say weed is 
fundamentally different from alcohol, in that alcohol you do drink right 
there, but weed is the kind of thing you hold on to?’ His answer was rhe-
torical: ‘Then can you buy the weed and go in your country [the USA] for 
one month, then come home [here in Amsterdam] and say you bought it 
one month ago and say, “Can I [stay in here without buying anything]?”’
It may make economic sense for personnel to require cannabis pur-
chases during busy times. However, asking patrons to do so violates the 
advertising rule, as I understand it, because it requires patrons to be told 
about their illegal wares. I discussed this issue with Ruben, who com-
mented: ‘You cannot make people buy. We do, though. It depends how 
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busy it is. If I just have nobody in the shop, it is crazy to not sell a cup of 
coffee. But when it is very crowded and we have limited space, you have 
to buy some smoke. If they don’t want to, then they go. That’s what we 
do, but it is not legal.’ ‘So there is something saying you can’t force people 
to do that?’ I queried. ‘I think there is a law’, he replied. I tried a direct 
question: ‘I have always wondered when I go into a coffeeshop, “Can they 
even legally tell me I have to buy weed?’” He answered: ‘No, no, they 
cannot. If people just buy a drink, you cannot tell them they have to buy 
weed.’
Selma and I also discussed the issue. She was uncertain of what is 
allowed: ‘I don’t know if I can tell the people that they have to buy a bag of 
weed. I don’t know if it is the law that I can do that, but it is my place [of 
business] and so I think I can.’ ‘What if it was illegal to do that?’ I asked. 
‘Would you keep doing it?’ ‘I would have to ask my boss what he wanted’, 
she responded, to which I asked, ‘What do you think he would say?’ She 
guessed that he would tell her to carry on: ‘Probably just keep on going 
because if everybody came in the coffeeshop and nobody bought a bag 
of weed, why are we open? I don’t earn my money off coffee and juice.’
Perhaps that mindset explains why personnel may refuse to make 
non-cannabis sales, even when they have plenty of room to spare for non-
smoking customers. This happened to me with great frequency. Once I 
went into At Last when it was almost entirely empty, except for a table 
with eight people crowded around it. There were at least 30 open seats 
and 10 open tables. When I requested a latte from the only on-site mem-
ber of personnel, who I think was the owner, he asked, ‘Like something 
to take for smoke?’ I declined, but he said it is the rule. I asked if he could 
even have that rule, which took him by surprise. He argued that it was like 
a restaurant requiring the purchase of food, which I counter-argued by 
saying coffeeshops are different in that the business is only half- legal. His 
facial expression showed he was unimpressed, so I questioned whether 
it is better to sell a latte or nothing at all. ‘Nothing at all’ was his answer.
If improperly executed, turning away customers is detrimental 
to a coffeeshop’s profit. It can also hurt their business in the long run 
if it angers patrons who then complain and gossip about the place.20 
Disgruntled customers do so to retaliate against the establishment, or 
simply because they want to help their fellow smokers. Many examples 
are found on Coffeeshop Directory, such as:
- Not allowed to smoke your own ganja brought by you! So if 
you don’t buy ganja there, it will be not allowed you to smoke there. 
Don’t wanna go there again.
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- Was forced to buy drinks from very rude staff. Will not be 
going back.
- Removed my bag, jacket, hat etc., all being watched by the 
guy behind the bar, I would point out, only to be told as I asked for 
a coffee that I had to buy hash/weed to get a coffee!!! I have not 
returned.
- I was told that one HAD to purchase hash/weed to stay in 
the coffeeshop, purchase of a drink was not enough. I decided not 
to stay and left.
- Very rude waitress, not helpful and disdainful. She refused to 
serve us just a tea, we had to buy weed! So we left.
Those reviews suggest that conflict over obligatory consumption is 
more likely to occur when personnel have a rude demeanour. Another 
reviewer described his take:
We walked in and were greeted by a guy behind the counter who 
asked what we would like. We said ‘coffee’. Without any acknowl-
edgment, he asked what herb we wanted to buy. We said we had 
some already and he then asked us to leave. He was amazingly rude 
and we were polite. It’s about 10 feet to another shop so it wasn’t a 
big loss, but I would have been happy to buy some herb from him 
had it just been nice about it, e.g. ‘Hi guys, this is a small place. I 
really only sell herb. If you want to smoke, I have some great stuff’.
When asked to buy something or leave, all customers do one or the 
other, eventually. But this may involve nasty words, threats or physical 
violence. Some of the reviews reveal that when customers take offence, 
their mind turns to vengeance. Consider a reviewer’s description of a 
contentious incident:
I got to the shop not too long after they opened on a frosty Saturday 
morning mid-January. I was the only person in the shop besides the 
dealer and his mates sitting at the bar, and they were all well pissed 
up [drunk]. I got a gram of weed, sat down, rolled it up and was in 
the process of smoking it when the bloke who sold me the weed came 
over to my table and started yelling at me, ‘Gee, so are you going to 
buy anything to drink, or are you just going to smoke that and fuck off, 
eh?’ I’m quite mellow and non-confrontational, so I didn’t respond. 
I simply stood up, and started gathering my things to head outside 
with my spliff. Again, he started shouting at me, ‘Fucking tourists 
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come in here and think they don’t have to buy anything to drink’, 
and then [said] some rather harsh sounding Dutch to his mates at 
the bar. At this point I had had enough, so I simply told him to fuck 
off. He flew into a rage, slapped the joint right out of my mouth onto 
the floor, gave me a push towards the door and told me, ‘Fuck off 
and don’t fucking come back in here’. I paused for a moment, but his 
dodgy mates were already getting up from their barstools. I decided 
it would be best to leave at that point.
Such conflicts are also a problem from the personnel’s perspective. Luca 
told me about one troublesome individual:
This guy is always shouting, always drunk, comes in the morning, 
wants to sit here and there are a lot of customers inside, but he 
doesn’t want to order anything. If you don’t order something you 
have to go out, right. So he didn’t want to go out, so I shoved him 
out and that’s it, end of the story. If you ask a person about five 
times, politely, to go out and he still doesn’t go out and he starts 
shouting, it is very simple for me: push him out. For me it is the 
solution.
And Lizzie described a story in which the rule requiring purchases led to 
tangible conflict:
We had a fight with this guy who works at [a nearby bar] because 
everyone that stays [here] is supposed to drink something. He told 
me he just wanted a drag of his water pipe and then he was going 
to go. Then he went to sit down like more elaborate, and I said to 
him, ‘Look, you know you have to drink something because that’s 
the rule’. He looked at me like I was air. He didn’t react to anything. 
So I said, ‘If you want to drink something can you please answer!’ 
Nothing, no reaction, no look, nothing. Then I got a little bit pissed 
off. ‘OK, fine, that’s it. Go!’ Still no reaction. So then I thought to 
myself, ‘Yes, I could ask the guy [who is my colleague] to kick him 
out’, but I thought, ‘I can fix my own problem I because I want to be 
taken seriously, also’. So I told him: ‘Now, look, if you don’t answer 
me I want you to leave.’ No answer.
He was sitting here [at a nearby table], I took the chair and 
then he was on the floor. Then he all of a sudden realised he was 
on the floor and then he got up and was pissed off that I threw him 
on the floor. I said, ‘Look, I had to do something because you don’t 
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react. You are not hurt, but now we can talk. But because you don’t 
answer I have to do something, you know?’ But then I said, ‘Look, 
it is finished now and you have to go.’ Then the dealer guy came to 
help me. He asked ‘What is going on?’ and I said ‘This guy has to go 
out’. It was very nice that the dealer didn’t make a story or ask about 
the story, he went straight away: ‘You – out, out, out!’ And that was 
it. Then he went to the other [coffeeshop under the same owner-
ship] to complain about me. He complained to the people there that 
‘This girl threw him on the floor’.
She went on to explain her reaction as a matter of keeping Whole Truth 
under control:
I try to remind people that they are a guest here. This is not your 
house, this is a business. We have rules. You are very welcome. You 
can do almost anything you like within the rules. Be polite: we are 
all people. And if you cannot be then go to one of the other 250 cof-
fee shops. Get lost. I mean I give [tolerate and compromise] a lot, 
but if you start to take the piss then [things are too out of control]. I 
don’t want people who mess with the atmosphere. The customer is 
king, yes. But I am the empress. In other words, you have to behave 
yourself.
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 4. Since leaving Amsterdam, it is my understanding that these coffeeshops are now under differ-
ent ownership.
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Coffeeshops are forbidden to have minors on the premises.1 There are no 
exceptions. As Elias told me: ‘A lot of parents think they can bring their 
kid. They say like, ‘They are with me”. I don’t give a shit! Nobody under 
18 means nobody under 18. That’s just the rules. We can lose our permit 
for that.’2 Complying with this rule is particularly stressful for personnel. 
Unlike the bans on 500-plus grams and advertising, they are not wholly 
in control of violating the ‘no minors’ rule. This is because underage per-
sons do walk into coffeeshops, or at least try to, despite the wishes of the 
coffeeshop’s personnel.
For example, Mara feared this scenario: ‘three [underage] guys 
[come] in, and behind them two cops [come in to do their check]. They 
come in, they stop the guys, they close the door, and then they say 
“Are you 18?” When you are working behind the bar, you haven’t had 
the time to ask them that [yet]. When they are inside, I have the prob-
lem because they [police] say they’re inside.’ Her hypothetical exam-
ple is based on real experience: ‘it happened in the past, then we got 
problems. They were police problems.’ James described an incident in 
which the ‘police caught someone [underage] in the other [coffeeshop 
under the same ownership]. The police went in, there was a guy of like 
16 with a guy of 17 who had actually bought weed. They were sat at 
some table.’ Asked about the punishment, he answered, ‘The dealer 
got fired. The police were very good [in that] they didn’t give them 
[the coffeeshop] a warning’. The Mighty was less lucky. After the police 
found underage persons on the premises, Ruben told me they ‘were 
closed for a week’. Of course, the worst-case scenario is that ‘you can 
be closed down forever, ever and ever and ever’, to use Gwen’s words.
It is good for a coffeeshop to have more customers, unless they 
overwhelm personnel and thereby put the business in jeopardy. To 
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that point, situational constraints make it difficult for personnel to 
stay fully within the rules that are examined in this chapter and subse-
quently.3 A well-known theory is people commit less deviance if busy,4 
but people also exert less control for the same reason.5 In addition 
to enforcing rules, personnel have other tasks to complete, such as 
weighing product, taking money, making drinks and cleaning up. An 
owner or employee will do all that alone, or with the help of at most a 
few others. Successful control is all the more difficult when it involves 
keeping an eye on many people in a large space not entirely visible 
from their primary workstation, such as the dealer counter.6 In short, 
when fewer personnel are working in a bigger, busier or less open cof-
feeshop, it is harder to keep track of who is inside and what they are 
doing.
Even in the smallest establishments, personnel become too pre-
occupied to guard against violations. Consider what happens at the tini-
est coffeeshop in the area, no bigger than a few small office cubicles. It 
is a popular joint, so, semi-regularly, the line grows to 10 people deep or 
more, at which point it starts to stretch out of the door into a tiny alley-
way. In turn, the personnel speed up their service, but this comes at the 
inevitable cost of less thorough surveillance. This increases the opportu-
nity for minors and other unwanted persons to idle inside until their turn 
at the counter, as a doorman was rarely present.
On that note, coffeeshops sometimes place an employee at the 
entrance to keep problematic people outside. Probably the busiest and 
certainly the largest coffeeshop – with more than 100 seats across three 
floors – has a doorman positioned throughout the day, almost every 
day of the year.7 This is uncommon, though. My student observers only 
encountered a doorman on 4 per cent of their visits, and just 12 per cent 
of personnel told me that their establishment employed a person solely 
to fulfil this role. But the coffeeshops that did so perceived the cost as 
worthwhile, as it prevented underage people, among others, from gain-
ing access. Mara explained why she pays someone to guard the entrance 
of Wish, the coffeeshop she owns:
He helps in the shop [a little], but he’s checking IDs and things like 
that because busy days it’s difficult – because you [otherwise] work 
alone – to check IDs and everything. It’s better [to have him here] 
because you, how do you explain it, keeps it a little bit quieter? It 
just stays quiet because when people come in, he watches and asks 
for ID. Gives a rest for people behind the bar.
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House rules
As alluded to by Mara, the major technique by which personnel prevent 
minors from being on the premises is to check their ID (short for iden-
tification) cards.8 Requiring customers to show their ID is a ‘house rule’ 
in every coffeeshop. Whereas government rules are enforced by police 
against coffeeshops, house rules are enforced by personnel against 
non-personnel, including customers and other people on their terri-
tory. ‘These rules are for you to have a good time’ reads one coffeeshop 
sign. That may be true. Yet their more fundamental purpose is to keep 
coffeeshops orderly. This is where proterrence (scaring people into pre-
venting others from doing something bad) becomes important. The gov-
ernment rules, associated checks and punishments deter personnel from 
certain acts, but also proter them into stopping non-personnel from par-
ticipating in those acts and others. So in order to understand how person-
nel stay in compliance with the government rules, or at least appear to do 
so, it is necessary to understand the house rules.
There are many house rules but, abstractly speaking, they come in 
three forms distinguished by their content and rationale. Government-
based house rules are those with content conveying a government rule. 
Their rationale is to make non-personnel aware of the government 
rules and thereby reduce the risk of them being unknowingly broken.9 
Examples include signs at coffeeshops specifying ‘Minimum age of 18 
years’, ‘No entry under 18 years’, ‘Attention!!! No entry under 18 years’, 
and, in case that is unclear, ‘Under 18 no entre and dont [sic] fuck 
around’. Other signs convey messages such as ‘No hard drugs’ or, more 
specifically, ‘No use or sale of hard drugs’. In addition, signs display bans 
on nuisance, such as ‘No aggression’, ‘No violence’, ‘No verbal or physical 
abuse’ and ‘No dealing in stolen goods’.
Another type of house rules are government-inspired. Similar to 
government-based house rules, the inspired type are meant to reduce the 
odds of government rules being violated. But government-inspired rules 
do not directly refer to government rules. Instead, they pertain to actions 
that affect the risk of violating them. An example is requiring patrons to 
show ID. Dutch policy does not require coffeeshops to check ID, but they 
institute this rule to reduce the risk of selling to minors. More about this 
is examined in the next section of this chapter.
Not all government-inspired rules have an obvious relationship 
to the government rules. A seemingly trivial house rule, such as a ban 
on wearing a hat or sunglasses, can serve to minimise violation of the 
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government rules. A motive for this rule is to get a better look at who is 
inside and thereby be in a better position to confirm their age. The dealer 
Stijn told me: ‘Most of the time if you have sunglasses on, you have to 
take them off. If you have a hat on, I tell you to get the hat off just to see 
your face for the ID [check]. Then you can put it on again.’ He further 
explained the rule:
I know the main reason people use it [the rule], because my friend 
is manager at Mind and Matter. It is because [if] they have one more 
fine [then] they are closed. Yeah, and it has just opened, because 
once they [police] came in and they found a guy under 18 there, 
and you can only get two [violations]. With two you are closed man. 
With a hat they cannot see good if you are old enough. The same at 
[my coffeeshop,] the Mirror Image. At Mirror Image, you have to 
get your hat off.
Some coffeeshops entirely ban wearing hats and sunglasses inside, 
not just on entry. For these establishments, the rule is also geared 
towards getting rid of street dealers of hard drugs, who are stereotyped 
as wearing these accessories.10 When I asked Jasper why they have a ‘no 
hat’ rule, he answered: ‘For the [street] dealers. We have a lot of cameras 
and when we see people with a hat, I cannot see your face. Hats off. And 
some people don’t like [that rule, so] they go away. That kind of people 
we don’t want. Please go somewhere else.’
This rule reflects the suspicion white personnel hold of young-
sters who are ethnically Moroccan, Antillean or Surinamese.11 These 
minorities are perceived as a disproportionately high source of misbe-
haviour, including not only street dealing but also nuisance, especially 
aggression. Having them inside, then, is deemed a threat to compliance 
with the government rules. Consider the perspective of Gijs, a white 
Nederlander:
You will understand that there is a problem with the Moroccan 
community, there is a problem with Antillean community, the 
Surinamese community. The Antilleans, they are behaving badly 
most of the time, and a lot of Moroccans do. This is not general-
ising. This is a small group of the Moroccans, a small group of the 
Antilleans, because all my friends who are Antillean or Moroccan, 
they don’t like it either. You have to deal with these people. If they 
want to come into your shop, you are welcome if you behave to our 
rules, if you are nice.
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Because the customary style of these ‘problem’ people includes a 
hat and sunglasses, personnel ban everyone from sporting these items.12 
Consider how Max explained the origin of Everybody’s ‘no hat’ rule:
A few years ago, about three or four years ago, there was a cof-
feeshop on the [Rembrandtplein] square and they [the govern-
ment] closed it down. That was next to the Metro station. A lot of 
guys from the Bilmer [which is about a 30-minute ride on the sub-
way from there], they went to that shop because it was next to the 
Metro station. When that shop was closed, they started to look for 
different shops. They heard about the quality we sell, so we had a 
lot of these guys coming in. I don’t want groups of Moroccans, you 
know Moroccan kids, inside. And so we thought up a few rules to 
make it a little bit uncomfortable for them.
Max added that this ban helps personnel to identify who is on hard drugs 
and, by logical extension, in possession of them: ‘You can’t even watch 
someone in the face because he has his cap on, his hoodie on. And also in 
the summer, you have to take your sunglasses off, and that’s because we 
want to see your eyes [to see] if you use hard drugs, or [to ensure] you 
are not totally wasted.’
In short, outlawing hats and sunglasses is a subtle tool for pushing 
unwanted customers outside. To the extent these stereotypes are correct, 
the rule stops (some) minors, people who may create nuisance, and hard 
drugs from being in coffeeshops. To quote Gijs again:
There are a lot of local youths with attitudes, let’s put it that way. 
This is not a racist or discrimination thing, but in the [shop] there 
are a lot of these kids living there that don’t care about anyone else. 
They are like street gangsters. They check out the American LA 
gangsters, and they think they can do the same thing here. Well, not 
in our shop! That’s basically why we have this [no hat or sunglasses] 
rule. When these guys come into the shop, other people get scared 
and they go away; they feel intimidated. So we have these house 
rules like you can’t wear a [winter] cap inside or any hat. When 
you take it off, you say, ‘Hello, good afternoon’, and [then] you are 
really welcome. Some say, ‘Oh, I don’t want to take it off’. ‘Then you 
go somewhere else, my friend.’
Of course, this rule is not absolutely effective at keeping out 
unwanted people. After all, they simply have to take off their hat and 
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sunglasses. However, the process is useful for sorting the deterrable 
offenders from incorrigible ones who prefer to go elsewhere than fol-
low a rule.13 By enforcing this ban, moreover, personnel send a clear and 
early signal about who is in control, and that they are on the lookout.14 
In Max’s words:
If you have a quarrel about anything [at the coffeeshop], it’s really 
like [with] people [who] have to take off their hats. There are only 
a few people who want to make a fuss about it, but those are really 
the people that you don’t want in. When they want to make a prob-
lem I say, ‘It’s just my rule. That’s how I want it. You can take it or 
leave it’.
It is critical for coffeeshops to create and enforce house rules to 
remain compliant with the government rules. Not all house rules have 
that rationale, however. The third type of house rules are unrelated to 
the government. Unlike government-based and -inspired rules, unre-
lated ones are not facets of proterrence. Instead they are wholly informal 
mores. Personnel gave me examples such as ‘No telephones’ (Jasper), ‘No 
dogs’ (Joseph) and ‘No food’ (Kamila). These prohibitions are seen in 
signs too. They spell out, for instance, ‘Do not hang on doors or windows’ 
and ‘Please clean your table when you leave’. Other signs get their point 
across by pairing the universal ‘no’ symbol – a red circle with a diago-
nal line through it – with an image of the prohibited item or behaviour.15 
And tying back to Chapter 2, a commonly seen house rule is ‘mandatory’, 
‘required’ or ‘obligatory’ consumption. Perhaps to avoid violating the 
advertising ban, none of those signs specify that a customer must pur-
chase cannabis, though some read ‘Drinks are required’.
The origin of government-unrelated house rules are based in per-
sonnel’s preferences and experiences, both personal and vicarious.16 For 
example, when asked why mobile phones are prohibited at After Hours, 
Stefan cited two factors, including one that could affect the bottom line:
Because you want to come in there and escape it a little bit, right? 
People are like [yelling], ‘Yeah, we’re in the coffeeshop!’ That’s not 
nice for anybody, especially the people working there. But generally, 
the music is up, [so] if I don’t hear someone talking on the phone, I 
don’t mind. But as soon as I hear someone having a telephone con-
versation and if it’s annoying me, [then] it could be annoying other 
people, right? You want to be in a nice atmosphere.
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It can also fuck with the scales. The scales can react to that 
[phone signal somehow and start incorrectly weighing the canna-
bis]. And you don’t want that, you don’t want that. Especially in 
the one little shop [that is part of our coffeeshop chain], if you see 
someone on [their mobile phone], you’ll see the scale vibrating, 
the digital reading changes. But yeah, it’s more the fact you want 
to keep a nice atmosphere. People generally raise their voice when 
they’re talking on a telephone. It’s like, what are you coming in here 
for? Go outside and make your telephone call.
A single house rule may be found across coffeeshops, but have 
different rationales from one to the other. An example is hats and sun-
glasses are also forbidden as a matter of respect and politeness. For 
Ruben, ‘Shades, they have to take them off when you talk to me. I want 
to look somebody in the eye. I am not working behind the counter with 
sunglasses’. I commented, ‘It is rude’, to which he responded, ‘It is. I like 
treating people the way I like to be treated’. At Thing, Maikel explained, 
the ban on these accessories is a matter of security: ‘You have to take your 
hat off so that we can see their face, to see who comes in. It is my place, 
and I need to know who comes in here, and who goes out.’
Furthermore, a house rule may have multiple rationales within any 
given coffeeshop. In addition to forbidding hats and sunglasses to keep 
out so-called ‘problem’ people, Max cast the rule as a matter of sociability:
This is not very social [to wear a hat and sunglasses inside], and I 
think a coffeeshop is a very social place. It [the rule] started for the 
[problem] guys, but now I don’t even want to see it any more. Most 
people, when I explain it then they think about it and say, ‘Well, 
you are right [that those accessories are somewhat antisocial]’, and 
then they understand and they are OK with it.
That quote brings up an important distinction, namely between the 
‘communicated’ and ‘actual’ reason for a rule.17 Sometimes, they are one 
in the same; in others, with partial overlap; still in others, entirely differ-
ent. Recall that Gijs explained that the major reason for banning hats and 
sunglasses in Escape Clause is to keep out the ‘problem’ people. However, 
while visiting his coffeeshop, I observed him explaining the rule to people 
as a mechanism of surveillance. A guy came in wearing a hat and then 
stood in line for the dealer counter, where Gijs was working. When the hat 
wearer approached the counter Gijs asked him to take off his hat ‘for the 
security’. During our interview, he told me that the security-based expla-
nation causes less conflict than the other:18
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There are more shops who have a ‘no hat’ rule. Already five years 
ago, I walked into a shop, and they asked me to remove my cap. I 
said, ‘Why?’ He said, ‘Because we want to see faces on the camera. 
In case anybody robs anything or whatever, then we can find this 
person back or we can show the police’. That’s part of the reason, 
and I use this to explain to people as well: ‘It’s to see faces in case 
somebody robs you, then we can find them back, etcetera.’ That’s 
what I tell people. I am not going to tell people, ‘Look, you look like 
a gang member and you have attitude’, because then you create 
problems. You don’t want to do that. You want to have this person 
feeling welcome as well, as long as he is nice.
Personnel frequently communicate house rules to non-personnel. 
‘They asked my brother’, commented a reviewer on Coffeeshop Directory, 
‘to remove his hat. Why?’ How people react to instruction depends on 
how it is delivered. A positive reaction is more likely when personnel’s 
demeanour is friendly, whereas rudeness is apt to produce responses like 
that of the following reviewer:
The dealer came over and demanded that my fiancée remove her hat, 
as it interfered with their videotape security system. I thought it was a 
joke. No, he insisted. I got the impression that he was convinced that 
two 50-year-[old] accountants with grandkids posed a serious secu-
rity threat to their organisation. We had enjoyed just about all the 
stinkin’ hospitality we could stomach, thanked them and marched off.
To avoid negative interactions, owners and managers teach more 
junior employees how to convey rules to customers. Gijs described how 
he educates workers:
I do guide them in how to act, and how to communicate with peo-
ple. I do regular talks with them on the shop floor, but also we have 
a talk in the office or something. I just [recently] have been going 
through [this] with all the dealers. There are about 20 to 22 deal-
ers. I discuss with them any new working scheme, some points for 
attention, some house rules, things they might not be doing right, 
steer things the right way again. Then I take any points they want 
to make about it.
If there are things happening, like people keep their hats on 
[when asked to take it off] or whatever, I talk it through with them 
like, ‘Say it in this way’ or ‘Say it in that way’. Always say it nicely, 
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be  friendly. In a professional way, you have to be nice to people 
where the customer is king. If the customer is a nice king, then he 
should be treated as king. If he is not a nice king then, you have to 
go my man.
Like verbal instructions, rule signs are used to inform and thereby 
control non-personnel.19 They specify government-based, -inspired and 
-unrelated rules, usually in English and Dutch, but sometimes in Italian, 
German or French. Rule signs are a pervasive feature of coffeeshops, 
found at 86 per cent of the 50 coffeeshops in the sample (Tables 3.1, 3.2 
and 3.3).20 The signs are affixed to the outside of a door or window, an 
inside wall or placed on the dealer counter or tables. The biggest sign is 




Outside Inside Outside Inside Out or in
After Hours X X X
Alike All Over
Angels X X X
Arrow in the Air X X
At Last X X X X X
Back There
Buzz X X X
Chaser X X X
Dollar Room X X X
Doomsday X X
Dust X X X
Elegy X X X X X
Escape Clause X X X X
Everybody X X X X
Execution X X
Eye of the Beholder X X X
Fever X X
Four of Us X X X
Hitch-Hiker X X X X
Howling Man






Outside Inside Outside Inside Out or in
Last Flight X X X X X
Like a Child X X X
Live Long X X X
Man in the Bottle X X X
Maple Street X X X
Meek X X X X X
Mirror Image X X X X X
Most Unusual X X
Mr. Bevis X X X
Nice Place to Visit
Nick of Time X X
No Return X X X
Open Sky
Passage
Perchance X X X
Purple Testament X X X
Shrine
Stop X X X
Sun X X X
The Hour X X X X X
The Lonely X X
The Mighty X X X
Thing X X
Walking Distance X X X X X
What You Need X X
Whole Truth X X X
Wish X X X
World of Difference X X X X X
World of His Own X X
Per centage with sign 66 36 46 46 86
Note: ‘X’ denotes that the coffeeshop has at least one sign. For information on the 
types of signs included in ‘Government-based’ and ‘Non-government-based’ columns, 
see, respectively, Tables 3.2 and 3.3.
Table 3.1 (Continued)
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Table 3.2 Government-based rule signs of interviewed coffeeshops
Coffeeshop No minors No hard drugs No nuisance
Outside Inside Outside Inside Outside Inside
After Hours X X X
Alike All Over
Angels X
Arrow in the Air
At Last X X X X
Back There
Buzz X X X
Chaser X X X
Dollar Room X X X
Doomsday X X
Dust X X
Elegy X X X X
Escape Clause X X
Everybody X X
Execution X
Eye of the Beholder X X X
Fever X
Four of Us X
Hitch-Hiker X X X
Howling Man
Judgement Night X
Last Flight X X X X X X
Like a Child X
Live Long X X
Man in the Bottle X X
Maple Street X X
Meek X X
Mirror Image X X X X
Most Unusual X
Mr. Bevis X X






Coffeeshop No minors No hard drugs No nuisance







The Hour X X X X X X
The Lonely X
The Mighty X X X
Thing X
Walking Distance X X X X
What You Need X
Whole Truth X X
Wish X X
World of Difference X X X X
World of His Own X
Percentage with 
sign
50 32 32 26 20 22
Note: ‘ X’ denotes that the coffeeshop has a sign. ‘No nuisance’ includes signs to that 
effect and also signs of ‘No aggression’.
Table 3.2 (Continued)
Table 3.3 Non-government-based rule signs of interviewed coffeeshops
Coffeeshop ID 
required









































































Dollar Room X X X X
Doomsday
Dust X
Elegy X X X X
Escape 
Clause
X X X X
Everybody X X X X X
Execution




Four of Us X






Last Flight X X X X X X X X X
Like a Child X
Live Long X












































Mr. Bevis X X
Nice Place 
to Visit
Nick of Time X X























X X X X X




30 24 10 6 24 22 8 14 12 14
Note: ‘X’ denotes that the coffeeshop has at least one sign. Because some of these 
signs may (not) be intended to prevent breaking the government rules, they are not 




about 2.5 metres in height, hung on the wall next to the windows looking 
out onto the street, with rules spelled out in red capital letters about the 
size of a hand palm (Figures 3.1–3.4).
A benefit of having signs is that personnel can point to them when 
people question or break a rule. To quote Olivia: ‘There are some house 
rules. It is mainly that if somebody does something, we can say, “The rule 
sign is over there”.’ This is useful for maintaining order by demonstrating 
the rules are not being made up on the spot, which could be interpreted 
as unfair treatment and cause further trouble.21
Written or spoken, house rules are part information item, part 
impression management.22 They signal to police and public that rules are 
taken seriously in this establishment. An example concerns Wish, which 
Figure 3.1 Signs such as these display a variety of house rules that  
are government-based (e.g. ‘No hard drugs’), government-inspired  
(e.g. ‘ID required’) and government-unrelated (for examples see 
Figure 3.2). Source: author
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Figure 3.2 Because not all patrons can read Dutch or English, signs 
use the universal ‘no’ symbol to convey government-based, -inspired, or 
-unrelated house rules. In these signs customers are notified that mobile 
phone use and dogs are prohibited inside. Source: author
you may remember had ‘police problems’ because of minors. Following 
these events Mara posted about 10 signs on the windows and door. Half 
of these signs explicitly banned persons under 18 years of age, while the 
other half stated that ID is required upon entry. Anyone who walked by 
could see that minors were not welcome at Wish.
Signs inform non-personnel of what is forbidden, with some con-
veying implicit or explicit threats. ‘When rules are broken, you will be 
asked to leave’, one sign reads. Another says at the bottom: ‘These are 
the rules. You can’t accept them? Please leave through the same door.’ 
Non-personnel get the sense that if they want to engage in certain pro-
hibited behaviour, they are better off going elsewhere.23 The choice is 
not always left up them, however. ‘We can choose’, said Claire, ‘whether 
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Figure 3.3 Whereas some signs encompass many house rules, others 
are dedicated to a single one. This written sign, under the Jim Morrison 
memorial, combines English and French to communicate the ban on 
minors. It is posted at the entrance of the coffeeshop. Source: author
or not they can come in.’ ‘We are very conscious about who we let in’, is 
how Thomas put it. Kamila stated: ‘I am obliged to ask the people about 
their age, about [everything], you know? You understand? We don’t 
welcome drug dealers. We do not welcome drunk people nor, of course, 
very young people. We don’t let them in, we just stop them at the door.’
However, personnel are unable to prevent every troublemaker 
from getting inside. This is because coffeeshops rarely have someone 
working the door, as discussed above (p. 20). Once inside, then, prob-
lematic non-personnel have to be expelled. The process was discussed 
by Emir:
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Business is serious. We must ID everybody. He [the owner] wants 
the business to stay open. If he doesn’t like someone who comes 
in here, then he tells them this is the last time they come in, like if 
someone is too loud. Only tourists, clean people, not criminals or 
people off the street. He has always been like that. We don’t want 
any problems, we don’t want people who might have knives, we 
don’t want that.
House rules are not always enforced. In part, this is a consequence 
of discrimination.24 The creation and enforcement of the ‘no hat or sun-
glasses’ rule is a case in point. Gijs stated the ban is enforced unless it 
infringes on religious practice: ‘You can keep it on if you are Jewish, 
Figure 3.4 This sign is seen across numerous coffeeshops, which is 
unusual because rule signs tend to be individually made and posted by 
individual shops. Source: author
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Muslim or Sikh. Then it is up to them, but they can keep their hat on 
and everybody else get off your hat, get off your hoodie, it doesn’t mat-
ter.’ When entering coffeeshops, I must have been told at least two dozen 
times to take off my sunglasses. This would not be a problem, except that 
my sunglasses have prescription lenses. So I had to reach into my mes-
senger bag, pull out my glasses case, take out my spectacles and put them 
on while trying not to drop them or my sunglasses. That may not seem 
like a big deal, but my wife will tell you that I can make a big deal out of 
anything. After a couple months of tolerating this inconvenience, I began 
to ask personnel if I could be an exception. ‘These are prescription lenses’, 
I explained. ‘May I please leave them on?’ No one said no, presumably 
because they deemed my justification acceptable.25
Max told me that once a year, the restriction is relaxed for Americans 
because enforcement is too costly: ‘We don’t do that [rule] with the 
Cannabis Cup because you have a lot of Americans coming in. These peo-
ple come to the shop, and [if] they have to take off their hoodie, and they 
have to take off their coat, and their glasses, they won’t even come in your 
shop any more because they think it’s so ridiculous.’ The Cannabis Cup is 
an annual competition in which coffeeshops compete to have their prod-
uct voted the best. The judges are smokers who pay for the privilege. For 
coffeeshops, winning is good because it generates press coverage – and 
free advertising – in smoker-oriented publications, especially High Times. 
Plus victory provides bragging rights over neighbouring coffeeshops and 
a selling point for the menu. Max explained further: ‘That’s the only week 
that we say, “OK, they can keep their hat on”, because otherwise they 
don’t come in and they won’t vote for you.’
Checking ID
Getting back to a focus on minors, Linda remarked: ‘I check ID on 
everything because we are not allowed to have people under 18 in[side], 
and I don’t want to lose the permit.’ ‘You have to always ask for ID any-
way because you don’t want anyone under 18 in your shop’, Gijs told me. 
‘The police can close you [for that].’26 Then referring to his employees, 
he added: ‘Almost daily, I keep reminding them to check the fucking IDs, 
because what happens is if they [police] catch you with 17-year-olds 
inside, they can close you for a week straight away [or more]. That’s a 
week with no profit, a week with no work for people inside the shop, 
customers can’t go there. It’s negative for everybody.’
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Customers should expect to be asked for ID. A rule sign to that effect 
is posted in 46 per cent of coffeeshops, in addition to the two-thirds that 
display a sign specifying ‘no minors’. Examples of these signs include ‘ID 
required’, ‘ID must be shown on request’, ‘ID compulsory on demand’, 
‘Keep your ID ready’, and ‘Show ID please’. Coffeeshops also spell out this 
rule on the cannabis menu, stating, for example ‘Minimum age 18, only 
when valid ID’, ‘Minimum buy age = 18 years. It’s necessary to show your 
ID-card’, ‘Beware for proof of age! We don’t sell underneath the age of 
18!’ and ‘Minimum age 18 I.D. required!’
Personnel assume that by checking ID, they succeed at not selling to 
minors. Ninety-four per cent of coffeeshops reported full compliance with 
the rule in the previous 12 months, or so they claimed. Typical responses 
to the question include: ‘No, I am sure [this didn’t happen]. I am very 
hard on [enforcing] this one’ (Claire); ‘No, we are very strict’ (Stijn); ‘No, 
we are very strict in this coffeeshop’ (Sophie); and ‘No, never, not even 
by accident’ (Maikel). When I asked whether Arrow in the Air had sold 
to any underage persons, Kamila’s reply was definitive: ‘No, because we 
check everyone. We check everybody.’ Imran answered the question in 
similar vein: ‘No, never. I am 1,000 per cent sure because the girl [drink 
server] is there. The bar is pretty near to the entrance. It is a smaller area, 
and it is easier to control. Anybody that enters, she will see. She will ask 
straight away for identity.’
It is common for personnel to encounter persons without ID, or at 
least claiming such. Coffeeshops have a house rule for dealing with this 
problem as well. Specifically, people must leave if they cannot show ID 
when asked, even if they are clearly over 18. ‘No entry without ID’ reads 
one sign. And Wouter said of Live Long: ‘We ask for cards, and if they 
don’t have a card, don’t have ID, they are gone.’ Referring to underage 
persons, Jens asserted: ‘If the cops come in they create a problem, and 
[so] you shouldn’t let them in without a valid ID, even if they are old 
enough.’
The goal of denying entry to people without ID is to prevent pun-
ishment, of course. Emir explained why they are expelled from Walking 
Distance: ‘The first thing [when people come inside] is ID. I always need 
to ask [for] ID because many times people are only 17 years [old]. If you 
don’t have ID, then I don’t serve you. It is a big problem [otherwise]. 
You can be fined and closed. The business has to stay good. We want 
to keep a clean house and keep my boss happy.’ Similarly, Finn said of 
minors entering Execution: ‘It happens often, daily. If they do not have 
an official ID – either a passport or European Community Card – get out! 
[If t]hey do not have an ID on them, and we deem them too young, 
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we have to guide them all the way to the door, because if you leave them 
to walk this stretch to the door and at that moment the police walk in, 
you are fucked.’
Personnel are especially suspicious of Dutch people without ID. 
Emma and I discussed why. ‘If they are Dutch’, she stated, ‘and they do 
not have ID, it is usually that they are not 18.’ ‘Do you always carry ID 
with you?’ I asked. She explained: ‘It is the law. Everybody over 14 has 
to carry ID since a couple of years [ago]. When you ride without a light 
on the bicycle [for example,] and you get arrested for not having a light, 
you get the fine for not having the light, and if you do not have ID you get 
a fine for not having ID, as well. I am sure that it is over 14 that you have 
to carry ID.’
Less clear to personnel is why foreigners claim not to have ID. There 
are plausible reasons. Hostels and hotels sometimes take people’s pass-
ports during their stay, I assume to prevent them leaving without paying 
the bill. And loose border restrictions in Europe make it possible for peo-
ple to travel internationally without a passport, if they stick to ground 
transportation. Perhaps for this reason, Kamila noted: ‘French people, 
they don’t have any ID with them. How did they come to Amsterdam with 
no ID? Did they swim or what? Mostly out of the five people, one only has 
ID. These people say, “No, I don’t have one in my home [country]”, so I 
think what are you doing here then?’
Local youth learn that foreigners are less likely to have ID, so they 
try to mimic them when entering coffeeshops.27 They put on their best 
impression of an English-speaking tourist, made possible, in part, by the 
Dutch school system’s emphasis on learning foreign languages. Most 
have a particular Dutch accent, though, which personnel use to distin-
guish foreigners from natives. Maud spoke about how she detected and 
handled such impersonators:
The children from Holland, from Amsterdam, they want to smoke. 
They come here acting like they are tourist people – this is a trick. 
They are acting like, ‘Oh, I left my passport in the hotel’, but the 
way they speak English is very Dutch [and this gives them away]. 
They try to do everything to buy something. It is funny, actually. I 
say to them, ‘Out boy! I did that trick many years ago and you are 
not a tourist! You are just a Dutch boy who wants to smoke. Come 
back at 18!’
Minors also try to buy cannabis at coffeeshops by using a fake ID. 
I find it amusing that four coffeeshops have a sign specifying ‘No Fake 
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ID’, as if that is not obviously forbidden. There are two types of fake ID.28 
One is government-issued IDs, so ‘real’, but used by someone other for 
whom it was originally issued. From the perspective of fake ID users, the 
strength of this type is that their look and feel – such as width, length, 
weight, thickness and material – appear correct to personnel because, 
after all, they are genuine ID. Yet their weakness is that the pictures may 
not sufficiently resemble the new user. Selma described an incident: ‘A 
young boy came in with an identity card of somebody else. There was 
just a customer sitting here, and when this guy showed me the identity 
card, I first went to my colleague and I [also] asked this guy who was 
sitting here, “This is not the guy standing here?” We kept looking at him 
and looking at the photo, like, “Boy [you’re trying to pulling a fast one]”.’
The other type of fake ID is not issued by the government, but made 
to seem like it. Users produce these at home or purchase them at shops, 
physical or online, that sell shady goods.29 The benefit of making a fake 
ID is that the photo can show the intended user, thereby reducing the 
odds of being discredited as fake. The drawback is they may not look or 
feel ‘right’ to personnel, alerting them to the possibility that the ID holder 
may be a minor.
Who is checked?
It may seem like a small thing to ask someone for their ID, take it from 
them, look it over and hand it back. To understand what a problem that 
can be, you have to multiply that task by the number of times it happens 
per day, which can be several hundred, and then multiply that number by 
the number of days worked in a year, which can also be several hundred. 
Also there is the issue of ID-related conflict, discussed shortly. For these 
reasons, checking ID becomes a pain. When personnel say something 
like, ‘We check everyone’, they mean it as a general expression, not an 
accurate literal description. They do not actually check everyone’s ID, but 
only that of some persons.30
Whose ID do personnel choose to check? One group usually left 
alone is people who look many years past their 18th birthday. My senior 
colleagues, Rick Rosenfeld and Richard Wright, were never carded when 
visiting coffeeshops with me. On that point Emir noted, ‘I always need to 
ask ID’, though he went on to qualify this: ‘If someone comes in who looks 
50 years old, then I don’t need ID.’ Conversely, personnel seek out the ID 
of individuals who look young. In Stijn’s words: ‘It’s very stupid to sell to 
somebody under 18. If somebody looks younger, I always check. If you 
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look young, you have to have ID. If you don’t have ID, you have to go out.’ 
Jack agreed: ‘We are very strict on ID. Anyone who comes in the door and 
looks like they were born in the [19]80s, I want to see their ID. That is my 
philosophy.’ I was born in 1983, so I asked if he would card me. ‘Possibly, 
yeah’, he answered. ‘I considered it when you came in the door. Then you 
gave me your [business] card and I was like, “OK, we can pass that one!”’
Common sense dictates whether a person is ‘old’ or ‘young’ based on 
their appearance.31 Do they have wrinkles? Spots on their skin? Facial hair? 
Grey hair? Are they bald(ing)? How high are their pants? Personnel do not 
conscientiously consider these factors; they process them unconsciously 
to make snap decisions about age and, in turn, whether to ask for ID. 
Personnel also develop an instinct: they get a ‘feeling’ that someone may be 
a minor.32 Yet because people of different ages have overlap in appearance, 
personnel are not always sure of a stranger’s age group. Of course, it makes 
little difference to them if a patron appears closer to 30 versus 40 years old. 
But whether someone is 17 or younger versus 18 or older is very important, 
and this can be very hard to determine without ID, or even with it. People 
do look older or younger than they are. One of my childhood friends had a 
beard at 16 years of age, but I will never be able to grow one.
Personnel could handle age ambiguity by giving a customer the ben-
efit of the doubt. Instead, their rule of thumb is to ask for ID when in doubt 
of someone’s age. ‘I card if I am in doubt’, Noah affirmed. ‘It happens all 
the time.’ Hassan described his process as: ‘I get this feeling, and I say this 
to my people [employees] as well, whenever you think she [or he] is a 
minor, immediately don’t go and judge and say, “OK, maybe she is 19”. 
Never. Someone who looks like 23 or younger, ask them immediately.’
In addition to physical appearance, doubt of age is based on how 
people present themselves.33 How do they walk? Talk? Do they seem con-
fident or apprehensive? Genuine or fake? Luca said of identifying minors: 
‘If I have any slight doubt, then I ask for their ID. No ID, no service. I can 
see on your face that you are not 18. It’s to do with my feeling, and usu-
ally I am right. After five years [working here,] you should know.’ ‘How 
do you know, though?’ I persisted. He stated: ‘Well, if you ask people for 
their ID and they go like “this” [acting all uncertain of themselves], or 
they first walk by [the counter] looking [to see if they’ll be asked]. No ID, 
no service, man. End of story.’
Personnel do not always ask for the ID of people who appear young. 
Repeat customers, if they are recognised and remembered, are not asked 
for ID. I saw this play out when a young female walked into Open Sky 
and ordered a gram of marijuana. She received it without being IDed by 
the dealer. I turned to Joseph and asked, ‘You don’t think she looks young 
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enough to ID?’ ‘She is from Spain’, he answered. ‘Cute. I know her, already. 
I have seen her. This one is around 19, 20 years [old].’ Assumptions can be 
dangerous, however – she may have initially gained access by using a fake ID, 
for instance. With this in mind, I commented to Joseph: ‘If you just say, “Oh, 
I know [they are of the legal age]”, sometimes that may not be not true.’ He 
thought about it, then stated, ‘You are right. I just assume I am always right. I 
am human, I can be wrong. It is not often, maybe once [in a year].’
The influence that knowing or recognising someone has on checking 
their ID also came up with Maud. She stressed: ‘Now we always check IDs. 
When we don’t know, we always check IDs. And that’s what we say, we say 
to the person working: “You ask everyone. You have to ask everyone for 
ID”.’ ‘But not really?’ I queried. She responded: ‘When people come every 
week, you [already] know they’re 18 [or over]. When people come inside 
with a grey beard you know they’re 18 [or over]. But we say the rule is 
you ask everyone. When we don’t know and they don’t have ID, they go.’
The ‘ask-if-in-doubt’ technique of age verification results in many 
false positives. This happens all the time in coffeeshops, as the vast 
majority of persons asked for ID are in fact 18 years of age or older. Such 
incidents are a waste of time and effort in the immediate moment, but in 
the long run it is safer to be wrong about someone being too young than 
about them being of legal age. Usually confirmations are uneventful, but 
a discussion may spring up. Maud told me about a conversation she had 
with a young-faced patron:
I ask them every time. If I feel something is not right, then I follow 
my feelings, my instinct, and that is always right. Sometimes people 
look older than they are, and it happens much [of the] time. One 
guy had a beer, he was a redhead with freckles, and he looked old. 
But I had a feeling he was very young so I said, ‘I want to see your 
ID’. He was looking at me as if to ask why I wanted to see his ID. If I 
ask and then they say, ‘I am really 18 or 19’, and you say, ‘Yes, but I 
really want to see it’. If then they give me their card, I say, ‘You look 
so young, what is your secret?’
Occasionally I was asked for ID when entering coffeeshops. By no 
stretch of the imagination did I look 17, but, apparently, looked close 
enough to cause doubt. Like most people, this never bothered me. A com-
ment on Coffeeshop Directory illustrates the modal response: ‘The bud-
tender asked for an ID, which I was more than happy to oblige because 
this is Dutch law and must be followed in order for all of us to enjoy the 
freedoms Holland has to offer. After presenting an ID (and also showing 
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him my receding hairline which gave him a good laugh), he opened the 
folder to present the menu.’
Asking for ID should be harmless, but some individuals take offence, 
often because they are a minor. Mara described one occasion when ‘there 
was a guy coming in and I said “Can I see your ID?” “I have some ID, but 
I go somewhere else because you’re asking”, he said’, to which she simply 
replied, ‘OK, go’. Even if personnel are right to request ID, they dislike result-
ant conflict. This is the worst part of the job for Jana, who complained: ‘I feel 
like a police person. You have to check everybody that comes in, like young 
kids that come in. And that is also annoying: people that make problems 
about their ID. There is all this discussing, you know? I just want to work, 
do my job.’ Yet as Jana knows, watching out for young kids is part of her job.
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Basic business sense dictates it is better to sell more, yet that is not 
entirely true in the case of coffeeshops. This is because the government 
limits the amount a coffeeshop can sell to a single customer in a day. In 
Emir’s words: ‘The maximum is 5 grams. Sometimes people come in and 
ask [for more], and we tell them, “It is not possible. It is 5 grams [maxi-
mum]”.’ This limit is of little concern to most customers, but a source of 
conflict with some. ‘One time with some English guys’, recalled Kamila, 
‘they wanted to buy a lot from the coffeeshop. I just said I couldn’t do 
it. And then one of them started: “But for you it is good business selling 
one time big, rather than selling the small packages.” I told him, “No!” I 
think I was a little bit abrupt.’ Rather than drop the issue, the customer 
repeated: “Do it! Do it!” It really was not nice. That was out of the ques-
tion, what he asked me to do.’
Personnel restrict their sales because, as Luca explained, ‘The police 
can just stop anybody and check your pocket here. That is allowed, and 
we have obvious [plastic] bags [that we put the sales into, revealing the 
cannabis is from us]. Five is five, not more. It’s not worth it.’ In other 
words, the extra profit does not outweigh the risk of punishment. To 
quote Guus: ‘That’s the rule. It’s a risk, so I sell [only up to] 5. You have to 
keep on the rules.’ Dean put it this way: ‘We don’t like to do that because 
if you do just one mistake like that, we have to close the shop.’ And James 
declared: ‘I know certain places do [sell more than 5 grams], but there is 
no point jeopardising the business for something silly like that. You play 
the game by the rules, and it makes it easier for you.’
To James’s observation, the 5 grams limit does get exceeded. Mike 
described an experience in which ‘this guy came around 10:30 [am] 
and he buys 5 grams, then he goes away, comes back at 11 [am] and 
buys another 5 grams, and then again at tea time buying 5 grams. I saw 
it all these times, like every half an hour he comes and buys 5 grams’. 
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According to personnel, coffeeshops violate the 5 grams rule more than 
any other rule (see Table 0.5). Examples are presented in the next sec-
tion. First, I should note that some participants claim that they obey the 
rule, but are unsure of their colleagues’ activities. When Claire was asked 
about selling more than 5 grams to a customer in a day, she responded: 
‘Me, no. The others, I don’t know. I can’t be sure.’ To the same question, 
Anna responded, ‘No, I don’t do that’ was Anna’s reply to the same ques-
tion, but of her colleagues she was less confident: ‘I am afraid that some-
times they do, but I always tell them not to do it. It is not necessary. It 
can ruin their job.’ Because of this, and other issues mentioned later, cof-
feeshops probably do break the 5 grams rule more often than reported.
Ignorance-based violations stem from misunderstanding the rule. 
The ban is on selling more than 5 grams per person per day, but some 
personnel think it only prohibits selling more than 5 grams at a time. Stijn 
is an example of this. He explained: ‘I am not going to sell you more than 5 
grams. I tell you to come back. The rule is you can go out and come back in 
and buy 5 grams again.’ Knowing that is not true, I questioned him further. 
‘I thought it was in one day?’ He answered adamantly: ‘No, no, no. You 
can go to your hotel, then come back. It is a possession thing.’ Presumably 
Stijn arrived at this idea by conflating the coffeeshop rule with the Dutch 
policy on personal possession. It more or less stipulates that the police will 
take no action against persons found with 5 grams or less.1
The ban is also violated by personnel who do understand it prop-
erly. Despite wanting to obey the rule, they mess up due to ignorance of 
colleagues’ actions. Lizzie alluded to how it happens: ‘It is possible that 
someone [a customer] comes in during the morning shift or comes in late 
at night, so that it is two different staff [that they buy from]. It is possible, 
but it is two different shifts.’ What may occur is that a customer comes in 
during the first shift (e.g. 9 am to 4 pm) and buys, say, 3 grams of canna-
bis, then returns during the next shift (e.g. 4 pm to 11 pm) and purchases 
the same amount again. This is a violation of the rule, although the 
dealers are not aware of it. To try and prevent this from happening, cof-
feeshop menus spell out, ‘Maximum 5 grams per Customer’, ‘Maximum 
5  grams a day a person’ and ‘We are only allowed to sell 5 grams per 
person per day’.
At any given coffeeshop, multiple factors explain why the rule is 
broken. When I discussed the issue with Gwen, she denied knowledge of 
a violation – but subsequently stipulated that she does not know whether 
workers break the rule, then admitted she would break the rule if a cus-
tomer came back at multiple points in the day, and that this may hap-
pen without her realising it. Referring to the 5 grams rule, she initially 
100 GREY AREA
stated: ‘We are very strict on that because we get punished for that really 
bad, so absolutely not. We really try to stick to the rules with basically 
everything.’ Then she clarified this: ‘If I say “No” [what I really mean is] 
it is not [broken] to my knowledge, because I can never be certain, of 
course.’ At that point I posed a hypothetical question. What would she do 
if I came in and ordered 6 grams? She thought about it and hypothesised: 
‘I would give you 5 grams now and maybe would say if you come back in 
four or five hours [then I’ll sell you more]. But, of course, some people 
may come in here four times a day and I can’t tell.’
Big single purchases
Personnel cannot always blame violations on ignorance. Some do make 
sales despite knowing the sum exceeds the daily allowance.2 Asked if 
this happened at Alike All Over, Jack admitted that ‘it has been known to 
occur’, but refused to disclose further details. Asked the same question, 
Ruben simply commented ‘Sure’. I followed up by asking him what was 
the largest amount that he would sell to a customer. He smiled and said 
simply, ‘I would rather not say’. Again such evasions are revealing, as they 
show that personnel worry about being sanctioned for violations.
It is doubtful that any coffeeshop fully complies with the 5 grams 
rule. I watched violations unfold while sitting near the dealer counter, 
especially on busy days at busy coffeeshops. This mostly happens when 
customers order a few grams of ‘this’ and a few grams of ‘that’, the total 
exceeding 5 grams. I never observed a dealer refuse, though sometimes I 
saw their facial expression change while fulfilling such orders. They had 
the look of someone thinking harder than they should be in this situation. 
Perhaps this is because they were not only weighing the cannabis, but 
also evaluating the risk. Sometimes dealers looked as though everything 
was normal – perhaps because they were too busy to think about it, better 
at acting or reckoned the prospect of being caught was too low to worry 
about.
By far the largest sales I heard about involved Man in the Bottle. 
When I asked Selma for the weight of their biggest sale, her reply was 
‘a kilo’. Then she described the largest exchange of which she had been 
a part: ‘Me, personally, I did 400 grams’ – about €4,000 worth. ‘He [my 
boss] told me: “OK, you go get the stuff.” You don’t meet in the coffeeshop, 
you meet by McDonald’s. It is like 200 metres away from here, so I walked 
to this [place] and there we exchanged [the cannabis and money]. I felt 
like a very wrong dealer! Half a criminal.’
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Man in the Bottle is also the place of the largest sale I saw. I was 
sitting at the counter talking with Selma, her colleague Alex and their 
boss. A young white guy walked into the coffeeshop. Apparently a trade 
had been planned with him; I heard talk of 200 grams and all the person-
nel were aware of what was going on. Alex gathered the cannabis into a 
small black rubbish bag, then handed it over to the customer in exchange 
for cash. For some reason he wanted to pay in part with a US$100 bill. 
Not sure what that was worth in euros, a discussion about the current 
exchange rate ensued. They arrived at $1 for €0.64, until Amber pointed 
out that an exchange fee would be required, making the rate $1 for 
€0.60. The personnel were annoyed about the American money; before 
he walked out they told the customer to bring only euros in the future.
Unfortunately I learned only a little about the proverbial ‘backstage’ 
of coffeeshop sales.3 I have no idea what percentage of coffeeshops make 
large sales, as Man in the Bottle does, nor how often, nor in what amounts. 
What I do know, however, is such sales rarely occur on the ‘frontstage’; 
that is, in full view of the public. When the 5 grams rule is broken at the 
dealer counter, it is almost always by small amounts. Hanna unabashedly 
acknowledged the fact: ‘More than 5 grams? Yes, of course. The most I 
sell, 10 grams.’ Emma admitted that the most she sold was ‘about 10 to 
15 grams. The bags are already made; [for example] if they want some 
hash, that is a gram and a half. So, if somebody buys 10 bags that is 15 
grams’.
Perhaps coffeeshops would visibly break the 5 grams rule more 
often, and in more egregious amounts, if there was greater demand. But 
there is little reason for locals to stock up in a city where every adult user 
can buy what they want for personal use daily, from many coffeeshops. 
The lack of desire to stockpile applies also to most customers visiting 
Amsterdam for a limited period. For this reason Imran did not perceive 
compliance with the 5 grams rule to be an issue:
It is not even a question, it is not happening, because we do not 
have locals. The tourists don’t buy 5 grams. It is, usually, only 1 or 2 
grams. We have tourists, and they just come and try one gram here 
and one gram there. They will not buy a lot at one time. They are 
here, on average, for two or three days. How much can you smoke? 
Five grams is too much. So what they will do, they will buy 1 or 
2 grams, try another coffeeshop and [buy more from there].
You could read into these words that if anyone is buying more than 
5 grams at a time, it is locals. Yet for even the heaviest smokers, 5 grams 
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is enough to last a few days. The quality is high, so a user does not have 
to consume much to get that way.4 In jurisdictions that prohibit cannabis 
possession entirely, it may be rational for a user to buy larger quantities. 
First, this means they can make fewer purchases; second, they spend 
less time travelling with it, which in theory reduces apprehension risk.5 
However, that is irrelevant in Amsterdam because users do not fear being 
caught by police. They do not risk trouble as long as they have no more 
than 5 grams on their person – a further reason not to buy more than that 
at a coffeeshop.6
Those issues reduce the demand for large purchases, although other 
factors promote them, which I shall examine shortly. First, however, I 
should add that even if buyers are interested in acquiring relatively large 
amounts of cannabis, success does not hinge on enticing coffeeshops to 
break the 5 grams rule. Customers can easily sidestep the government-set 
limit by buying the maximum amount at multiple coffeeshops. ‘If they 
want more than 5 grams’, remarked Finn, ‘they just step across the street, 
buy 5 grams, step around the corner, buy 5 grams more.’ All of this is to 
say that coffeeshops are not under much pressure from purchasers to sell 
more than 5 grams.
Two groups are known to order larger quantities than permitted. 
One consists of people living in a nearby country, such as Belgium, 
France or Germany. I observed these tourists make prohibitively large 
purchases at Man in the Bottle. By train, a trip between Amsterdam and 
Paris or Brussels takes five or three hours respectively. I mention that 
because French-speaking persons wearing train uniforms (resembling 
those worn by airline attendants) came into the coffeeshop, stocked up 
on their favorite cannabis varieties, put it in their bags and headed back 
to Central Station for their trip home. Though I have no direct knowledge 
of this, it is easy to imagine that Europeans living outside the Netherlands 
travel to Amsterdam and buy relatively large quantities of cannabis; they 
then resell it upon returning home. That possibility is indeed why the 
5 grams rule exists in the first place. Years before, the limit was 30 grams, 
but, over time, that was deemed to be too high.7 Past and present, this 
international problem is much more associated with Dutch border cities 
than Amsterdam, located in the heart of the country.8
Undercover police are the other group suspected of requesting 
more than 5 grams from coffeeshops. ‘You never know who it is’, reflected 
Adam. ‘Some people are very paranoid about it, and think there is some-
one spying on the coffeeshop.’ Though Stijn misunderstood the rule, he 
said of selling more than 5 grams at a time: ‘It doesn’t happen because 
most of the time here, we are very strict. The police come in every once 
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in a while, and we have a good name. You would be very stupid if you do 
that, because sometimes the police send people to buy it, to buy more 
than 5 grams. They just check it.’ There is a belief that undercover police 
observe coffeeshops before conducting the formal check. This was men-
tioned after the police check on At Last (see Chapter 1); I overheard the 
owner tell Maud that he was convinced undercover officers had been 
inside the night before.
Personnel may worry about undercover policing, but it is clearly not 
an absolute deterrent. This is because they believe they can use social 
cues to distinguish undercover officers from normal customers.9 Maud 
confessed to breaking the 5 grams rule, distributing ‘6 or 7 [grams], not 
more than that’. She thought it is harmless: ‘Yeah, I have done it, but I 
don’t take risks. I know they are not from the cops.’ The type of customer 
cast as a potential undercover cop is white, male, middle-aged or older, 
with a native Dutch accent. Thinking this, Selma sold large quantities to 
anyone except them (and, as discussed in Chapter 1, she hesitated to take 
samples from them). When I asked Hanna if she sells more than allowed 
to anyone, she responded in similar vein: ‘Depends [what] the people 
are like. People who are Dutch, I wouldn’t do it. Maybe they are from the 
police or something or they go to police.’ I asked what about if I asked for 
more than 5 grams. ‘Yes’, she answered, ‘I would give you.’
Discounts and freebies
Related to how much customers purchase is how much they pay. Chap-
ter 2 details the range and normal cost of coffeeshop products. Another 
issue is variation between customers in how much they are asked to pay 
for any given product, such as a particular strain of marijuana, at a given 
coffeeshop. Most people pay the advertised amount, but some are given 
discounts and freebies.10 I learned of three circumstances in which dis-
counts are given.
One scenario is standard business practice: charging less when a 
customer purchases more. ‘The more you buy’, said Luuk, ‘the cheaper it 
is.’ Hassan told me: ‘I give deals on 5 gram bags. If you buy 5 grams, you 
get a deal on it: 50 cents discount per gram. Normally a gram is €8. If you 
take 5 grams, you are going to get €7.50 [per] gram.’ Selma admitted 
that Man in the Bottle sells cannabis at 50 per cent fdiscount when people 
buy 100 grams or more. For instance, a gram of Jack Herer is listed as 
€12 a gram on their menu, but sold at €6 if a person purchases the requi-
site amount. Her coffeeshop also gave a discount for customers that ‘take 
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5 grams. It says a discount on the menu [for that amount]’. Selma went 
on to say: ‘But then when people take more like 15 or 20 grams, we can 
make even a nicer price. Then it is really cheap because instead of €70, 
it is going to be €60 because the normal price is €7 a gram. So if you buy 
10 grams it is [usually] €70; we give it to you for €65 and we make this 
extra discount for €60.’
As Selma mentioned, quantity discounts are advertised on canna-
bis menus, such as one that reads, ‘Special at 5 grams. 10% Discount’. 
Other coffeeshop menus offer White Widow at €8 for 1 gram or €38 for 5 
grams (a saving of €2 per gram) and Juicy Fruit at €12 for a gram or €55 
for 5 grams (a saving of €5 per gram).11 Quantity discounts start lower 
than 5 grams in some establishments, such as one selling Vanilla Kush, 
among other products, at €15 for one gram or €43 for 3 grams (a saving 
of €2). The menu at another coffeeshop listed the amount of grams given 
in exchange for €10, €20, €40 or €50. For example, a customer there can 
buy a gram of Northern Lights for €8.50 or get 1.3 grams for €10. They 
can also get 3 grams for €20; 6.4 grams for €40; and 8.5 grams for €50.
That sliding scale raises the question of how coffeeshops are able to 
advertise selling more than 5 grams. A menu communicates the answer: 
‘We are only allowed to sell 5 grams per customer per day. Larger deals are 
for groups only.’ They openly sell more than 5 grams to a person, if that 
customer is with someone else. Personnel calculate they can sell up to 10 
grams to two customers, 15 grams to three and so on. When Charlotte 
asserted ‘It is written clearly on the menu that you can buy more than 5 
grams, but then it says in little letters’ – I interrupted to comment, ‘If you 
have more than one person’ – and she responded, ‘Yes, that is the trick’.
The trick is within the rules, but it does lead to violations. A person 
who wishes to buy more than 5 grams can simply walk in with a bunch of 
friends who, in fact, have nothing to do with the purchase. Or customers 
can lie about being with a large group of people to see if the dealer calls 
their bluff. Stijn said of such deceit: ‘If people are with more people, then 
you can sell them more. Some of them lie, and say they are with 20 peo-
ple upstairs, trying to buy whatever he wants.’
The other two discount scenarios are more social (than simply eco-
nomic) and interrelated: coffeeshops offer cheaper prices to employees, 
some of whom, in turn, offer ‘their discount’ to their friends, workers 
from the area or neighbourhood residents. In addition to quantity-based 
discounts, Selma gave better bargains to ‘the locals – they get some extra 
discount. I can make, instead of €14 for the bag, I can make it €12 for 
the bag. I can just make it myself a bit how I think the person is. I write it 
down just as discount. I make a line around it [on the accounting sheet,] 
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and sometimes I write down if I know who it is or I say [it is] a neighbour.’ 
James described his employee discount and how he passes it on to others, 
partially rationalising his social altruism in economic terms:
We get 5 per cent discount as staff and, yeah, I give my staff discount 
to some of my friends. Five per cent is not a huge amount. I mean 
certainly [I give it] for all the other dealers [who work at other cof-
feeshops] because I’ve drunk and socialised in most of these places. 
If I am giving the dealers from Doomsday and Whole Truth their 
weed [for personal use], and [in return] someone [who] comes 
in and asks them where they buy their weed, they haven’t got any 
qualms about saying ‘No Return’. I mean, you have to promote your 
own coffeeshop. We have 18 or 19 weeds, whereas most places have 
only got like 6 or 7. So if the dealers are buying at your coffeeshop 
then obviously they are going to send more business when people 
ask for something different. So I give them a discount because it is 
worth it for the business, I think.
Perhaps it seems odd that personnel should buy their cannabis from 
coffeeshops other than the one(s) they work at. But the market is suffi-
ciently varied in the price and quality of available products to motivate 
employees to buy their marijuana and hash from competitors. Probably 
more would do so were it not for receiving discounts from their place 
of work. Selma and Alex told me that without their ‘special price’, they 
would not buy from Man in the Bottle; its normal prices were too high.
Not all coffeeshops offer discounts. When I asked Wouter if any of 
Live Long’s clients get a better bargain, he denied it. ‘No, everybody gets 
the same. Even if they are my best friend, they get the same amount.’ 
Maud agreed. ‘No, because I have to pay it [full price] myself. Even if 
people are nice, I just give them the normal weight.’ Gijs gave a simi-
lar response: ‘No, we never do that. Everybody is equal, everybody gets 
the same price. There is no discount for anybody. If people say, “If I buy 
5 grams can I get a discount?” the answer is “No, everybody [already] 
gets [a] discount. Go to the other shops, compare the prices from them 
with our prices, and you will see that everybody is a winner”.’
Personnel can charge less for purchases, but not give more weight. 
This is due to the two ways in which coffeeshops sell loose cannabis: the 
pre-weigh and free-weigh systems (p. 30). For example, Emma, who 
dealt with the pre-weigh system, said of discounts, ‘It is impossible [to 
give extra cannabis], everything is already counted. The bags are counted 
and I just have to come up with the money. I can’t give any discounts’. The 
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other way coffeeshops sell loose cannabis is to ‘weigh it up in front of 
the customer, on the counter on a scale’, as Hassan did at Shrine. These 
scales are accurate to tenths or hundredths of a gram, and personnel are 
accountable for every little bit. Referring to giving extra weight, Thomas 
observed, ‘I can’t do that because everything is in the system and is very 
specific, to 0.1 gram. So I can’t do that for anyone’.
While some coffeeshops give everyone the same price, offering 
non-cannabis freebies is common practice among them. ‘Everybody 
pays the normal thing’, remarked Mara, though she added, ‘When peo-
ple come every time and they sit here and drink, they get coffee for free 
sometimes. They sit here, they take 4 coffees they pay for 2. But we don’t 
make different prices for different people.’ Gijs mentioned that his work-
ers do something similar, except it comes out of their on-the-job drink 
allowance: ‘They can give away drinks. Everybody who works on the 
floor has €15 to spend in his shift on drinks, coffee or whatever is availa-
ble in the shop. This is hard to spend in a day. You are not going to drink 
eight bottles of coke. You don’t do that, so you can give away some to 
customers. This is only with the drinks.’ He also told a funny story about 
a promotional cannabis item that they gave away, until it got out of hand:
We had this rule that if it is somebody’s birthday you can give him a 
pre-rolled joint, ‘Happy Birthday it’s for you’. You put it in the com-
puter as ‘given away as a pre-rolled joint’, but I stopped that yester-
day because it was getting out of hand. I had a feeling that some 
of the staff working there were like, ‘Oh it’s my birthday today’. So 
that’s why I put a stop to it yesterday, and that’s going to be for a 
few weeks yet.
Rip-offs
Whereas some buyers pay a lower price per gram, others are defrauded 
or ‘ripped off’.12 To be clear, I am not referring to cases in which custom-
ers’ experiences fall short of their expectations about quality. An example 
is a reviewer on Coffeeshop Directory who complained: ‘My husband ate 
half a piece of hash cake and I ate only one bonbon. After waiting an 
hour to two hours, we felt NOTHING! Next day we ate a whole piece of 
cake and, again, nothing! Were we ripped off ’cause we were Americans?’ 
Another reviewer posted: ‘I was ripped off with five grams of Caramello. 
When burned, it bubbled, smelt really bad; no stone whatsoever, just a 
sore throat and headache. Will never darken their door again.’ Though 
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quality complaints might be legitimate, they could also be due to unrea-
sonable expectations or inexperience in getting high.13
In this context a ‘rip-off’ or ‘fraud’ strictly refers to cannabis/money 
transfers in which the advertised price per unit does not match the 
amount received. Examples of this also appear on Coffeeshop Directory.14 
A customer wrote: ‘He definitely under-weighed us. Their scales have 
been tampered with. Beware. We went in, then went out. Crap.’ Another 
protested: ‘He [a friend] purchased a gram of Maco Haze, but didn’t 
actually see the budtender weigh it. When my mate went to roll up, he 
commented on the size of the deal and I must admit it looked well light-
weight.’ Whether customers are suspicious or certain of being ripped off 
depends on their ability to check the weight on a scale. ‘I’m convinced’, 
one reviewer moaned, ‘the bags weren’t quite the size they were meant to 
be. I mean we didn’t have scales on us, but from my previous experience 
in Amsterdam that day I thought 3 grams would have been bigger.’
In contradiction to those accounts, personnel were adamant that 
everyone gets at least a fair deal. When I asked Hassan and Mara about 
defrauding customers, he and she asserted, respectively, ‘No, no, I don’t 
have the need to do that’ and ‘No, we don’t do that’. Only one dealer, 
Claire, confessed to (barely) ripping off a customer:
We weigh it. Sometimes I have customers, like before I had French 
people who were a real pain in the ass because they are too lazy to 
talk English. They talk French to me. They are very arrogant, and 
sometimes they think they can do everything here. They still talk 
French to me and then they have big attitude and I just give them 
0.9 instead of 1 gram. I hate you because you don’t treat me like a 
normal person, so I give you just 0.9! It is the wrong thing to do, but 
[I did it].
As with giving discounts, the manner in which coffeeshops sell loose 
cannabis affects opportunity to defraud clients. When questioned about 
giving better or worse deals, Luuk just answered, ‘No, it’s already in the 
bag’, indicating that this precludes the choice. Yet depending on how long 
the marijuana has been bagged, and how long it is dried beforehand, pre-
weighed bags can lose weight and thereby falsely advertise the purchase 
price. I asked Luca if this ever happens. ‘They are dry when you buy them’, 
he confidently replied. ‘People don’t want to buy wet weed. Why would 
you want to buy wet weed, man? It needs to be dry.’ However, custom-
ers complain of this problem, which they prove valid by weighing pur-
chases with their own scales. ‘I took a scale with me’, shared one reviewer. 
108 GREY AREA
‘Got Silverhaze for €15 for 2.8 grams, but it was 2.1 plus 0.7 packaging.’ 
‘They are selling the weed in pre-weighted bags and they try to fool you’, 
wrote another reviewer. ‘I bought some Orange Bud and some K2. Every 
weed in there is 3 grams. I bought two bags, didn’t smoke anything. 
Back at home my scale showed me exactly 2 grams (Orange Bud) and 
2.1 grams (K2) without the bags. With my friends’ bags it was the same. 
Shame on them!’
Rather than weigh it themselves, customers ask personnel to do so 
in front of them. ‘Many customers ask me “Can you just weigh it for me?”’ 
said Kamila. ‘If you don’t weigh it out in front of the customer, they can 
ask you to weigh it for you. Some German people [for example] came in 
and asked to check, and I said, “Yes, let them check it”. Also, we have to 
put one [empty] package [on the scale to see what it weighs, too]. It is 
about zero, but sometimes it is a bit more.’ I asked her why she agrees 
to such requests, to which she simply said: ‘You should do. It is good for 
your business.’15
Customers do the same at free-weigh establishments. I saw this 
at Man in the Bottle. Shortly after opening, three young French guys 
came in and ordered 5 grams. Selma weighed that amount, bagged it 
and handed it over. For whatever reason, the customer requested that 
she weigh it again. She put it back on the scale and invited him to have 
a look at the reading, but he declined. Selma re-bagged it and told him: 
‘If you pay for 5 grams, you get 5 grams.’ He took the marijuana and left 
with his friends, at which point Selma turned to me and commented that 
it was stupid for him to have the cannabis re-weighed, but not to look at 
the scale.
Compared to the pre-weigh system, the free-weigh system seems 
less likely to result, intentionally or not, in ripping off customers. After 
all, the weight literally reads off at the point of sale, which eliminates the 
opportunity for losing weight (due to the drying process) or mislabeling 
bags. This openness should protect against fraud by making the amount 
clearly visible to anyone. Yet the free-weigh system has its own problems. 
Some dealers are cheeky enough to test customers. This happened to one 
reviewer, who wrote: ‘The dealer with the baseball cap ripped me at 0.2 
grams on a 5 gram deal. Even as I told him that was not enough, he just 
gave me a smile!’
More often, rip-offs spring from the difficulty of weighing cannabis 
to precise amounts, such as 1.00 gram. Exactness matters because giv-
ing even a tenth of a gram too much is bad for the bottom line, but giving 
too little can cause conflict with customers, which is bad for business 
too. Getting the weight right takes meticulousness and time. Typically 
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the dealer starts the process by placing on the scale whatever amount 
of cannabis is obviously needed to get near the ordered amount, but no 
more. It is better to go up in weight than down because the former is 
less likely to annoy customers. From there, the dealer will add pinches 
of cannabis until the gram count is on the dot. If it is not quite there, the 
dealer places tiny amounts on the scale until the reading bumps up a 
tenth of a gram.
If a computer-based scale is used, the dealer continues that last 
step until satisfied with the amount, then presses a button that logs it. 
Sometimes a dealer jumps the gun by pressing the button too soon – from 
the customer’s perspective. On one occasion I was near a customer who 
requested a gram of marijuana from the dealer. The worker proceeded 
to free-weigh the weed, but the highest the scale got to was 0.99 gram. 
Rather than keep working to get the perfect amount, the dealer simply 
pressed the button. He handed the bag over to the buyer, who paid for it 
without mentioning its low weight.
Such discrepancies rarely, if ever, work in the customer’s favour. If 
the total is not exactly what it should be, it is almost always less. Yet at 
what point does a discrepancy become defined as fraud? That depends on 
who you ask. I suspect that many stoners frown at a dime bag weighing 
0.9 gram, though this is only off by 10 per cent and practically too small 
to see. And most may agree that 0.99 gram is close enough. If the price 
per gram is €10, that is equivalent to throwing away 10 cents. Some buy-
ers, then, will want the purchase to be no less than 0.999, which leaves a 
single cent on the table; even that may be wanted back.
The point here is less about transactions involving money and can-
nabis than the principle of fairness.16 Still, losing a few cents may seem 
trivial. It is not to staff, however, as they understand that small differ-
ences add up. Gijs and I discussed this issue, a conversation that began 
when I asked if Escape Clause ever rips off its customers.
Gijs: You don’t want to do that. We don’t do that, and we can’t 
do that because we have a computer screen standing there that is 
linked to the scale, so the customer can see exactly what he gets. 
Everybody gets what he pays for. It’s such an accurate system. If you 
want to weigh a gram [for example], I always tell people [dealers 
to] start from 0.8 or 0.9. If you start breaking off from higher than 
a gram [1.2 for example], there is always the chance it could go to 
1.1 gram, and if that happens with a 100 customers you are going 
to miss out 0.1 gram 100 times.
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Me: So how accurate do you feel a coffeeshop should be? At what 
point is the customer getting ripped off? I mean, maybe 0.99 isn’t a 
rip-off, but is 0.98 or 0.97?
Gijs: You are talking about 10 cents. That can happen. Some cus-
tomers, they see that and they go, ‘Hey man, that’s not €10, that’s 
€9.90’. You say ‘Oh fuck, sorry, here is 10 cents’. Next time he won’t 
ask for that any more.
Me: So that actually happens?
Gijs: That has happened, yes, that has happened. So you go, ‘Sorry 
man, here’s 10 cents or would you like this little crumb of weed 
with it?’ Then they are like, ‘Oh fuck’ and they feel embarrassed, 
like ‘Why did I ask for 10 cents?’
Me: The customer could argue it both ways.
Gijs: They can, they can. In the old days, like I say I’ve smoked 30 
years, if it was a little bit over a gram, I’d leave it. But you can’t afford 
that if you have a shop like Escape Clause. I mean there are a lot of 
customers coming in. If you keep giving away to every customer, at 
the end of the line – because we have computer printouts of the shift – 
you can see exactly that you gave away too much.
Notes
 1. See Verdurmen, Ketelaars and van Laar 2005.
 2. For additional evidence of coffeeshops breaking this rule, see Hazekamp 2006.
 3. For information on the frontstage versus backstage of social life, see Goffman 1959.
 4. But see Becker 2015.
 5. See Jacques and Wright 2015.
 6. See Verdurmen, Ketelaars and van Laar 2005. In other sorts of retail cannabis purchases (i.e. 
outside coffeeshops), it is typical for buyers to limit the amount purchased (Davenport and 
Caulkins 2016).
 7. See MHWS 2003.
 8. See Advisory Committee on Drugs Policy 2009.
 9. For information on drug dealers’ ability to discredit supposed buyers as undercover officers, 
see Jacobs 1993, 1996. On discrediting stigmatised individuals generally, see Goffman 1963.
10. For information on drug dealers giving discounts and gifts to users, see Coomber 2006; Jacobs 
1999; Jacques and Wright 2015.
11. For information on quantity discounts with respect to illicit drugs, see Pacula and Lundberg 
2014.
12. For information on drug dealers defrauding customers, see Jacobs 1999; Jacques, Allen and 
Wright 2014; Jacques and Wright 2015. On rip-offs by licit retail sellers, see Blumberg 1989.
13. See Becker 2015.
14. For additional evidence of coffeeshops defrauding customers, see Hazekamp 2006.
15. For information on demonstrating one’s self as not having a stigmatised trait, see Goffman 
1963.




A major goal of Dutch drug policy is to minimise hard drug consumption, 
such as that of cocaine, ecstasy and heroin.1 To separate the hard drug 
and cannabis markets, coffeeshops are allowed to sell the latter. Other-
wise, it is feared, cannabis users will be offered hard drugs by their deal-
ers. Part of achieving market separation is the rule against hard drugs at 
coffeeshops. It is effective. Research shows, for example, that coffeeshops 
are less likely than other cannabis sellers, such as those working the 
streets or from home, to sell hard drugs.2 This implies that coffeeshop 
clientele have less opportunity to start and continue using more serious 
substances. Consider how the policy shaped Jana’s experiences:
I believe very much in the system of keeping the line very big 
between marijuana, the soft drugs, and the other stuff, hard drugs. 
I really think it is a good thing that as you grow up, people see it 
[cannabis sold in coffeeshops]. It is open. It is not something that 
is really scary to do. I also hear from people from England, like the 
drug dealers there, that if they don’t have marijuana, they have all 
this other stuff that you can have, ’cause you still want to get high 
on something. Here, where I was born, there was never a time that 
people said: ‘I don’t have it [cannabis] so take something else.’ I 
never saw that when I was younger, and I am happy for that.
Technically, the rule is that coffeeshops cannot sell hard drugs. In 
practice, however, this is interpreted by personnel and police as a whole-
sale ban on having hard drugs on the premises. About two-thirds of per-
sonnel reported full compliance over the prior year (see Table 0.5). For 
example, Gijs and Claire said of hard drug use and street dealers respec-
tively ‘I never found anyone doing that [in the coffeeshop]’ and ‘They 
don’t come in here’. But, as with minors, personnel are not always sure 
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that hard drugs are absent. ‘Not that I know of’ is how some personnel, 
such as Hana and Luca, answered my question about whether hard drugs 
had ever been on the premises.
In part, the doubt is attributable to the 1012 being notorious for 
hard drug trade and use.3 During the study period, and especially in 
and around the red light district, it was common to pass by people who 
appeared to be destitute drug addicts, or tourists high on more than 
cannabis and alcohol. Furthermore, an observer would hear offers of 
‘cocaine, ecstasy’ or ‘white, brown’ – code words for cocaine and heroin. 
Street dealers are notorious for whispering this to passersby who they 
think may be interested in these substances. As a researcher, I used this 
to my advantage. When solicited by a street dealer, I solicited their par-
ticipation in an interview. What they said with respect to coffeeshops is 
presented in this chapter’s concluding section (p. 118).4
Given the 1012’s reputation for hard drugs, personnel have good 
reason to believe they are brought onto the premises by non-personnel. 
Finn thought that ‘on the whole, the coffeeshop is powder and pills free’, 
but then added, ‘I am sure some guys sniff something’. ‘I am sure’, Linda 
postulated, ‘some customers might have had it in their pockets or their 
bags. But I haven’t caught anyone, or heard of my colleagues getting 
anyone.’
At this stage in the book, it need not be repeated that the risk of 
sanction motivates personnel to obey the rule. More so than any other 
government rule, however, personnel perceived enforcement of the ban 
on hard drugs to be unjust. Part of the complaint is that coffeeshops 
are punished for small amounts that are tolerated on the street.5 Adam 
described an occasion when police ‘closed the place [a coffeeshop] down 
for a week. The police came in, and they found a tiny amount of cocaine 
and some ecstasy pills. We are talking about very small amounts’. ‘The 
police come in and find a gram of coke on the floor’, Hassan asserted, ‘you 
are fucked! You are going to get closed. That’s how it goes.’
Personnel also protested that they can be punished for non-person-
nel’s actions. ‘If you get caught in a coffeeshop with a gram of cocaine in 
your pocket’, Jens told me, ‘even if you are [just] a fucking person who 
comes in there and sits down and smokes a joint, that person is risking 
the licence of that coffeeshop, and the whole existence of the coffeeshop. 
They can close you down permanently for someone else having a con-
trolled substance in their pocket in your coffeeshop.’
Coffeeshops face a similar problem with minors. Controlling hard 
drugs is more difficult, however, because there is no mechanism equiv-
alent to checking someone’s ID. To quote Joseph: ‘I can’t search you, 
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so I don’t know what is in your pocket.’ Without a reasonably foolproof 
method of checking for hard drugs, personnel doubt that their cof-
feeshop is completely free of them. When I asked Jack about compliance 
at Alike All Over, he answered: ‘Almost certainly [hard drugs have been] 
in people’s pockets. Nobody has been caught. This is the thing: we can’t 
search everyone coming in the door.’ Elias took a similar postion: ‘I have 
not seen it, but as long as I don’t know though [there is nothing I can do]. 
Otherwise, I have to turn everybody’s pockets around and see what they 
have on them [which I can’t do].’
Referring to how coffeeshops are stuck between a rock and a hard 
place, Anna asserted it is ‘very silly [to be punished by the government 
for this] because I cannot see what is in my customers’ pockets’. Luuk 
stressed that it ‘was not possible’ to keep hard drugs out of coffeeshops, 
then declared why punishment for their presence is unfair: ‘I heard today 
from somebody, they found in a coffeeshop somebody had hard drugs 
with them, and now they want to shut down the shop. But it’s unfair 
because when I go to the Albert Heine [grocery store], the police come 
in, I have cocaine in my pocket, and [they] find cocaine with me, they 
don’t shut down Albert Heine.’
Signs of hard drugs
Personnel are not entirely helpless, of course. ‘Looking out’ is their major 
tactic for complying with the ban on hard drugs. Looking out is impor-
tant in every coffeeshop, but especially those in the 1012 because, to reit-
erate, it is a hotbed of hard drug distribution and consumption. ‘If you 
know there’s a lot of street dealing activity around you’, Stefan asserted, 
‘you’re a bit stupid if you’re not looking out for it in your shop.’ Yet, as 
Dean half-joked, that it is difficult because hard drug possessors ‘don’t 
have a sign [on]’ to that effect. Instead, personnel must rely on social sig-
nals to identify troublemakers.6 Finn alluded to this when he remarked: 
‘I have been throwing out people [for a long time] who have used heroin, 
cocaine or whatever, so I know when someone does not belong in here.’
Some signs of possession are behaviour-based. Personnel look out 
for persons acting in a way that is abnormal – or, thought of differently, a 
way that is normal for hard drug dealers and users. Sophie recounted an 
encounter with an English customer, for instance: ‘He was very drunk, and 
I think he was on coke because he was like spaced out of his mind.’ Signs 
are also appearance-based.7 In Chapter 3 we discussed how coffeeshops 
ban anyone wearing a hat and sunglasses because they are associated 
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with ‘problem’ groups – Moroccans, Antilleans and Surinamese – involved 
in hard drugs. A more obvious indicator is ‘if you have white powder on 
your face’, which Claire told me is indicative of cocaine use. Flour face 
results when people snort cocaine, as the powder can shoot in directions 
other than straight up the nose. If the snorter does not take care to clean 
up afterwards, they look as if they have been baking.
Poor hygiene is another appearance-based sign of hard drug use or 
dealing. ‘One time we had someone here’, Emir recalled, ‘and he looked 
illegal. He looked dirty [hygienically], not clean, like a criminal. He 
came inside and we were busy and I saw him come in. My boss would 
not want [inside] dirty people from the streets, who do business on the 
streets; criminals.’ ‘For us’, Thomas informed me about Buzz, ‘upstairs is 
an area actually for tourists, and for people that want to use the vapour-
iser. Locals are not allowed up there [because] there have been cases of 
dealings going on up there, hard drugs.’ I asked how he distinguishes a 
local from a tourist, to which he admitted: ‘I am judging on appearances, 
if they kind of look nasty.’
In addition to what people look like, personnel use language to 
make inferences about involvement in hard drugs. Elias observed that 
‘if you are really coked up, I can see it with your speech’. Hassan took a 
straightforward approach: ‘I have the kind of customers I want to get in, 
and those customers I do not. I only want tourists. That’s who I want to 
have in. You have a lot of dealers here on the streets, and I never let them 
in.’ I questioned how he knows the difference, to which he answered, 
‘Based on their looks, whether they speak Dutch’. As with suspected 
undercover cops (see Chapters 1 and 4) and minors (Chapter 3), speak-
ing or sounding Dutch is a bad sign.
Some personnel have been around the 1012 long enough to recog-
nise particular hard drug users and dealers.8 Owners and employees use 
that information to keep the usual suspects at bay. As Wouter told me: 
‘We know the faces ’cause they are walking here all around the centre 
[of the city].’ Lizzie said of her coffeeshop’s doormen: ‘Security knows 
exactly who the street dealers are because they have worked in this area 
for many years. Especially the older man, he has worked in cafés almost 
all his life, so he knows all of them.’
Personnel learn ‘who is who’ based on the aforementioned social 
cues. They also obtain such knowledge by witnessing people solicit interest 
in selling or buying hard drugs. Joseph described a time in which a street 
dealer ‘was trying to sell something to the people outside, I think they were 
English guys. When he was there, he tried to ask them for a lighter and 
got into a conversation, but I saw what was going on was not good.’ Emma 
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told me she has ‘see[n] money being exchanged. I just go up and tell them, 
“This is my business, and I am the only one doing business here”.’
Elias estimated that ‘100 times in a year’ street dealers try ‘to push 
in front of the door, announcing that they have some stuff’. Their mes-
sage is not always explicit, so personnel are not always sure what is said. 
But suspicion that hard drugs are the topic is more likely to arise, and be 
acted on, if the person in question looks like a street dealer in the eyes of 
watching personnel. Jack alluded to this cause-and-effect relationship: 
‘It is a matter of watching people wandering by up and down here. There 
are faces I know from the neighbourhood, and it is more beggars than 
street dealers, but anyone starting to chat with my customers on the ter-
race will get moved along. It is only ever, “Move along please”.’
Basic economics suggests that street dealers are a problem in the 
1012 because there is demand for their products.9 Evidence of this is that 
customers ask personnel about buying hard drugs, presumably not real-
ising that to do so in a coffeeshop is a massive faux pas. To quote Kamila: 
‘They come in and ask, “Do you know where I can buy something?”’ 
Joseph mentioned this is particularly common of ‘the British, the English 
guys. They come here, they ask if you have cocaine’. Once when I showed 
up at Man in the Bottle for a cup of coffee, Selma told me that a couple 
days before a German couple had asked her something. Unsure what, she 
asked the woman to repeat herself; she then leaned in to whisper, ‘Do you 
have cocaine?’
Personnel’s worst-case scenario is to spot hard drugs in plain sight, 
as the police could suddenly walk in and see the same. Jens, for example, 
‘found a gram of cocaine on the floor’. Remnants of consumption are a 
problem, too.10 ‘We have found needles in the toilet, it was hidden’, Noah 
informed me. James reported: ‘You go and check the toilets, and you 
might find a bit of white band around the tiles. It is probably utter bullshit 
that some tourist bought off an idiot out there, but [it still is a problem].’
Comically bad cases are those in which customers try to use hard 
drugs openly while sitting at a coffeeshop. Ruben remembered one occa-
sion: ‘these big sporty guys, like military guys, were trying to sniff on the 
fucking table, man. They were on the fucking front table, man! Stupid 
fucks.’ Guus hypothesised why customers use hard drugs in the open, 
and described a case in which he had been involved: ‘Many tourists, 
when they come to Holland, they think when they go into a coffeeshop 
they can do everything. They think everything is legal what you do. I was 
very surprised one time, I went upstairs to bring his drink, and he put a 




When personnel think, or know, that someone is in possession of hard 
drugs – or is trying to acquire some – they respond with distancing tech-
niques.11 Street dealers loitering outside are asked to go elsewhere, for 
example. Finn directed them ‘to piss off [from] in front of the door’. Like-
wise, Elias ‘ask[s] them to take their business elsewhere. If you ask them 
to leave, they leave’. Thomas asserted: ‘We have a very tight control. We 
are very strict on that. No loitering about whatsoever. Anybody [who] 
does not belong there gets asked to move along.’ Joseph reacted in the 
following way when he observed a street dealer soliciting a customer on 
the terrace: ‘I went to kick him out and I warned them that in my prem-
ises we don’t do [hard drug] business. I told him to leave, and he just left.’
Street dealers do not always go willingly, however. ‘We have a lot 
of screaming going on almost every day because they are in front of my 
door’, Sophie explained. ‘If they deal in front of the door, then we ask 
them to go away.’ When they put up a verbal fight, personnel’s modal 
response is to respond in kind. ‘They can have a big mouth’, Gwen stated 
nonchalantly, ‘so you just tell them to shut the fuck up and they will go 
away.’ Likewise Ruben ‘tell[s] them to fuck off sometimes. Not out of here, 
but in front of the coffeeshop. They know me, most of them. Sometimes 
they forget where they are, and I have to tell them, “Listen man, this is 
my street. You have my respect so give me respect”.’ When I questioned 
him about what they say in return, Ruben replied: ‘“Blah, blah” – but they 
always walk away.’
Another facet of distancing is denying entry to possessors. ‘If I know 
you are coked up’, Stijn remarked, ‘if I see it, you don’t get inside. I can 
then tell [you] I don’t want you inside.’ Personnel’s ability to deny entry is 
limited because, as we have discussed, coffeeshops tend not to have door-
men, though they are effective when used. Lizzie explained that because 
of Whole Truth’s doormen, ‘We don’t have a lot of problems from street 
dealers. And if they come anywhere near here, they are not allowed to 
interact inside at all. Just, “You know you cannot come here”.’
When a hard drug suspect does make it inside, the method of dis-
tancing changes from denying entry to expulsion. Personnel do so before 
or after selling to the wrongdoer, depending on the timing of the provo-
cation.12 Hassan insisted that he denies service when ‘I see someone and I 
don’t trust him; when I have that feeling my senses say, “Listen, this guy is 
not 100 per cent”, so I don’t sell him stuff’. Referring to the ‘dirty’ person 
‘from the streets’, Emir continued: ‘He came inside and we were busy and 
I saw him come in. I told him, “Man, it is not OK”. I had a feeling and I 
 HARd dRUGS 117
stopped him. I told him, “Sorry, excuse me, I don’t need you to stay here”. 
We don’t want that sort of people in here.’ Linda stated that suspected 
‘street dealers are just told, “Hey, we don’t want you in”. We remove them 
right away’. And Joseph described why he refuses selling to people he 
deems risky: ‘People come here, and I refuse to sell to them because I 
don’t trust them. I see them as street guys, maybe like a drug dealer. I 
cannot search you, but I will tell you clearly that I refuse you because I 
think you are a street boy.’
Other cases of expulsion occur after a sale is made to the posses-
sor. Joseph recalled a case in which he ‘kick[ed] away a customer who 
was trying to do [hard drug] business here. I have been here quite a long 
time, I have a lot of experience, and I can just tell’. ‘Every time we suspect 
someone is selling hard drugs’, Claire asserted, ‘we tell them to leave. We 
tell them not to come back here.’ ‘We asked him kindly to get out’ is how 
Sophie handled the drunk and presumably coked-up customer she talked 
about. And Maud affirmed: ‘Sometimes it happens, a client comes inside, 
and then we have to throw him outside if they are acting weird. We don’t 
want those kinds of people inside of the coffeeshop.’
The manner in which personnel expel suspects ranges from cool to 
hot, meaning from calm to aggressive.13 When Guus rhetorically asked 
his customers if that was cocaine on the table, their response was ‘This is 
a coffeeshop. This is legal’. Guus corrected them: ‘I have to explain what 
it is. “You can use in a coffeeshop only hash [and marijuana]. You cannot 
use another drug.” [Then] I asked him to leave.’ Kamila told the custom-
ers who asked about how to get cocaine: ‘“Go to the police station and 
they will tell you very quickly!” They are ashamed and walk out.’ After 
being asked the same question by patrons, Joseph asked his own ques-
tion: ‘“Do you see it there [in the counter display]?” They say, “No”. So 
I say: “Then why are you asking me? Everything I have is in the middle, 
so if you don’t see it there I don’t have that one. So why ask me?” I kick 
them out.’
A hotter response was described by Ruben. When he discovered 
open cocaine use at The Mighty, he ‘blew up. I said, “Are you fucking 
sick in your head or something!? What the fuck are you thinking!?” They 
thought it was normal or something to use hard drugs in Amsterdam. I 
kicked them out. I just took his arm and helped him get the fuck out really 
quick.’ ‘Why did you react like that?’ I asked. He answered: ‘It’s because 
the coffeeshop would be shut if they found hard drugs on the premises, 
and that is the number one rule.’ Similarly, when customers asked Selma 
about getting cocaine, she ‘flipped out’ (her words) by yelling at and 
expelling the couple. She explained this reaction as due to being in a bad 
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mood, noting that a few days earlier she had been asked the same by a 
customer, but that time responded, ‘You’re lucky I’m in a good mood. No, 
we don’t. Get out of here’.
In addition to distancing, personnel described two other ways of 
discouraging street dealers, in particular, from being inside or even near 
their coffeeshops. These alternatives are comparatively uncommon, but 
still worth mentioning. One is to call the police or to threaten doing so.14 
This happens when dealers are unwilling to be shooed away while loiter-
ing outside. ‘We will ring the police if they don’t go’ is how Mara put it. 
Maikel recalled: ‘There have been some street dealers standing in front 
of my terrace. I ask them to walk away. Sometimes they are stubborn. I 
tell them it is my shop and I will call the police, then they walk away.’15
The other method of handling street dealers is to tolerate their pres-
ence.16 James did so, albeit only for short stints, because he thought it is 
better than making a fuss: ‘Pretty much they know not to [come inside]. 
If they come in and just want a paper I will do it, as long as they are 
respectful, because it is easier than going, “No, no”, and causing a scene 
over what takes two seconds – they can just get a paper and go.’ Gwen, on 
the other hand, tolerated their presence because she trusted them not to 
bring hard drugs into Like a Child:
You kind of know who they are. They also know that they have to 
keep everything outside. Come inside with your stuff in your pock-
ets and you are out of here, and they know that. Of course, you can 
never really know. To be honest, none of them actually stay for all 
that long, just a few minutes. The people that actually are allowed 
inside know the rules, and I think they do understand. I know they 
have stashes out there.17
Staying away
The previous section focuses on how personnel distance possessors from 
their coffeeshop, which is a matter of proterrence. So too, and even bet-
ter, is preventing possessors from even coming near the establishment. 
Emma believed that street dealers ‘know they shouldn’t be here’. Sophie 
agreed: ‘They just know this is not the place for them. If they come in 
here, they know that they are not welcome. Every dealer in the street 
knows that they cannot come in here.’ And Luuk stated: ‘We know them, 
and they know us, so they don’t come. As long as they’re not in front of 
the shop or near, that’s OK. And they know, so they stay away from the 
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shop, don’t come in the shop, they’re not in front of the shop, they’re not 
near the shop.’
Those sentiments may seem optimistic, or naïve, but they are 
largely confirmed by the street dealers that I interviewed. When asked if 
they solicit or sell in coffeeshops, they normally gave answers like ‘No, I 
don’t’ (Astrando), ‘No, I try not to do that’ (Sherida) and ‘Never, honestly’ 
(Damien).
There are a few reasons why possessors, especially street dealers, 
stay away from coffeeshops. One, it makes little sense to bring a punisha-
ble substance to a place subject to random police checks. Jack said it best: 
‘If you are up to dodgy shit, you wouldn’t store anything in a place that 
could be raided by the [police] at any moment of the day or year. To me 
that makes sense.’ Street dealers expressed the same opinion. Kenneth, 
for instance, steered clear of coffeeshops ‘because if you happen to be 
in there when they get raided [you’re in trouble]’. To be clear, this sort 
of motivation reflects deterrence (not proterrence), as the dealer’s only 
concern is the action of police, not of personnel.
Additionally, street dealers worried that personnel would initiate 
police action by calling them. ‘It gives you problems, man’, said Amparo. 
‘The owner might kick you out and call the police immediately. So it is 
too high a risk. You will get problems.’ This motivation is the product of 
proterrence in that personnel call the cops on street dealers to prevent 
their establishment from being punished for hard drugs.
Respect is another reason why possessors stay out of coffeeshops. 
This was mentioned by Soraida, who commented of making hard drug 
sales: ‘No, never in a coffeeshop. I have respect for coffeeshops. It is the 
people’s business. I have respect for the owner of the shop. I would not try 
to do my business in his shop. I do my business outside the coffeeshop.’ 
Guus expressed the same sentiment regarding possessors: ‘They know 
they do not belong here. I think that has to do with respect.’
In part, respect reflects common knowledge that coffeeshops are 
put at risk by bringing hard drugs inside. Selma believed that street deal-
ers ‘would really like to come here’, but did not do it ‘because of their 
respect. They really respect the fact that they cannot because [otherwise] 
they risk my job’. ‘If the police come there, they will close it’ is the reason 
Roy gave for not dealing drugs at coffeeshops.
Going a step further, another street dealer, Soerin, hints at a self-serv-
ing reason not to cause problems for personnel: ‘The coffeeshop would 
not like that. He would blame you, and that is why I do not like going 
to coffeeshops to do that.’ In a similar vein, Imra told me: ‘It is better to 
have respect for the people. For respect, I don’t go inside it [coffeeshops] 
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because if the police come and they find something, you are the mother-
fucker, you bring shit to them.’ This concern was echoed by a coffeeshop 
dealer, James, an occasional hard drug user. He never mixed cannabis and 
hard drugs while at coffeeshops because ‘you know the police come in for 
checks, and if you lost him [the owner] his business because you had a bit 
of something in your pocket, he would be very unhappy with you. I would 
say [this street] is my centre of existence, so if I got one of them shut down 
for being a dickhead, it would reflect very badly on me.’
The words of Soerin, Imra and James show that, among other ways, 
coffeeshops prevent trouble by gaining respect.18 From the perspective of 
personnel, the utility of being respected is that it stops possessors from 
bringing hard drugs to their establishment. And from the perspective of 
possessors, the utility of paying respect is avoiding the label, and con-
comitant bad treatment, of someone who puts a coffeeshop at risk or in 
trouble.
Yet even if possessors do not respect personnel or fear formal sanc-
tion, it may be rational for them to stay away from coffeeshops. After 
all, there is little reason to go there if you are going to be denied entry or 
expelled. Chamiel stopped trying to sell at coffeeshops because the person-
nel ‘doesn’t let me go inside’. ‘No, never in a coffeeshop’, Ashwin said of his 
business. ‘Owners don’t want anyone with hard rocks in their coffeeshop, 
so you would have a lot of problems.’ On this point, Jens said of street deal-
ers: ‘They usually know not to come in. They know not to come in when I 
am working, because I know most of them now and know their faces. They 
know I would knock their fucking brains out.’ Furthermore, possessors 
do not like to be watched, and coffeeshop personnel are well known for 
watching. ‘We don’t have a problem with them. I know them and I am very 
aware of them’, said Anna. ‘If they are sitting here I keep an eye on them. 
They don’t like that.’ Validating this perception, Enzio gave the following 
answer when asked if he sells at coffeeshops: ‘Oh no, no, no. I don’t sell 
things in a coffeeshop. In the coffeeshops there is a lot of watching, they 
listen, and people are coming and looking [like], “Who are you?”’
Notes
1. For information on hard drug use, trade and policy in Amsterdam and the Netherlands, see 
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 7. For information on appearance-based discriminatory control of drug suspects, especially with 
respect to race/ethnicity and class, see Alexander 2010; Jacques and Wright 2015; Mohamed 
and Fritsvold 2010; Provine 2007.
 8. For information on managing individuals who are discredited, see Goffman 1963.
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researching it, see Caulkins and Reuter 2010; National Research Council 2010; Moeller 2017; 
Ritter 2006.
10. Seeing disorderly behaviour versus its remnants reflects the difference between social disorder 
and physical disorder respectively. For information on disorder, including its relationship to 
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12. One way that both control agents and offenders seek to reduce problems is by minimising 
provocations; see Clarke 2009; Jacques and Reynald 2012.
13. My use of ‘cool’ versus ‘hot’ here is different from, but perhaps causally related to, the use of 
those terms as synonymous with cognitive and emotional; see van Gelder 2013.
14. For information on calling police as a component of guardianship, see Reynald 2010.
15. Not every interviewee was in favour of this approach. Sophie, for example, saw its downside as 
raising the potential for retaliation: ‘You just learn to live with it because if you call them every 
day, the next day they are out on the street again and then they remember your face and they 
know that you called the cops, so it’s like [not the best way to handle this problem].’
16. For information on drug dealers’ use of toleration to manage conflict, see Morselli et al. 2017; 
Jacques and Wright 2011, 2015. For information on mixed contacts between stigmatised per-
sons and normals, see Goffman 1963.
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due to their use of stash spots; see Bernasco and Jacques 2015; Jacques and Bernasco 2013. 
One street dealer, Coen, made a comment that validates Gwen’s trust: ‘No, [I] never [make 
sales] inside a coffeeshop. It is not the place for me to sell. It is the place where I relax, where I 
take my time for myself, take it easy for two seconds. That is my place of peace when I am not 
doing my job.’
18. For information on the importance of respect for preventing problems, see Anderson 1999. 





Nuisance is a mercurial concept.1 It includes everything from annoy-
ing noise and parking problems to disorderly offences such as loitering 
and littering to attracting violence, theft and vandalism.2 If coffeeshops 
directly or indirectly cause these problems, they can be punished for vio-
lating the ban on nuisance.3 Yet no personnel knew of a coffeeshop being 
closed or otherwise sanctioned for such an incident.4 Nonetheless, per-
sonnel are in a daily struggle against boorish and threatening behaviour.5 
Lizzie said it best: ‘You have to tell people all the time what to do, and 
especially what not to do.’
Nuisance ranges from minor to serious. At the lower end of the scale 
is impoliteness. Some bad manners are behavioural. ‘The worst thing that 
happens in here’, Finn exaggerated, ‘which immediately means a red card 
[expulsion], is if a male person uses the female toilet. That is a capital 
crime in here.’ Rudeness may be verbal, too. Jens told me: ‘If you act up, 
you have to leave. We treat each other nice here. Say “Please” and “Thank 
you”’. Ruben’s review of the house rules referred to both acts and words:
Don’t shout, don’t put your feet with your shoes on the couch. Just 
treat the coffeeshop like it is my home. Everybody can have a [roll-
ing] paper, but ask [don’t just grab one]. When you are not buying 
anything and you just walk in for a paper, don’t grab, just ask me. 
You want to go to the toilet when you are not a customer, no prob-
lem, but say ‘Hello, can I go to the toilet?’
In addition to what should be said, another aspect of politeness is 
knowing what not to say. Gwen gave a couple of examples: ‘Often [the prob-
lem at the coffeeshop] is just the boys [young customers] who are new, and 
they just want to show themselves [i.e. act tough]. Normally, they come in 
and they start bitching about the weed, saying it isn’t good enough or [that] 
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the person behind the dealer’s bar doesn’t treat them as they want to be.’ 
Sophie described a verbal slight to which she responded in kind:
This one time, I was in a very good mood and there were two 
Americans sitting at my bar. I started talking to him and he was, 
‘So, are you working in the red light [district] and are you standing 
in the window as well?’ I was like, ‘No’, and I made a joke out of it. I 
was like, ‘So what are you? You are from Texas are you? So, you are 
basically hillbillies?’ He got mad, mad as hell, though five minutes 
ago he called me a whore. He was as mad as hell. He walked out.
Volume is a further facet of polite talk. When I was speaking with 
Willem about preferred types of customers, he pointed across the street 
and stated: ‘A large crowd, like those guys there, they are the type of peo-
ple I prefer not to come in.’ He was referring to a ‘stag party’ or ‘bachelor 
party’ – an occasion in which a group of adult males get together to cele-
brate a member’s upcoming marriage, often by acting like boys.6 Typical 
of such groups in the 1012, the group in question was loud – and likely to 
be that way wherever they went, including coffeeshops.
At the serious end of the nuisance continuum is fighting between 
customers. Kamila laughed about an incident involving a couple of 
female customers: ‘Someone was jealous and so they just started fighting 
here. They were shouting, “You were just looking at my boyfriend!” It was 
just so funny.’ Wouter mentioned that at Live Long, the locals ‘get in fights 
with each other a lot’ over ‘little bullshit’. A slightly more serious fight was 
described by Olivia:
A psychotic guy felt like somebody was not listening to him. It was 
one of our neighbours, a guy who comes in quite often. We saw him 
deteriorate, just doing more and more drugs, just getting stranger 
in his head, just getting weird. I think he feels like he is attacked all 
the time, he was like [to my colleague], ‘You don’t respect me. You 
never listen to me’. There were some [customer] guys in the shop 
that were like, ‘If he doesn’t shut up now, we are going to kick him 
out’, and my colleague was remaining quite calm. I think he [the 
psychotic guy] went on, and the other customers actually kicked 
him out. They hit him, and he did hit back.
Max talked about a conflict between black market traders who 
walked into Everybody. ‘We had to laugh about it’, he said, ‘but it was for 
us, in the beginning, a little bit dangerous.’ Here is the story:
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I was sitting upstairs. Two guys who looked like Moroccan guys, 
but they actually were from Algeria [we later found out], they 
wanted to buy cocaine from a Surinam guy on the streets. The guy, 
the Surinam guy, didn’t have any cocaine, but just wanted to take 
their money. He said to them, ‘Yeah, yeah, give me the money, and 
I have to go in here [to get the cocaine]’. He went into the shop, and 
locked himself into the toilet and thought, ‘As long as I stay here 
in the toilet, after a while these guys will go away’. I was sitting 
upstairs, and we were focused on that [guy]. All of a sudden I see 
two Moroccan-looking guys in the shop looking around. As soon 
as I saw the Surinam guy was staying in the toilet a long time, I 
thought, ‘What is happening?’ Then a few [personnel] went to the 
guys to ask them ‘What are you looking for?’ He said, ‘Yeah, we 
are waiting for the guy’. [Personnel told them,] ‘No, you have to 
go out!’ So they went outside, and then we heard that they were 
waiting for this guy in the toilet.
I went knocking on the toilet door. ‘Hey, get out, you have 
to go out of the shop!’ But he didn’t want to go. He was afraid to 
get out because the two guys were standing there like ‘He took our 
money!’ They wanted to grab him. [Once the Surinam guy left] one 
of the guys [who works at the coffeeshop] got in between them. 
‘I don’t even know why you are helping him’, I said. ‘He wants to 
rob a few tourists, and they’re not very smart because they want 
to buy drugs on the streets. But if they want to kick his ass, be my 
guest because he also went into our shop and thought it was safe or 
something. That will teach him a lesson.’
Customer fights are not common in coffeeshops, reportedly occur-
ring at only 12 per cent of them in the previous year.7 To give a point of 
comparison, they occur 10 times more often at bars in the 1012.8 Perhaps 
there are relatively fewer fights in coffeeshops because personnel spend 
so much time controlling smaller problems,9 or because cannabis intoxi-
cation inhibits aggression, especially compared to the effect of alcohol.10 
As Noah and Charlotte respectively commented, ‘Smokers don’t fight that 
much’ and ‘Weed calms you down, it doesn’t make you aggressive’.
Sources of nuisance
Personnel think of three groups as being prone to cause nuisance. One is 
homeless individuals.11 They are unwanted inside coffeeshops because 
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they damage the atmosphere. Dean described how their appearance and 
smell affects the vibe:
A lot of homeless people, they use the coffeeshop as a hangout 
place. You have different people. Some people who live on the 
street are looking very dirty. In the beginning [of being homeless], 
they look good. But after a half year, they have dirty clothes. In the 
first half year, they use the coffeeshops for hangouts and that kind 
of thing. [But after a while] the people who are standing on the 
streets, they smell of sweat. Then we have to tell them to go out and 
take a shower or something. They stink a lot.
The actions of homeless people damage the atmosphere, too. Maud 
recalled one incident: ‘this guy who came in, he was looking around, 
and I saw he was a little bit lost. I thought there was something different 
about this guy. He was bothering my clients [by begging, I found out].’ 
On other occasions, instead of asking for handouts, Emma commented 
that homeless individuals ‘go by the ashtrays to see if there are any left-
over joints’.
Drunk persons are another group cast as a common source of nui-
sance. In addition to being loud, as are many stag/bachelor parties, they 
say things that, to quote Jana, ‘can be annoying. They make you think 
they have drunk a little too much’. Jens described an individual who 
‘wasn’t a customer from the coffeeshop; he was someone who came in 
off the street, and was really off his face [drunk] and annoying’. Stefan 
recalled an encounter with ‘a drunk asshole; he came in and was all mel-
low and sat down, and [then] started visibly annoying other groups of 
people’.
It is ironic that a cause of nuisance in coffeeshops is alcohol, as it 
cannot be sold or consumed on the premises as of 2007. ‘In the beginning’, 
Lola explained, ‘you could start a coffeeshop also with an alcohol licence. 
After a few years, they changed to one or the other.’ Each coffeeshop 
had to choose between the cannabis and alcohol trade. Remnants of this 
bygone era are still visible. Some coffeeshops have a counter with stools, 
like those common in bars. On the outside, coffeeshops have signage that 
includes a cocktail glass (visible at five coffeeshops) or writing on the 
windows or wall reading ‘Café-Bar’, ‘Café’, ‘Bar’ or ‘Pool Café’ (visible at 
seven coffeeshops).
No coffeeshop secretly sells alcohol, but customers try to consume 
it, covertly or openly. ‘Before you realise’, Joseph told me, ‘you see their 
beer bottle, and it’s not allowed to drink.’ Some offences are due to 
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ignorance of this rule. It is surprising to foreign customers, who assume 
that since you can smoke cannabis in coffeeshops you will also be able 
to drink alcohol there. But not all violations are due to ignorance. Signs 
specify the ban and personnel tell clients about it. Lizzie described a time 
that customers asked her about the rule, only to wind up ignoring her: 
‘“Can I drink alcohol?” I say: “No, I don’t serve any alcohol.” “Oh, do you 
have beer?” So I say: “Well, beer is alcohol.” “Oh, yeah. Can we bring our 
own?” “No, you cannot do that,” I explain. Then I come over to the table, 
and there are three plastic cups and a bottle of Cognac on it. So I get very 
annoyed.’
Alcohol-related nuisance also includes passing out and vomiting. 
In a similar way to how people are warned not to mix grape (wine) with 
grain (beer), personnel think it is a bad idea for drunk people to ‘start a 
fire’ (smoke cannabis).12 Lizzie gave an example of the effect:
If you are really drunk and you smoke a joint, it can go badly. You 
can get very ill. One time I had a Japanese guy sitting where you are 
[at the counter]. He was like this [appearing nauseated]. I looked 
[away and then looked] again – there was a pool of puke. I told the 
guys [colleagues] to please help me pick him up because he passed 
out [and] carry him outside. The puke was running down his face, 
on his clothes and everything.
Dean narrated a similar incident:
We had someone puke. A lot of people come in here drunk, and 
you have tourists, they think that they can smoke. A lot of people, 
they go and eat, they drink. Then they are a little bit drunk and 
they think, ‘Oh yeah, come on, let’s go to the coffeeshop and we will 
smoke a joint’. They smoke a joint after their drinks. If you drink 
and smoke together that is fine, but if you drink a lot and then you 
smoke, everybody can puke, for sure. Me, I am a regular smoker and 
a good smoker. If I drink a lot and then after a while I smoke, that 
happens to me, also.
Along with tourists, young people are characterised as drinking too much 
before smoking. In Mara’s words: ‘Young people drink, drink more, drink 
more, drink more. [Then say to themselves,] “I have to smoke, then I’m 
the big guy.” They throw up!’
In fairness to alcohol, smoking on its own can make people sick.13 
People who smoke too much – in quantity or potency – are the third group 
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identified as regular contributors to nuisance – albeit only that related to 
accidents and falling ill. Dean observed: ‘Sometimes you can puke if you 
had a long flight. You come off the plane and smoke a big joint. Then you 
get too tired and puke.’ More than any other nationality, personnel stere-
otyped Americans as smoking more than they can handle. Time and time 
again in coffeeshops, I heard them say to dealers ‘Give me your best’ or, in 
the form of a question, ‘What is your best?’ This is conspicuous consump-
tion at its finest, or maybe foulest.14 Victor talked about how this mindset 
affects the propensity to make themselves sick:
They [Americans] always think they can handle the biggest, the 
baddest and the strongest stuff. Then 20 minutes later, they are 
blowing [vomiting] in the corner and I have to go over [to help] 
because they can’t handle it. It just seems a little bit stupid, you 
know? Why don’t they just slow down a little bit and then see how 
far you can go, instead of taking the strongest stuff and just falling 
down? It’s not fun even. What is the fun of being sick on the floor?
Being high leads to accidental injury and property damage, too.15 
‘People do get hurt when they pass out’, Linda commented, ‘and bump 
their head against the table.’ When I asked Luca about violence at the 
business, he answered: ‘The only injuries are people so stoned that they 
fall off their stools!’ In response to the same question, Victor replied: 
‘No [violence], except for people smoking too much and falling on the 
ground and smashing their own head. I have seen people fall through 
glass windows. They black out [meaning ‘pass out’]. They just walk and 
they black out. I have fucking seen people fall over chairs. They are like 
ghosts [in skin tone].’ People being so high that they walk through a win-
dow is not hyperbole. Adam told me of one such instance: ‘This American 
guy was really stoned; he thought it was the exit, but it was a big window. 
Just walked through it. He was actually all right, I think. He was just [like 
afterwards], “What did I do?”’
Managing nuisance
As with controlling minors and hard drug possessors, personnel look out 
for nuisance and work to distance it from their coffeeshop. If outside, 
sources of nuisance are asked to go further away. If trying to gain entry 
or make a purchase, they are denied. If already inside, they are expelled. 
Whether proterred to manage minors, hard drug possessors or nuisance, 
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personnel use distancing techniques because their concern is stopping 
violations from occurring at their coffeeshop. Of much less concern is 
what happens beyond its borders.16
When I asked Elias if there are certain people refused entry, he gave 
homeless people as an example: ‘Yes, junkies and some people are just too 
filthy to be inside; maybe they have slept on the street for a week. They 
are not going to sit on my seats.’ Stijn gave a similar response: ‘Junkies, 
people from the street, they cannot come in. They are not allowed to 
come in here.’ Referring to ‘bums or people that don’t order anything’, 
Emma stated: ‘I tell them to leave, usually they leave. Usually they don’t 
start to argue, but if they do, I just repeat myself again, and usually they 
go. I never have a problem with this.’
In response to being questioned about who is denied service, sev-
eral personnel stated that drunk individuals are handled that way. ‘If 
they come in and I see they are drunk’, Hassan asserted, ‘I put them 
out.’ Stijn remarked: ‘Sometimes people come drunk in the morning, 
like the English [tourists]. They come from the boat; they have been on 
the boat drinking all the time and they come in and they are agitated, 
they want to smoke, and then you don’t want to serve them because 
they are drunk. You say, “No, go to your hotel, chill out and come back 
tonight”.’
The main reason personnel distance minors and possessors is to 
protect the coffeeshop from punishment. However, this is less true of 
managing nuisance because single cases rarely, if ever, result in legal 
trouble. In these cases, therefore, personnel’s motivation is to protect 
the establishment’s atmosphere and customers. That is why Ruben dis-
tanced ‘smelly ones and drunk ones, because we don’t want to change 
the atmosphere in here. When somebody is really drunk they may start 
out being nice, but in five minutes they can change’. ‘Sometimes’, Anna 
stated, ‘someone is very angry, but we don’t let them in. We tell them they 
have to go out because they are drunk. We do not want to make problems 
here. We have our responsibilities to our customers. I don’t want to only 
make money from them.’
In addition to distancing people from the coffeeshop, personnel 
prevent bad behaviour by limiting the amount of cannabis sold to people. 
Well, not all people, but only those acting improperly, or who appear on 
the fringe of doing so. Such clients are ‘cut off’, meaning they are allowed 
to stay in the coffeeshop, but not to buy any more cannabis. The goal 
is twofold: to protect the establishment and to protect customers from 
themselves. Lizzie put into words the way in which personnel act as 
stewards:
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You know people travel, they don’t eat. They travel on the plane, 
don’t eat breakfast, come with their suitcase to the coffeeshop, 
smoke so much, either puke or get so stoned, wander around the 
city and I say, ‘Why do you do that? Why? Go check in first, then 
you know where your hotel is. You eat something, then you come 
to smoke’. That is why I think it is good that there are coffeeshops 
in Amsterdam, because we supply a lot of information. People come 
sometimes, they want to buy four space cakes. I say, ‘Oh, are you 
going to have a party with your friends?’ They say, ‘No, it is all for 
me because I am going on the plane.’ I say, ‘Look, I am not going to 
sell you four space cakes. You can have two, maximum’. You have to 
be like [how you are] when you serve alcohol. At a certain point you 
have to say, ‘Look, enjoy this last beer because after this, I am not 
serving you any more alcohol. You can have coffee, tea, juice, but 
that is it.’ I tell them, ‘I care and have responsibility for you. You are 
inside and from me you do not get another drop of alcohol, finished’.
A third, and certainly the nicest, way of managing nuisance is 
helping its source.17 This is the response to intoxication-induced sick-
ness. Lizzie talked about this as well, because it is how she reacted to the 
Japanese customer who vomited:
I told the guys [working], ‘Please help me pick him up because he 
passed out, carry him outside’. We picked him up like this [carrying 
him by his armpits]. We gave him a bucket of water to clean himself 
up. Then I asked the guy if he had a place to clean himself up. He said 
no, and that he was going on a train that afternoon. So [I] advised 
him to buy for €5 some clothes on the Waterloo secondhand market 
and to spend another €3 in having a shower at Central Station.
She went on to describe her general approach to helping:
I always keep an eye on people. As soon as I see them change to a lit-
tle bit grey, or the sweat drops come here [the forehead], I tell them 
to sit outside first of all because of the fresh air, and it does them a 
lot of good. I feed them sugar water. Many of them will throw up, 
but then it is already outside so I am happy. But people will some-
times get up, want to make it to the toilet, don’t tell me they are ill, 
pass out here on the floor and then puke and lie in their own puke. 
The show must go on, so we grab a bucket of water and clean it up 
as fast as we can. That is the most disgusting part.
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We look after you when something happens. I had this one 
guy, he was walking down the street, the other guy passed out. He 
came back running in here: ‘Call an ambulance!’ He was scream-
ing. [I said,] ‘OK, sugar water’. Then he yelled at me: ‘Don’t make a 
fucking espresso! Call the ambulance!’ I said, ‘Look, first rule, relax, 
don’t panic. We are already helping’. He was high, his friend was 
high, passed out. The guy doesn’t know what is going on, and he 
starts to panic. I had [another time] one guy who went to walk out 
here, couldn’t make it, fell on the steps and split his head open. So 
many stories like that. I sent him down the street there, where there 
is a medical post, with a towel.
Helpful behaviour is not unique to Lizzie and Whole Truth. Across 
coffeeshops, personnel lend a hand to customers who overdo it. For 
people who vomit, Mara explained: ‘I put a chair outside and sit them 
in front of the door, and they get some fresh air.’ While talking to Max, 
I mentioned what I had observed at Everybody, as it seemed odd to me:
I’ve noticed twice, when I’ve been in this coffeeshop just by chance, 
someone would just be tripping their ass off [seemingly on hallu-
cinogenic mushrooms]. So the way you guys handle that is you 
make them sit on a chair outside? Do you put a chair outside for 
them? Like how did this come up? Does this happen a lot? And 
where did you come up with that strategy, ’cause it’s interesting 
to just put someone tripping outside your shop on a chair and tell 
them to hang out.
Max explained the rationale:
You have to take responsibility for the people. I know we have a 
lot of tourists. What they do is they go to the museum, and they go 
to the Heineken Brewery, they don’t eat well. Then they come to 
the shop, and they all want the strongest stuff. But your sugar level 
drops, and I don’t want them to throw up in our shop. I have done 
that also many times – clean that up. I sold them the soft drugs, so 
that is my responsibility. But I take them outside so they don’t throw 
up in my shop. They also get fresh air. They need the oxygen and 
then I give them sugar. Of course, it looks a little bit silly, for all the 
people who are passing by, that somebody is tripping out in front 
of my shop. But I am responsible for them. People pass out inside, 
they wet [piss] themselves, that also happens. People have passed 
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out and then they let everything go, you know? I am responsible for 
that. I clean it up, no problem.
The representative of Dollar Room, Dean, described a similar response to 
sickness.18 This came up after I asked him, ‘When someone pukes, how do 
you guys respond?’ He answered laughing:
Smash them in the face! No, not really! It depends. It depends on 
what kind of customer it is. Most of the time, we are very kind. We 
help on our side. They need fresh air [so put them outside]. We give 
them sugar water. You mix hot water with a lot of sugar, or you mix 
it with cold water and let them drink it; that kind of thing. And we 
have to clean the place down where the bastard has puked.
Instead of distancing or helping sources of nuisance, personnel may 
warn them to shape up or ship out.19 Jasper and his colleagues do so ‘if 
somebody’s shouting and being rude. We say [as a warning], “Go get 
your weed somewhere else, man”, and next time he’s very quiet’. Jens 
said emphatically: ‘Don’t act up or else I will put my foot in your ass and 
that will be the end!’ He meant that figuratively, adding: ‘I will tell you 
that you are being a dick! Like dude, “We don’t do shit like that here, so 
pack it up and fuck off!”’
Warnings are not always sufficient, however. This becomes the 
case when a written or spoken warning fails to have its intended effect. 
After Lizzie’s customers poured out Cognac, she told them: ‘Look, you 
asked me. I explained to you, I explained to you twice [that alcohol is 
not allowed]. I want you to pick up and go now because now you are 
taking the piss. You come to ask me, I say no. I explain to you why so you 
can have more peace with the rule, and you take the piss. So now, you 
go.’ Joseph had a similar response to people who drank alcohol, despite 
knowing it is not allowed: ‘When you come, you can see my display and 
[the rule sign specifying] there is no alcohol. If you try to go contrary to 
that, I don’t have the patience. I will tell you to go away.’
Personnel deem warnings as insufficient for unwanted persons, such 
as those who appear homeless, drunk or threatening.20 Jack ‘will sit down 
and chat to a drunk person who is being a bit lairy’, for example, ‘and then 
send them on their way’. When a homeless person walked into At Last and 
started talking to customers, Maud took action: ‘[I] went over to him. He 
said he just wanted weed. I just asked what he was doing, why he was both-
ering my clients. I told him if he wanted weed, I could give it to him, but 
if he did not have the money then I am sorry, I could do nothing for him. 
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I told him to please leave.’ And when the ‘drunk asshole’ annoyed Stefan’s 
customer, he ‘asked him to leave and calm down a bit. We asked him to 
leave a second time and he left. I’ve never had to remove anyone forcibly’.
Hands-on expulsion
Distancing gets touchy.21 Personnel universally see physical expulsion as 
a last resort. Yet it is one they are prepared to employ. To quote Victor: ‘If 
somebody doesn’t want to leave, if he doesn’t want to listen and is not fol-
lowing the rules, then we make him leave. That is your job.’ Physical expul-
sion ranges in severity from suggestive to forceful. The former is illustrated 
by how Ruben handled heavily intoxicated persons: ‘Most of the time, the 
only thing that happens is like [I] grab somebody by the arm, turn them 
around and tell them where the door is. That’s it. It’s just putting someone 
on to the streets.’ Gwen declared: ‘If somebody is really annoying, then I 
actually take them from the table, and I will actually take their arm. Then 
I just get him out. That does not happen a lot. I think in the last year, it 
happened four or five times that I actually had to take somebody from the 
chair.’ I asked, ‘And are you actually like grabbing them?’ She clarified: 
‘No, I always do it like this first [lightly placing her hand on my arm], with 
no force, but I will make sure that you understand what I am saying.’
Hands-on expulsion intensifies from suggestive to forceful when a 
troublemaker is asked to leave but refuses. Referring to the guy ‘really 
off his face’, Gwen explained that he ‘wouldn’t leave, so he got kicked 
out. He got shown the hole in the door, and landed on the pavement. 
He was launched out’. Sophie said of the ‘hobo’ collecting joints that ‘we 
had to push him out’. Hassan described an encounter with a customer: 
‘He didn’t keep to the house rules that I have here. He was taking off his 
shoes and walking around like that, talking to himself, that kind of shit; 
weird shit, crazy kind of weird shit. I think he was drunk and mentally 
ill, as well. He wasn’t like 100 per cent, you know what I mean?’ Initially 
personnel tried to talk sense into the guy, but things escalated:
We said all these things like, ‘You know that’s not the way you 
should act here’. He made the business look bad, because we had 
customers here and they don’t like that. He didn’t want to listen. He 
[the employee] told the guy to leave. He [the nuisance] was like, 
‘No, I’m not going to leave’. He didn’t want to go out. So he was like, 
‘Listen, I’m gonna tell you another time, you are going to leave if I 
have to drag you out of the business’. He was like, ‘Yeah, if you touch 
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me you will have [a] problem’. He didn’t want to listen, that was the 
thing. He pulled him out, struggling. There was pushing.
I asked Hassan why it was important to remove the guy from the cof-
feeshop. He answered: ‘Because you need some kind of order in the cof-
feeshop, and he was destroying it.’
There are notable, and I think explainable, differences in how per-
sonnel’s responses to nuisance differed from those to minors and hard drug 
possessors. For one, personnel help customers who become sick, and warn 
people causing offence that their behaviour must change to remain inside. I 
did not hear or see these methods being used to deal with minors and pos-
sessors. The difference, I think, has to do with the risk posed by these respec-
tive groups. Coffeeshops are not punished for single cases of nuisance, not 
even serious incidents such as fighting, whereas they are sanctioned for 
the presence of minors or hard drugs. This makes helping and warning less 
appropriate for managing minors and possessors on the premises.
On the other hand, personnel physically expel people causing nui-
sance, which is rarer with minors and possessors. This is surprising, given 
that minors and possessors are a greater risk to coffeeshops. Perhaps 
hands-on distancing is more common with people who are drunk or men-
tally ill because these traits reduce their willingness to go away voluntarily. 
According to Luca, that effect is assumed: ‘A lot of people come here drunk 
off their heads, and of course there is some shoving.’ Another explanation 
pertains to respect and acknowledgement of one’s wrongdoing. Minors and 
possessors may leave without a struggle because they realise they are in the 
wrong, but people who are drunk or mentally ill may see things differently.
As mentioned in Chapter 5, personnel involve the police if deemed 
necessary to handle a problem.22 Lizzie, for example, said of fights 
between customers: ‘If it is really a problem, we call them [police] and 
ask them to come.’ Olivia told me what happened when the ‘psychotic 
guy’ got in a scuffle with customers at Elegy:
The employee called them [police] because he knew the guy and he 
thought he was having some kind of paranoid fit, so I don’t think the 
police even really arrested him. I think they just took him, gave him 
some valium and called his shrink or something. He is our neighbour, 
and his mum lives there, too. Sometimes she walks by and she is a 
really nice lady. She was just so embarrassed about what happened.
Jack reported a serious case of nuisance, including how and why person-
nel got the police involved:
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We had about 15 very, very drunk Moroccan boys come in the shop. 
They were extremely loud and lairy and just not what we wanted and 
I sold them all some weed and then they all wanted to hang around. 
Then they started abusing my colleague behind the bar and generally 
abusing everyone else in the shop. They were standing there being 
abusive and it was getting to the point where they were looking to 
have a fight. I wanted them out and they weren’t going. I was like it 
is about to kick off, and suddenly 12 of my regular customers stand 
up ready for a fight, and I am like I really don’t want this to happen. 
Generally in my coffeeshop, I know that if it is ever going to happen 
I generally have someone at the back to help me. It was in that area 
[point of seriousness] where without police intervention, crimes 
would have occurred; there would have been a riot outside here.
The boss was thankfully here at the time, as well. I said to him, 
‘Look boss, can you go over the road and get the police because this 
is going to kick off real soon and I don’t want to hit anyone?’ They 
really riled me up and I was getting lairy and it was ‘Get the police 
now because I will get in trouble if I hit someone’. They were there 
looking for a fight and I was about to give them one, so it was like, 
‘Boss can you go across the road?’ – and the police were there. It was 
just a matter of saying [to them], ‘Can you come over here, we have 
a little issue over the road?’ and within 30 seconds there were six 
policemen here to take the drunk people away. They just arrested 
all of them. We pointed out these guys, they legged it and the police 
went after them and arrested them.
As much as the authorities do consider us criminal enterprises, 
the police do their best to work with us. As long as we can stay in 
line with them [with respect to the coffeeshop rules], we can count 
on them not treating us like gangsters, [for example] when I have 
a problem like that with 15 nutters about to start a riot in my cof-
feeshop. I can call on them for help in that respect and they will 
come running. They will come and help us. They don’t mess around. 
If we ask for their help they come quick.
For coffeeshop personnel such as Jack, the good and bad news about the 
police is ‘they are just right across the road’.
Notes
 1. The Netherlands Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport (2002: 30) specifies: ‘Public nuisance 
occurs in many different forms … For this reason the concept of “nuisance” must be interpret-
ed broadly.’
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 2. For information on nuisance with respect to coffeeshops, and Dutch drug policy more broadly, 
see Ooyen-Houben and Kleemans 2015.
 3. NMHWS 2003.
 4. Nuisance does appear to be used in a general way to close coffeeshops. This is why it is impor-
tant to distinguish between nuisance incidents (for example, particular fights) and the general 
perception of a coffeeshop, or coffeeshops, as a nuisance.
 5. This is the definition of nuisance adopted by Kelling and Coles (1996) and Wilson and Kelling 
(1982).
 6. For information on stag/bachelor parties, see Briggs and Ellis 2017; Thurnell-Read 2012.
 7. This pattern reflects the general inverse relationship between the seriousness and frequency of 
various forms of conduct, such as crimes of violence and property crime.
 8. Jacques et al. 2016.
 9. See Eck and Weisburd 2015; Newman 1972; Reynald 2015.
10. For information on the relationship between intoxication and aggression, see Boles and Miotto 
2003; Felson et al. 2008; Meyerscough and Taylor 1985.
11. For information on homelessness and its relationship to crime and control, see Bourgois and 
Schonberg 2009; Cress and Snow 2000; Desmond 2016; Duneier 1999; Liebow 1993; Snow 
and Anderson 1993.
12. For information on the interaction between alcohol and cannabis consumption, see Lukas and 
Orozco 2001; Robbe 1998.
13. See Becker 2015.
14. This reflects Veblen’s ([1899] 1994) notion of conspicuous consumption.
15. For information on the effect of cannabis on executive function and motor control, see Ra-
maekers et al. 2006.
16. This reflects the old approach of expelling offenders from city states and the like, as govern-
ment officials and citizens prioritised what happened in their community over that of others. 
However, this dissipated with the coalescing of these smaller sovereign territories into nations 
(Spierenburg 2007).
17. Whereas the other techniques of reactive control are penal in style, helping is what Black 
(1976) refers to as therapeutic (see also Horwitz 1982; Tucker 1999).
18. Dean also recalled a time that he asked someone who puked for compensation, specifically 
enough to dry-clean his shirt. Asking for compensation is fairly rare, so far as I can tell. Here 
is his description of the incident: ‘The guy comes in a little bit drunk [on the other hand] and 
the guy behind the bar tells him not to smoke. The guy here says, “OK, you can have something 
but don’t smoke”. But he [the customer] says he wants to, then he goes upstairs, smokes a little 
bit. Then the dealer goes upstairs and he sees him and says, “Go outside, I see in your face that 
you are not so good”. The guy says, “Blah, blah, OK”. After a few seconds he stands up and he 
pukes and a little bit over the dealer, pukes over the clothes of the dealer. The guy says, “Sorry 
for that”. But the dealer says, “Yes, but I have to go to the cleaning company so you have to 
pay a little bit for the cleaning”. For me that is totally good and if he pays the €20 then that is 
OK.’ For information on drug dealers’ use of negotiation to manage conflict, see Morselli et al. 
2017; Jacques and Wright 2011, 2015; Taylor 2007.
19. For information on drug dealers’ use of threats, both violent and nonviolent, to manage con-
flict, see Anderson 1999; Dickinson 2017; Jacques and Wright 2015; Jacques, Wright, and 
Allen 2014; Taylor 2007.
20. For a classic exchange on how the seriousness of an incident affects its handling, see Black 
1979; Gottfredson and Hindelang 1979.
21. For information on drug dealers’ use of physical force to manage conflict, see Anderson 1999; 
Goldstein 1985; Jacques and Allen 2015; Jacques, Wright and Allen 2014; Reuter 2009; Tay-
lor 2007; Werb et al. 2011.
22. Evidence that the seriousness of the incident matters is seen, for example, in Hassan’s expla-
nation of why they did not call the police when the guy without shoes did not want to leave: 
‘Because it didn’t go far. He wasn’t using aggression or anything, no hitting or anything like 
that. He was just a drunk guy acting in a “Oh, I don’t want to leave and this and that” kind of 
way. It was not necessary to get the cops involved.’
136
Conclusion
The utility of rules
Dutch coffeeshop policy is successful. It separates the markets for hard 
and soft drugs, without increasing the latter’s consumption1 and while 
reducing the cost – financial and moral – of imprisonment.2 In addition 
to minimising harm, the policy has positive benefits. It allows coffeeshop 
owners and employees to earn income above board, plus generates reve-
nue from taxes and tourism.3 Yet the policy is not without problems.4 As 
voiced by personnel, there are objections to holding coffeeshops respon-
sible for the behaviour of non-personnel, for example, minors and street 
dealers.5 Similar concerns are expressed over the requirement for cof-
feeshops to supply their de facto legal business through the black mar-
ket. Nor are the rules entirely clear, as is evident in Chapters 2, 4 and 6, 
which discuss advertising, the 5 grams allowance and nuisance respec-
tively. These problems are part and parcel of Dutch coffeeshop policy as 
currently practised. To put it differently, such problems are more or less 
inherent consequences of the government rules that currently regulate 
coffeeshops.
Another problem with the rules is that they may lead to conflict 
between personnel, customers and others who enter coffeeshops. People 
dislike being controlled. In response, they complain to the controllers, 
avoid them, seek formal redress or practise toleration.6 They may also 
retaliate.7 Overthrowing leaders. Shooting police. Yelling at parents. 
Breaking up with lovers. Writing bad reviews. These are just a few exam-
ples of vengeful actions that result from being controlled.8
Cases of rule-based conflict are found throughout this book. 
Coffeeshop personnel have a livelihood to protect, but put a target on 
their back by controlling others. They are well aware that enforcing rules 
causes problems, some of more concern than others. ‘It is hard work’, 
Ruben reflected discriminatorily, ‘because what are you going to do if 
there are six black guys coming in [the coffeeshop,] opening their big 
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mouths or whatever?’ When I asked Jana whether she worried about any-
thing, she answered:
When it is time to go, they [troublesome customers] don’t go – that’s 
the only thing I worry about. I am not saying that this happens every 
day. But you do have, probably once a month, this annoying person, 
and maybe I feel a bit intimidated or something. That is the only 
thing I ever worry about.
Seemingly even small things, such as asking people to take off 
their hat or sunglasses, can be a catalyst for trouble. Gijs noted: ‘There 
has been people coming in who have attitude. They don’t like it if they 
have to [take] their caps off or something, even if we ask it nicely. Then 
there might have been some shouting like, “Fuck you this” or “Fuck you 
that”, and then people leave.’ He went on to describe how fear affects rule 
enforcement among his staff:
I can’t be afraid of how big you are. But I occasionally come in the 
shop and there are certain people working, and I can see that they 
didn’t dare to ask [someone to take off his hat] because he is still 
wearing his hat. Then I just go up to him and say, ‘Excuse me, we 
have a house rule’. Then it’s, ‘Oh, I’m sorry’. Then the people behind 
the bar think, ‘Oh, I could have done that’.
Conflicts over rule enforcement may escalate from unkind words 
to violent threats. Selma described a hostile incident involving her col-
league. She begins with the back story:
I had this old neighbour from the sex shop; he was here a few weeks 
ago and we had a really nice chat. Then a Dutch man came in, he 
bought a joint and then they started talking with each other all 
about Ajax [the local football club]. He was really nice.
The man was nice, until he returned intoxicated and surprised not to see 
Selma. She explained what happened next: ‘That Saturday night, who 
comes walking in really drunk? This Dutch guy because he had a good 
time here. But he was really drunk, and he looked at my colleague [Alex] 
like, “Who the fuck are you?”’ Being drunk is bad enough inside a cof-
feeshop, but the customer also became, in her words, ‘a bit aggressive’. 
Due to this disorder, Alex expelled the man. ‘I think he [Alex] took his 
bag and put it by the door’, Selma continued, ‘and helped him towards 
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it. I thought it was funny because my colleague was saying, “Yeah, I had 
to push him out of the coffeeshop, blah, blah”, and he was like this [act-
ing like he was pushing a wall].’ The interaction ended with attempted 
intimidation: ‘He [the drunk guy] said that he would be “coming back” 
or something like that, so that means he was threatening my colleague.’
Max described a scarier chain of events – ‘a pretty big threat’ – that 
also resulted from rule enforcement.
We had a guy [customer] that we knew was no good. We had a 
feeling he was a coke dealer – not one who sells grams, but more 
like kilos. He was this big bodybuilder guy. One day I am there [at 
Everybody], and he is sitting there with another big guy with two 
really big American bulldogs. He was sitting there with big sun-
glasses on his face.
Max felt obliged to enforce the ban on shades, so he approached the 
customer and said, ‘Sorry, but can you take your glasses off? We have 
this house rule.’ Then the man went ‘totally nuts’. Max explained that he 
started ‘screaming at me and things like that. I was looking at him like, 
“No, I don’t care”. So he said, “You better call your boss [because they 
knew each other,] ’cause I am going to kick your ass”.’
As directed, Max called his boss:
He talked to the bodybuilder himself. ‘You are threatening my man-
ager. You cannot come in my shop any more. And I wouldn’t do that 
[threatening] if I were you. It’s not very smart. We grew up in the 
same neighbourhood, and you know I won’t put up with this.’ The 
guy simply responded: ‘Yeah, but.’ My boss continued: ‘Why are you 
reacting in this way? You know I have a house rule. He only asked 
you to take off your glasses.’
The counter-threat and explanation successfully handled Max’s trouble-
maker, as ‘then he didn’t go into the shop any more’.
For personnel, the worst-case scenario is for rule-based arguments 
to result in violent victimisation. For example, Jasper recounted that at 
The Hour, there was ‘a guy [who] couldn’t come in because his behaviour 
was not good and it was too busy. He went a little bit crazy [in response]. 
He started to try to hit the bouncers’. Though it is unlikely to cause bodily 
injury, spitting on someone is assault.9 At Alike All Over, Jack told me:
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I had this Eastern European, crazy lunatic. He had been in the shop 
before. I remembered him being an odd one, and possibly having 
asked him to leave in the past. I was sat down eating my lunch and 
one of my colleagues, a young girl, was serving drinks. This guy 
kind of pushed in front of somebody she was serving and started 
demanding things. She said to him, ‘Just wait a minute’. Then he 
started shouting again, and she said to him, ‘I am not going to serve 
you if you are going to be rude’. The guy just jumped up and spat 
on her!
Jack also described how being high versus drunk affects people’s 
response to being controlled. ‘[When] people are stoned, the chances of 
aggression are really slim. The fact is that levels of aggression are gener-
ally low among stoned people, with the chances of a disagreement reach-
ing a level of physical confrontation being really slim.’ Conversely, alcohol 
increases the likelihood of control leading to aggression: ‘Whenever 
there has been any sort of [violent] incident, it is drunk people. It has 
always been somebody who has had far too much to drink. It has been 
one of my staff members escorting them out of the building, then there 
could be a bit of pushing and shoving.’ Jack illustrates that process with 
a case he experienced:
Generally, my hand on someone’s shoulder is enough to let them 
know it is time to leave. Normally, I deal with it by sitting down 
with them at the table and saying, ‘Look mate, I think you have 
had a little bit too much to drink. Tonight is not the night to be 
in a coffeeshop. Away you go’. Sometimes people take offence at 
that and take a swing at me. I kind of laugh at their drunkenness 
and escort them out of the shop.
There was a geezer in here, probably about three months 
ago. It was such a funny conversation because I had my arm on 
his shoulder because I had taken him out of the shop. I said, ‘Look 
mate, you are a little drunk, and I don’t think smoking is going 
to do you any good tonight’. He was too drunk to manage a sen-
tence really, but he was kind of taking offence at me escorting 
him out. So he had a really feeble effort at a head-butt at me, 
and kind of nearly fell over. ‘Why did you just do that mate? I am 
being friendly here.’ Then he took a swing at me. I said, ‘Mate, 
that is really not necessary, on you go’, and turned him round and 
walked him on his way. Then he sort of shrugged and walked off.
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Persons who take offence at rule enforcement lash out in other 
violent ways. Linda recalled ‘one incident with my manager. The guy 
wanted to go in and he [the manager] said, “No, sorry, you are too drunk, 
and alcohol and coffeeshops don’t go together”. Then he [the drunk guy] 
slapped him.’ Unfortunately for that same manager, on a separate occa-
sion he was poked in the neck for the same reason. Another employee of 
No Return, James, told me the story:
The guy wanted to go into the coffeeshop and the manager refused 
him, like ‘Sorry’. He was trying to talk to the guy. ‘Hey you are 
drunk, blah, blah, I can’t let you in.’ Then the guy poked him in the 
neck with his fingers like this [fingers out and pressing against each 
other, really hard, in his neck]. I think he was searching for some 
[pressure] points. I think it was a combination of the booze and the 
refusal [that caused the aggression].
Rule-based retaliation shows that controlling others is risky. Then 
again, so is not exerting control. Many times a day, personnel have to ask 
themselves: Should I control a particular act by someone? If so, how? 
Every option has benefits and costs, though these vary by circumstance. 
Of course, those questions are not unique to coffeeshop personnel. We ask 
them of ourselves. We ask them of others. What, if anything, should be 
done to control something ‘bad’? This question is asked by and of every-
one: politicians, police, parents, lovers, teachers and more. If our guiding 
moral philosophy is hedonism,10 specifically the type preached by Jeremy 
Bentham,11 a ‘good’ approach is one with utility, meaning more benefit 
than cost; the ‘best’ approach is therefore that with the most utility.12
Does the Dutch coffeeshop policy have utility? The most honest 
answer I can give – indeed, that anyone can give – is ‘maybe’. A complete 
and accurate assessment of the policy’s benefits and costs is extremely 
difficult to generate. Perhaps it is impossible, if direct measurement and 
the variety of pleasures and pains are taken seriously.13 Certainly, my data 
preclude such an analysis. Even more certainly, I would be remiss to com-
pare the utility of Dutch coffeeshop policy to that of alternatives, such 
as a full-scale war on drugs or pure laissez-faire legalisation. There are 
too many factors to consider, such as effects on drug use, health, taxes, 
public expenditure, law enforcement, crime, nuisance and liberty.14 And 
then there is the problem of different morals leading to different ways of 
weighing each variable.
In these closing pages, allow me to share my thoughts as an indi-
vidual, not strictly in my role as a social scientist. In my teenage years 
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I believed legalisation and decriminalisation were better than prohibi-
tion for controlling cannabis. This belief stemmed from my personal pol-
icy: don’t tell me what to do; let me be me. My first trip to Amsterdam, 
described in the Preface, reaffirmed my view that ‘less is more’ in the 
realm of social control.15 Back in the States, first while in college and then 
graduate school, I gained understanding of what is wrong with prohibi-
tion: it is expensive; it puts many people behind bars; it breaks up family, 
friends and community cohesion; it exacerbates tension between police 
and citizens. Those are only a few of the problems.16
Yet my extended stay in Amsterdam taught me something about 
drug policy, and about social control more generally: in order to reduce 
bad things, people must be told both what to do and what not to do; their 
autonomy must be limited. People must be not only scared out of acting 
‘bad’ (i.e. deterred), but also scared into stopping others from doing so 
(i.e. proterred). It is not a sunny view of human nature, but I believe it 
is valid. Frequently I abstain from being bad due to fear of what would 
otherwise result. Don’t you do the same?17 To argue in favour of fear need 
not – should not, I hope – have draconian results. Again, if Bentham’s 
hedonism is our guide, the minimum amount of fear necessary to effect a 
‘good’ outcome is optimal. This is because fear, like punishment, is a cost, 
and more cost equates to less utility.18 To that point, fear is not only a bed-
fellow of prohibition and criminal punishment. Fear lies with rules and 
associated civil penalties, such as those controlling Dutch coffeeshops. 
Rules – formal and informal, de jure and de facto – guide decision-making 
and action.19 In theory, rules are effective to the extent they are clear, 
known and associated with larger, more certain and faster acting benefits 
and costs.20
A problem, it could be said, with criminalisation is that it lacks regu-
lation. Likewise I suspect that decriminalisation and legalisation are less 
effective when not paired with a set of rules that are properly crafted and 
enforced to achieve a set of goals. In Amsterdam, for instance, decrim-
inalisation per se is not what separates the markets for hard and soft 
drugs. Rather what works is giving coffeeshops an incentive – namely, 
the potential to profit openly from cannabis sales – to keep hard drugs 
away from users.
Nor is legalisation necessarily better than decriminalisation for 
reducing drug-related problems such as violence.21 It depends on the 
rules themselves. An example is that customer fights are 10 times less 
common in Amsterdam’s (decriminalised) coffeeshops than in (legal) 
bars.22 No doubt, the psychopharmacological effects of cannabis versus 
alcohol explain some of the difference.23 What also matters, however, is 
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that government rules motivate personnel of coffeeshops, more so than 
those of bars, to control problems.24 I will provide evidence of this in my 
research on violence, theft and destruction in Amsterdam’s coffeeshops.
Notes
 1. See MacCoun 2011; Monshouwer, van Laar and Vollebergh 2011; Reinarman 2009.
 2. For information on the moral dilemmas of punishment, see Bentham 1970 (1789).
 3. See Grund and Breeksema 2013; MacCoun 2011. For information on the types of drug-in-
volved pleasure, see Bunton and Coveney 2011; Holt and Treloar 2008; Jacques 2019.
 4. Of course, almost every policy is imperfect. Problems are to be expected and certain things 
may backfire, though these are not always predictable in concrete form (see Eck 2010, 2017; 
Freilich and Newman 2018).
 5. This objection should be weighed against its proterrent effect.
 6. See Black 1998. Cf. Emerson 2015.
 7. See Skinner 1971.
 8. For information on retaliation, see Anderson 1999; Black 1998; Collins 2009; Cooney 2009; 
Emerson 2015; Jacobs and Wright 2006.
 9. See AFP 2015. A street dealer, Shifran, described a rule-based conflict that led him to spit on a 
doorman: ‘This guy [who worked at a coffeeshop], he told me because I worked on the street 
too much [that] I could not come in his coffeeshop. I tell him, “Listen, I work on the street, but 
I never do business in your place man, so don’t fuck around with me.” He was a bouncer and 
I knew the day that he was working. It is the old, bald guy; the old man. I go there with three 
friends of mine, and he was not working that day, so I go inside. So I was sitting there maybe 
two or three hours, we had a lot of joints and I think the shifts changed and the guy came 
to work. The guy talks to me: “You have to go outside now. You know that you cannot come 
inside, blah, blah.” I tell him, “OK, I am going to finish my drink and then I will go outside.” He 
grabbed my drink. He said, “No, you cannot finish your drink. You have to go outside now, and 
if you don’t go outside I will put you outside.” I looked that man in the face. “I take my drink. 
I told you I will finish and then I will go outside.” The man took the drink and threw it in the 
sink. I spat in his face and I walked away, and the friends of mine came away with me. But as 
I am walking away he came to hit me. Yeah, he wanted to hit me, but the friends of mine were 
walking behind me and they grabbed him. Then the police came. Nothing happened. They 
broke it up. Nobody got arrested.’
10. Fairly so; not everyone will agree that hedonism should guide action.
11. Cf. Epicurus 2012.
12. Bentham 1970 (1789).
13. See Goldstein 1985; Nutt 2012; Jacques 2019.
14. For information on the complexity of drug policy and analysing it, see Houborg, Bjerge and 
Frank 2018. For examples, see Caulkins, Kilmer and Kleiman 2016; Caulkins and Reuter 2017; 
Kleiman 2009; MacCoun 2011; MacCoun and Reuter 1997, 2001; Nutt 2012; Pacula et al. 
2014.
15. This belief also reflects the code of the suburb (Jacques and Wright 2015).
16. See, among many others, Alexander 2012; Goffman 2014; Kleiman 2009; MacCoun and Reu-
ter 2001; Musto 1999; Nutt 2012; Phillips 2012; Provine 2007.
17. Some studies and meta-analyses indicate that fear is ineffective at preventing bad behaviour 
(Pratt et al. 2006). My guess is those findings are less indicative of reality than data problems 
(see National Research Council 2012). For information on drug prohibition’s deterrent effect, 
or lack thereof, see Bushway and Reuter 2011; Caulkins and Reuter 2010, 2017; Levine 2013; 
MacCoun and Reuter 2011; Reinarman 2009; Reinarman, Cohen and Kaal 2004.
18. See Bentham 1970 (1789).
19. See Goffman 1963, 1969; Graeber 2018. For example, this is seen in the ‘do’s’ and ‘don’ts’ as-
sociated with various forms of deviance or crime that prevent being discredited as an offender 
and punished as such (see Goffman 1963; Goffman, 2014; Jacobs 1996, 1999).
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20. See Beccaria 1995 (1764); Bentham, 1970 (1789). I am sure other factors matter too (see, for 
example, ideas examined in any criminology or penology theory textbook, handbook, ency-
clopedia or reader).
21. See Goldstein 1985.
22. Jacques et al. 2016.
23. See Boles and Miotto 2003; Felson et al. 2008; Meyerscough and Taylor 1985.
24. See Jacques et al. 2016.
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